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The decline in traditional methods of civic engagement is a cause for concern in 
many Western democracies. Similarly, studies of American party politics point to a 
transformation from locally-based volunteer organizations to national ones assisting 
candidate-centered, professionally-run campaigns, leaving little room for volunteer 
participants. This thesis analyses the recent resurgence of grassroots participation and 
organization in the United States. Using interpretive methods, I present a study of 
grassroots participants in Massachusetts Democratic Party primary campaigns in 
2006. Primary documents, interviews with volunteers and paid members of field 
staff, and observations of canvassing work all detail the personal and organizational 
contexts of participation, illuminating the meanings individuals found in campaign 
work. 
Grassroots participation takes place in a loosely organized set of candidate-based 
campaigns, local party committees, and civic spheres. When participants first engage 
in this environment, they become socialized into a community with learned norms, 
practices, and ways of knowing. While those interviewed shared some of the 
motivations of party activists in previous studies, the motives and beliefs described 
by both professional organizers and volunteers were less policy focused than 
expected, and blurred the distinction between ideological and social categories. 
Indeed, while organizers and volunteers build distinct identities through their 
campaign participation, they share many more similarities than the literature on 
activism and professionalism in parties would suggest.  
Participants also serve a crucial role as translators between party elites and their 
fellow citizens, with important implications for linkage and the problem of 
decoupling. Rather than a return to traditional methods and structures of political 
engagement, the participants observed take part in and are building communities 
which have much in common with new forms of non-traditional participation. These 
findings contribute to the development of party organization theories and point 
towards the need for greater dialogue between scholars of party politics, 
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On 3 November 2004 I sat in Faneuil Hall, Boston, and watched John Kerry, the 
Democratic candidate for President of the United States of America, deliver his 
concession speech after losing the election to George W. Bush. Exhausted and 
drained, I had walked over to Faneuil Hall with my fellow Kerry-Edwards campaign 
staff members who had made it to the office, and earlier that morning were busy 
answering the phone calls that came flooding in from all over the country as 
Democrats begged, pleaded, and demanded that Kerry contest the results in Ohio. 
Now I was crying on the shoulder of a woman who I did not even know, a staffer 
from another office who had also not slept in about three weeks and could only pat 
my hand and tell me that it would be all right – we did everything we could do to get 
him elected. It was a cathartic release after two of the most intense months I had ever 
experienced working on the Democratic nominee’s presidential campaign.  
Throughout that time, I was introduced to a world I previously had no idea existed. 
My job, as part of a team of fellow full time staffers, was organizing hundreds and 
then thousands of Massachusetts citizens to call, canvass, and volunteer in order to 
mobilize votes for Kerry in swing states, particularly New Hampshire and the Maine 
Second Congressional District.  When I got back to the office late on election night, 
having been up in New Hampshire helping out with get out the vote (GOTV) efforts 
during the day, my friend Tom proudly reported that they had so many people show 
up to make get out the vote calls that there was actually nowhere left to sit in the 
entire building-wide office. Volunteers were making calls on their cell phones 
standing in the lobby, the stairwell, outside the front door, and even in the elevator. 
By the end of the day volunteers were still calling Hawaii, and our phone bank had 
made more than 100,000 GOTV calls in a single day. 
Nothing prepared me for the many people I would meet who devoted their time, 
energy and passion to trying to get Kerry elected that year. Nor could anything have 





that experience, not just for me but for the many other volunteers, canvassers and 
staff members who were mobilized – some for the first time, some again after a long 
period away from politics, and some after steady years of experience. I did not know 
what, but something was going on, and I wanted to find out more. What was all this 
grassroots participation? And what did it look like from the viewpoint of those who 
were actually doing it? This latter question would become the primary one for my 
PhD, and the one that I address in this thesis. 
In addition to staying involved in the world of Democratic campaigning in Boston, 
Massachusetts, I began reading more about political participation. When I found 
copies of the just-published American Political Science Association report at my 
local bookstore on the state of political participation in America, published in late 
2005, I eagerly picked it up to find out how the academy addressed this question of 
what participation is and what was currently happening with it. Imagine my surprise 
then when, upon turning to the first page, I read that “American democracy is at risk” 
because people just weren’t participating the way they used to (Macedo et al 2005: 
1). Clearly, something did not add up between what I was reading and what I was 
doing.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
According to the American Political Science Association report on political 
participation, American democracy is at risk because “Americans have turned away 
from politics and the public sphere in large numbers, leaving our civic life 
impoverished. Citizens participate in public affairs less frequently, with less 
knowledge and enthusiasm, in fewer venues, and less equally than is healthy for a 
vibrant democratic polity” (Macedo et al 2005: 1). 
Yet the 2004 presidential election demonstrated that Americans were coming to the 
polls, they were reading the news and participating in public affairs with a passion. In 
2004 one could find any number of problems regarding the long term health of the 
nation to be unhappy about, but the lack of citizen engagement as indicated by the 
presidential election was surely not one of them. Indeed, the authors of Democracy at 
Risk noted that there did appear to be an uptick in reading the news and paying 
attention to politics immediately following September 11th, and marginal increase in 
traditional forms of political participation such as voter and campaign participation. 
But this tentative acknowledgement was only a pause before detailing the myriad of 
problems with civic engagement at almost every level. 
More puzzling was the fact that there was very little attention paid in Democracy at 
Risk to political organizations, and especially parties. While there is an entire chapter 
devoted to ‘Associational life and the nonprofit and philanthropic sector,’ there is no 
entry for ‘political parties,’ ‘Democratic Party,’ or ‘Republican Party’ in the index. 
Nor are there entries for campaign organizations, so that while considerable attention 
is devoted to levels of voter turnout, the length of the campaign season, campaign 
finance (which is listed in the index), and a host of institutional factors such as the 
electoral college and voter registration laws, there is almost no account given of 
parties or campaigns – perhaps the single most visible kind of ‘political organization’ 
in America. Further, among the seventeen listed recommendations of how to fix 
declining citizen participation in elections, none address what political organizations 
could do, and only three indirectly – by way of talking about processes – indicate 
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where political organizations might fit in. How is it that a book published by leading 
political scientists and devoted to the issue of declining political and civic 
participation can not talk about the organizations in which participation takes place? 
Ostensibly, participating in a campaign requires at least a modicum of organization in 
order for people to have something to participate in. But such dimensions do not 
appear, except in passing reference, in Democracy at Risk. 
The volume may be but one publication of many on political participation, but this 
omission of political organizations, and especially party organizations, is 
symptomatic of the way questions about political participation are treated in general. 
The paradox is that while political scientists may be deeply concerned about the state 
of political participation in the present day, current research agendas do not always, 
or even frequently, address the role of party and campaign organizations with respect 
to questions about civic and political participation.1 Conversely, while research on 
political parties is increasingly turning back towards questions regarding rank-and-
file membership and participation, these questions are often framed without reference 
to broader debates on the healthiness of political participation in society.2 And while 
studies of campaigning tactics have more recently begun to address both the effects 
and normative questions regarding voter turnout, these studies, by the very 
experimental design which makes their results so strong, do not really focus on 
campaigning or party organizations either.3 Rather than a gap in the field, then, this 
omission would seem to be a gap between different fields of research.  
The literature that does specifically address participation in collective political 
organizations, like parties, is often equally concerned with the question of declining 
participation and the attendant long-term health of party organizations which rely on 
member resources, yet this discussion happens almost in parallel to the question of 
civic decline. Thus whilst party membership (where applicable) and campaign 
                                                            
1 The same omission of either party organizations or campaign organizations in work addressing 
political and/or civic decline can be found in Putnam (2000); Skocpol and Fiorina (1999); Crenson 
and Ginsberg (2000); Cramer Walsh (2004); and Dalton (1996). 
2 E.g. Bennie (2004); Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992, 1995); Scarrow (1996); Seyd and Whitely (1992, 
2002); Whitely and Seyd (1998); Whitely Seyd and Richardson (1994) 
3 E.g. Bergan, Gerber and Green (2005); Gerber, Green and Schachar (2003); Gerber and Green 
(2000, 2001); Green and Gerber (2004); Green, Gerber and Nickerson (2003); Nickerson (2005, 2006, 
2007); Nickerson, Friedrich and King (2006); Vavreck, Spilotes and Fowler (2002). 
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activism is held up as proof of declining participation, the relationship between party 
organizational decline and civic decline is rarely discussed.  
Further, this research on participation in collective political organizations is primarily 
shaped through rational choice frameworks, in which the costs of participation are 
weighed against its benefits, is hugely influential in the research on active 
participation in collectives, such as party organizations. But rational choice may be 
so successful that the limitations of this approach are now more glaring than the 
parsimonious benefits its authors first brought forth. Rational choice theory has 
become so dominant that alternative explanations or research agendas are either 
squeezed into a rational choice framework when they may better be left outside it, or 
are not researched altogether. 
One of the omissions that may partially be tied to the predominance rational choice-
based research is a focus on participation as a practice. Because in rational choice the 
issue of participation is framed as one of deciding whether or not to invest resources 
(time, energy, or money) into collective action in order to receive the benefits, 
‘participation’ is conceptualized as an equation. This leaves the actual act of 
participating as an under-theorized middle that is of relatively little interest, except as 
it relates to the conception of costs and benefits. Setting the practice of participation 
in the theoretical background means that questions which arise from practice are 
harder to access and even harder to research. Questions which look at how people 
think, do, act, and interact as part of the practice of participation find less room in 
rational choice – unless, of course, these dimensions can either be translated into 
costs or benefits. 
Why bother asking about the practice of participation at all? First of all, asking about 
practice without limiting the question to costs or benefits opens up enquiry into how 
participants themselves think about participation along other dimensions – meaning, 
knowing, and ways of doing. Second, asking about practice re-contextualizes 
participation. While questions about costs and benefits can often be phrased in 
abstract language, discussing participation as practice and how people practice it 
necessitates explaining and understanding the context in which it is practiced. Taken 
together then, practice is people doing concrete things in concrete contexts. 
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As in the tradition of theorizing from empirical research, I believe that asking about 
these additional dimensions of participation can result in a fuller understanding of 
what the concept of political participation entails and how it may be different in 
different contexts. By asking ‘what does participation look like from your point of 
view?’ we may be able to go on to understand how people’s understanding of 
participation varies across experiences and contexts. Rather than a presumed 
universal conception of participation in terms of the costs and benefits, we may better 
understand the circumstances under which people think about their participation 
rationally, strategically, culturally, personally, or through any other set of 
interpretations. Practice refocuses the analytical lens on how people experience 
participation and the context in which it is experienced. 
Asking about practice necessarily involves moving beyond the analytical toolbox 
provided in rational choice theory or purely instrumental frameworks, and therefore 
in this thesis I use an interpretative approach to understanding participation. More 
specifically, I draw on the research and tools developed through interpretative theory 
and research, which requires the researcher to “grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action” (Bryman 2008: 16). An interpretative approach assumes not that there is one 
objective truth, but that research should aim to uncover the meanings which 
individuals construct, share, and take for granted through their everyday lives and 
activities. This is well suited to asking questions about how people experience 
participation, and for the purpose of understanding as part of the process of 
theorization. Of course, not all studies of participation in political organizations are 
done within a rational choice framework, and I draw from alternative sources on 
participation where relevant. But one of the key advantages of an interpretative 
approach is that it provides a coherent body of research and attendant methods to 
work with.  
Asking about participation as a practice in context also addresses the issue of re-
introducing political organizations back into the debate about civic engagement more 
broadly. From the perspective of participants, as I will show, it is not so easy to 
create a prophylactic boundary between political party participation, on the one hand, 
and civic participation on the other. Participation-as-practice shows up the divisions 
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created in the research on political engagement, and offers a way to bring disparate 
fields of enquiry back into the same academic conversation.  
In order to study participation as practice, one needs people doing real things in real 
contexts. In this thesis, I use a case study of grassroots workers – both volunteers and 
field organizers4 – participating in the Massachusetts Democratic Party primary 
election campaigns5 in 2006. Massachusetts presented the opportunity to work with a 
relatively concentrated body of grassroots volunteers and campaign organizers, many 
of whom had recent experience on the 2004 presidential campaigns and were 
currently involved in state-level politics. One of the benefits of this case study was 
competitive primary elections to be the Party’s choice for Governor and Lieutenant 
Governor, as well as competitive primaries in down-ticket races. Unlike so many 
electoral campaigns in the US where incumbency is the deciding factor, the extent to 
which these races were open meant there was a spirited electoral season involving 
significant grassroots campaigning by multiple candidate and party campaign 
organizations. In many ways, the case of participants in Massachusetts Democratic 
Party primary campaigns is not representative of all participants in all parts of the 
US, or even all parts of the Democratic Party – but the reasons which made it non-
representative are also the reasons which make it a useful case for the studying how 
people practice participation on an everyday basis.  
Box 1.1 summarizes the research question, aims, approach, and case. In this chapter, 
I will first expand on the primary paradoxes, laid out above, and articulate subsidiary 
research questions in greater detail. For each research question, I will contrast one 
common way of framing the issue with an interpretative alternative, which will be 
sketched out in greater detail below. Finally, I finish by highlighting key 
contributions this thesis will make to discussions about political participation, party 
organizations, organizations and learning.  
 
                                                            
4 Note that “worker” is meant as a generic term for anyone who does work in a political campaign. 
This study is concerned with different worker roles in the field division of campaigns – “volunteers” 
and “field organizers.” These terms will be discussed in more depth in the coming chapters. 
5 In Massachusetts (as in many other states), Democratic Party candidates for office in the general 
election are selected via an open primary election. The Democratic Party primary election in 2006 











Box 1.1 Research Question, Aims, Approach and Case 
Research Questions: How do campaign volunteers and workers understand their own 
political participation? What do participants do when they are participating? 
Aims: To reach a greater understanding of how participants understand their own 
participation. To use these understandings to build a more complete theorization of 
‘participation.’ To identify key contextual dimensions of participation for future research. 
Strategy: Interpretative, as especially developed in policy analysis. 
Case: Grassroots volunteers and workers in the 2006 Massachusetts Democratic Party 
primary campaigns. 
 
The problem of civic decline – and transformation 
By the mid 1990s, something like a consensus was developing among scholars of 
civic participation that was not unlike the consensus developing among party 
scholars: civic life and participation was in a crisis. This is the consensus that is 
captured in Democracy at Risk, and the main components of this narrative are now 
widely familiar. Compared to mid-twentieth century activity, fewer people were 
voting, campaigning, reading the newspapers, talking about politics, joining political 
parties, staying members of cross-class civic organizations, or even bowling (Putnam 
2000). While most pronounced and researched in the US, other western democracies 
were experiencing broadly similar trends (Dalton 1996). The decline is most marked 
for face-to-face activities which are most productive of social capital, leading to a 
whole host of civic ills beyond the mere lack of participation: declining trust in 
political institutions, disappearing bonds between citizens, and between citizens and 
elites. 
Yet almost immediately, other scholars pointed out that the story was slightly more 
complicated, and may not be so much a case of decline as transformation. While 
recognizing the decline of some activities like voting, Dalton (1996: 51) pointed out 
that participation in campaigns actually held steady. Macedo et al  (2005: 27-28) use 
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the declining number of high school seniors thought they may get involved in 
campaign work as an indicator of declining campaign participation, but Dalton points 
out that if political contributions to campaigns and campaign work are taken together, 
campaign participation stays at the same rate. So part of the issue is that the ways in 
which people take part in politics are changing: it is not just a decline in face-to-face 
participation, but an attendant rise in ‘checkbook’ participation. This trend is 
worrisome in its own right for some scholars of participation, as Crenson and 
Ginsberg argue that such forms of thin democracy (Barber 1984) do not include the 
vital elements of influence, knowledge, and engagement that face-to-face 
participation involve (Crenson and Ginsberg 2000).  
Theda Skocpol documents a similar concern in the changing civic organizational 
membership patterns of elected state and local representatives (Skocpol 2003). The 
decline of cross-class, mass member civic organizations such as veteran’s groups, 
Elks Lodges, and the Loyal Order of Moose, meant that citizens had fewer chances to 
rub shoulders with their elected state and local representatives, or to participate in 
national organizations with the capability of lobbying the federal government over 
issues which concerned them (Skocpol 2003, 2005, Skocpol et al 1999). The 
subsequent rise in the number of management-based organizations or non-profits 
aimed at lobbying the federal government and providing social services in the mid-
twentieth century filled part of the organizational void left by disappearing Elks 
Lodges, but with two important differences. First, these new organizations presented 
fewer opportunities for cross-class engagement, and elite actors, such as legislators, 
had fewer chances to hear directly from constituents and fellow citizens who were 
more ‘ordinary’ in terms of their socio-economic status. Similarly, those ‘ordinary’ 
citizens had fewer opportunities to interact with political elites and to lobby 
representatives directly and on their own behalf. 
Second, the shift in focus to government lobbying and applications to federal funds 
was undertaken by ‘professional’ staff and boards of directors meaning that fewer 
citizens were actually participating and interacting with government. When 
professionals undertake the lion’s share of the work interacting with government, 
there are that many fewer citizens who participate.   
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In all of these cases, what appears to be happening is not that civic engagement has 
simply stopped, but it has changed in ways which are important in terms of our 
understanding of what counts as meaningful participation for democracy. The 
activities have changed from social capital-rich face-to-face interactions to social 
capital-poor check writing. Where the organizations are the same, as the campaign 
example shows, the circumstances have changed, with some negative implications 
for political participation. It is not just about whether people vote or not, or canvass 
or not, but how they participation that matters. 
Even still, these accounts only tell one part of the story. At the same time that 
participation in traditional activities like voting and associational organization 
membership are declining, participation in some traditional forms like donating 
money to political campaigns are and in non-traditional are increasing. In her cross-
national comparison of political participation, Pippa Norris (2002) argues that 
actually what is happening is a broader shift towards new, non-traditionalist forms of 
participation. Importantly, this model of changing participation takes into account the 
changing political world in which participation takes place. States and government 
are not the same in the 1990s as they were in the 1950s and 1960s: between 
globalization of trade and the civil rights movement, the structures which citizens 
attempt to exercise influence through participation are changing too. So why should 
participation stay the same? The emphasis here – and it is one that Dalton (2008) 
similarly makes in his account of changing citizenship norms – is that people adapt 
their forms of participation to meet the changing macro-contexts of participation. 
In their work on participation (each somewhat independently), David Marsh and 
Henrik Bang, each with their co-authors, take this argument of change and 
participation one step further to argue that the entire notion of what counts as 
political needs to be re-assessed. Marsh, O’Toole and Jones (2007) emphasize the 
different notions of what counts as political among young people, and especially 
differences among ethnic minorities and across class lines. What appears political to 
the young people they spoke with – non-white and white citizens interacting in 
everyday social settings, such as a doctor’s office – does not fit into the traditional 
notions of what counts as political acts. Therefore, the traditional definitions of 
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political participation miss out on important aspects of participation today and may 
emphasize decline over transformation. By looking at those everyday activities, 
contexts and acts which are not state-focused but understood as political by the 
people in their study, Marsh, O’Toole and Jones show how the concept of political 
participation itself is changing.  
Similarly, Henrik Bang argues that the shift away from government and towards 
governance shapes the space for participation in important ways. Drawing from their 
study of ‘Democracy from below’ in Denmark, Bang and Sorensen sketch out two 
new identities for political participation, the ‘Expert Citizen’ and the ‘Everyday 
Maker’ (Bang 2004, 2005, Bang and Sorensen 2001). The ‘Expert Citizen’ is like 
Crenson’s or Skocpol’s professional in that they take part as full-time employees of 
organizations that are part of elite governance networks. ‘Everyday Makers’, on the 
other hand, have built their identity in response to governance networks and 
challenge Expert Citizens to stay connected to the world of everyday life and politics 
(Bang 2004). Rather than focusing exclusively on the state or on formal channels of 
influence, Everyday Makers emphasize thinking globally and acting locally (Bang 
and Sorensen 2001).  
While these latter examples are drawn from UK, European and comparative research, 
they are crucial developments in recognizing the changing profiles of the people who 
participate and the contexts of participation. And while Norris and Bang emphasize 
the changes in macro-structures, Bang also (along with Marsh et al) highlight how 
people may perceive or construct the narratives of their own participation, or their 
own accounts of ‘political’, which differ from the accepted definitions of these 
concepts. Taken all together, this debate about the decline or transformation of civic 
and political participation serves to highlight the importance of the form that 
participation takes for broader normative assessments. Does it matter how people 
practice participation – if it is professional or volunteer, if it is state focused or 
society focused? And what do these different categories of ‘volunteer,’ 
‘professional’, ‘state’ or ‘society’ mean?  
My first subsidiary research question addresses these issues. What are the qualitative 
similarities and differences between different forms of participation, and how do 
16 
 
these forms relate to broader changes in politics? Within my case study, I spoke to 
participants in a variety of roles within the division of grassroots field work 
campaigning. These roles can be broadly separated into grassroots volunteers and 
campaign staff field organizers, and I compare these two roles – volunteers and 
organizers – to draw out the questions of qualitative similarities and differences.  
 
Party Organization: decline and transformation 
At the same time as some researchers have been worried about civic decline, scholars 
of party politics have also been asking questions about party decline. Because these 
questions of party decline rest on particular conceptions of party organization, and 
because they highlight the paradoxes of participation in parties from which the 
research questions arise, I address the party decline thesis in detail here. While this 
thesis of party decline has some similarities with the civic decline thesis, rarely do 
the two narratives reference one another.  
Parties are difficult to define, but generally fall into one of two categories: one that 
focuses on party structure, and one that focuses on party functions.  The party 
structure tradition is best represented in V.O. Key’s work identifying the three ‘faces’ 
of the party as the party in government, party in the electorate, and the party 
organization (Key 1964). Each face works in concert, and sometimes at odds with the 
other in a sort of loose coalition, coming together during key processes such as 
elections. Alternatively, parties are identified by the functions they fill in terms of the 
nomination of candidates for office, the running of elections, providing a platform or 
program of policies, and so on (Souraf and Beck 1988). 
In the immediate postwar conception of American parties, the voluntary party 
organization was of chief importance, structured in a loosely decentralized, bottom-
up system, responsible for running election campaigns. Unlike the mass party system 
that Michels (1949) identified in which power was centralized among a few party 
leaders and sub-leaders, Eldersveld identified in his study of the Democratic Party in 
Detroit, Michigan a much more decentralized, fragmented system of ‘stratarchy’ in 
which, contra Michels’ few oligarchs with control lorded over the whole 
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organization, there were ‘little oligarchs’ in each town and county who were 
responsible for carrying out the party’s duties of selecting candidates and running 
campaigns (Eldersveld 1964: 99). These local party leaders did so with little to no 
central coordination, often working with the vestiges of the machine politics system 
and a network of volunteers loyal to the party’s aims of winning elections. The flow 
of resources, and thus influence, went from these decentralized and fragmented 
committees, to the state parties, who then passed financial resources on to a weak and 
relatively unimportant national committee (Kayden 1985: 4).  
In hindsight, scholars of the party decline thesis emphasized that this system of 
running elections could work because the party in the electorate – the voters – had 
strong party attachments, based on ethnic ties to the parties and their previous social 
attachments (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller 
and Stokes 1960). From this static notion of parties came several changes which 
shook the notion of parties as being relatively strong and stable. The party decline 
thesis, as it pertains to parties in the United States, is based largely on the consistent 
observation of three phenomena. First, the insurgence of issue activists into parties 
fueled speculation that they would no longer be able to perform their essential 
compromising function, and would fail to operate well in a left-right ideological 
continuum (Kirkpatrick 1976). Around the same time, the advent of the direct 
primary for the selection of all candidates robbed parties of one of their essential 
functions (Kayden 1985, Souraf and Beck 1988). Polling and survey research also 
showed a consistent decline in the number of voters who identified with a party: 
voters, it seems, were no longer that interested in parties (Wattenberg 1998: 3).  
Finally, the advent of candidate centered campaigns, run by consultants and for-hire 
professionals replaced the traditional role of the party organization in running and 
staffing election campaigns. According to Wattenberg (2002: 66), Banfield and 
Wilson (1963) “were among the first to note the impact of technology on parties 
when they ascribed to television the weakening of the importance of an American 
precinct captain’s visits.” Just as the use of TV as a communication tool replaced 
face-to-face conversation with friends, neighbors, and family about politics, so too 
did the personnel for communicating with voters change, from precinct captains and 
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ward heelers to professional men and women schooled in the arts of TV advertising 
and polling. In this brave new world of candidate-centered campaigning, candidates 
were expected to build their own personal campaigns, relying on an “organization 
composed of friends, followers, and nonparty groups” (Souraf and Beck: 299). While 
local party organizations could offer assistance in terms of volunteers to do some of 
the door-knocking and such, these activities were largely extraneous – and so, too, 
were party organizations. As they no longer carried out the essential campaigning 
functions, having handed these over to the professional men and women who ran TV 
ad wars based on the use of sophisticated polling techniques and emphasized the 
candidate’s personal characteristics, party organizations no longer commanded a 
powerful role in the party (Brox and Shaw 2006).6 As Souraf and Beck note (1988: 
299), these shifts in campaigning meant that the party was weaker both inside its own 
organization and out in the electorate. The result, as veteran political journalist David 
Broder declared in the title of his book, was clear: The Party’s Over (Broder 1972). 
But this concept of decline was soon rivaled by another thesis – of party 
transformation. Local party organizations may not have played a key role in 
campaigns any more, but parties adapted through a process of nationalization and 
institutionalization. This transformation included several elements: the strengthening 
of the Democratic and Republican National Committees and changes in the finance 
laws and structures, the growth of the national and state party bureaucracies, and the 
continued relative unimportance of local party organizations and volunteers. All in 
all, the result was that party organizations transformed themselves from a largely 
mass-based, delegate style organization into a bureaucracy whose primary function 
and viability came from their role as “service organizations” to the candidates (Bibby 
1994). The party was not over, just different.  
As Xandra Kayden (1985) notes, in the post-reform era the Republican Party was 
much quicker than their Democratic counterparts to transition from a set of 
decentralized, loosely coordinated state and local organizations into a national 
institution. Coupled with changing finance laws and structures, bolstered National, 
Senate and Congressional (House) Campaign Committees began to take a larger role 
                                                            
6 There are those who note that party activists continued to play a crucial role in selecting candidates 
through the primaries (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Fiorina 2004).  
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in marshalling the ‘new’ resources candidates would need to run campaigns – 
polling, consultancy expertise, and money (Green 2006). The result was that while in 
previous years resources and influence flowed from the state parties to a weak 
national committee, now the arrows were reversed – resources, and therefore 
influence, flowed from the national party to the state organizations (Bibby 1994, 
Cotter and Bibby 1980, Jewell and Olson 1982, Kayden 1985). This change produced 
revitalized state parties that worked as service organizations, consisting of 
permanently staffed party headquarters. The ‘new’ party bureaucracy provided 
campaign trainings for candidates and organized local party volunteers into get-out-
the-vote efforts as “auxiliaries” to the candidate’s campaigns (Herrnson 1994, 
Huckshorn and Bibby 1982: 99).  
While this emphasis on the new party bureaucracy does include improved GOTV 
efforts in with the other services provided, on further examination the evidence 
seems somewhat more mixed. Kayden declares that “local parties, which were 
populated by volunteers, no longer play a strong role in American politics” (1985: 4). 
It is also important to note that the Democratic Party lagged behind the Republican 
Party through much of the 1980s and 1990s in its organizing efforts (Galvin 2008), 
so the extent to which party transformation and state party organization 
reorganization is linked to get-out-the-vote efforts depends in part on which party 
one uses as a data set or case study. For those concerned with the Democratic Party, 
like Weir and Ganz (1997), voter mobilization and grassroots efforts continued to be 
anemic through the mid-1990s.  
Meanwhile, those professional men and women, especially those who could provide 
strategic advice, media training, research and polling, came to provide a more central 
and powerful role. They were the object of referral that party organizations would 
provide to new candidates. And as Johnston (2001) argues, they were the ones calling 
the shots. Even if there were volunteers doing some get-out-the-vote work, such 
activists were marginal campaign decision-making. 
Taking the party decline and party transformation arguments together, it is clear that 
they highlight related changes in the party structures and processes. Indeed, as 
Schlesinger (1985) argues, it is the very weakness of the party in the electorate which 
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forced party organizations to become stronger, investing more resources in 
campaigning and turning out what little section of their core vote remained. While 
some, like Broder (1972) claimed that the party organization has completely fallen 
apart, this appears to refer to a specific section of the party organization – the 
traditional delegate system and voluntary organization – and a particularly bad point 
in time for the parties – the late 1960s and early 1970s. Those that point out the 
strength of the party organization highlight what grew afterwards – strong 
bureaucratic organizations which worked directly with the candidate campaign 
organizations. The only group to consistently lose out in all these changes thus 
appears to be the activists and participants involved at the local level. When 
consigned to party organizations, they play, at best, an auxiliary role. And while there 
are those “friends and supporters” who join a candidate’s campaign, most of the real 
work is done by professionals and consultants who devise strategy, undertake the 
important message crafting, and decide when and how it will be delivered through 
mass media (Norris 2000). 
This, then, was the story - up until the present moment. As Galvin (2008) has argued, 
the Democratic Party invested money and time since the mid-1990s in rebuilding the 
state party organizations above and beyond what was being done in the 1980s. Thus, 
Howard Dean was able to capitalize on the investments of his predecessors in getting 
the party out of debt and building infrastructure by the time a wave of progressive 
sentiment swept him into the DNC Chairmanship in 2004. Since then, a very public 
debate has been unfolding as to the value of his 50-state strategy (Kamarck 2008), 
but the most important point here is that any gains in terms of a strong party 
organization at the state level has taken place within the context of an overall shifted 
landscape in which candidate campaign organizations and mass- or micro-targeted 
media have been considered the dominant way of running election campaigns. 
Moreover, political campaigns have also been returning to the use of labor intensive 
‘field work’ campaigns to identify and mobilize a candidate’s supporters (Brox and 
Shaw 2006). Indeed, this was the type of work I was involved in during the 2004 
presidential campaign. Far from being exclusive to presidential politics, field work 
may be undergoing something of a revival at the state, local, and national level. For 
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the Democratic Party, this may be the combination of shifting strategies by 
candidates themselves and from longer term re-investment in state party 
organizations (Galvin 2008).  
My first research question draws from this narrative of party organization decline, 
professionalization and revival, and then grassroots revival. The first concerns 
organization. If every candidate for the party (or candidate running for a spot on the 
party ticket) has their own campaign organization, and if party organizations are 
increasingly providing both professional and amateur participants for candidate 
campaigns, then it may be more a case of party organizations than a singular party 
organization. Thus, what do party organizations look like from the viewpoint of 
grassroots participants? If multiple organizations are involved in organizing and 
doing grassroots field work – i.e., identifying and mobilizing voters – then the 
question of organization necessitates further clarification. Asking ‘what is an 
organization?’ also implies that there may be more than one way to conceive it, and 
thus move beyond the solely instrumental and structural definitions of party 
organizations.  
 
Parties and the civic-political research gap 
In the same volume which draws out the account of changing forms of political 
participation from traditional to non-traditional, Pippa Norris identifies three 
different ‘levels’ of factors that are important for participation (Norris 2002). On the 
macro-level, the overall level of socioeconomic development as well as state 
institutions, constitution and electoral laws, and the party system can account for the 
variation between different quantities and forms of participation in different nation-
states. On the micro-level, the motivations that people have for participation, the 
resources that are available – including time, money, access, education, and political 
interest – are all important determinants of participation. And on the meso-level are 
‘mobilizing agencies’ – e.g. churches, unions, parties, movements and the media – 
which, when coupled with micro-factors, leads to certain levels and forms of political 
activism (Norris 2002: 20). 
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Using Norris’ framework to read the layout of Democracy at Risk helps to clarify 
what the latter volume covers and excludes. Democracy at Risk focuses on those 
institutional and macro-factors, such as electoral laws and institutions (including the 
Electoral College), and it focuses on micro-factors, such as political interest, 
knowledge, and resources. In terms of meso-factors, however, it deals exclusively 
with the non-party ‘agencies’: unions, churches, nonprofit and charitable 
organizations. This excludes both social movements and party organizations. 
Norris similarly distinguishes between parties and social organizations, separating 
the latter into associations (churches, unions, nonprofit organizations) and social 
movements. The important difference is that while Norris studies the latter two to ask 
questions about social capital, the study of political party membership is restricted to 
the question of ‘who joins?’ and ‘why do people join parties?’ These different 
research questions, between political parties, on the one hand, and social and civic 
associations and movements,7 on the other, make the theoretical treatment of meso-
organizations that much less coherent. 
Such a separation of political parties from civic concerns did not come about by 
accident, but grew out of, and in response to, the progressive reform movement of the 
early 20th century. For instance, Robert Putnam uses the example of turn-of-the-
twentieth-century women’s reading groups and temperance unions as important 
institutions which created social capital (Putnam 2000). These civic organizations are 
Putnam’s ideal fountains of social capital, a kind of civic institution which produces 
trust and all sorts of other social goods. But as Clemens point out, these women’s 
institutions were not just civic groups – they were very much political players of the 
day, lobbying government and mobilizing their members for political goals (Clemens 
1999). Not only were they political, but they were also an important part of the 
progressive movement. One of the chief goals of the progressive movement was to 
reform city and state government institutions and breaks the power of political party 
machines. While anti-party sentiment is not exclusive to the US (Ware 2006), the 
particular development of scholarly research on direct democracy and citizen 






movement. In this sense, what Katz refers to as the conspicuous marginality and 
absence of political parties in the work on civic engagement and the “impact of 
democracy on the human development of citizens” is not at all surprising, but logical 
(Katz 2006: 42).  
My next subsidiary research question is aimed at addressing this gap between studies 
of parties and studies of civic engagement. Does participation in party campaigns 
produce democratic benefits similar to those theorized for civic engagement? If so, 
how? If party organizations have undergone a series of changes in the past fifty years 
and those changes provide different opportunities for participation, then perhaps what 
is happening in parties is relevant for questions of civic engagement and decline. In 
answering this question, I will look at participation within the framework of focusing 
on the links between voters, participants, and elites that may be produced through 
grassroots field work. 
 
Rational choice and the paradox of participation 
By now, the essentials of a rational choice theory are so widely known that they need 
little introduction or elaboration. Yet at the time of publication, both Downs (1957) 
and Olson (1965) were arguing against the prevailing logic of a pluralist perspective 
which saw citizens ‘naturally’ collecting into groups in order to achieve collective 
goods (e.g. Truman 1951). Rational choice theory turned the study of participation on 
its head by using an economic model of human choice to show that participation in 
collective action was the unnatural choice. Any rational individual would choose to 
free ride and gain the benefits of collective action without having to expend any 
effort. By starting from the point that people are not inherently political but self-
interested, Mancur Olson (1965) elegantly argued that without coercive methods on 
the part of the collective organization (such as the closed union shop), participation 
would not take place. By foregrounding the problems of collective action and the 
tendency for individuals to act selfishly, rational choice theory highlights the 
difficulties inherent in organizing for collective ends (Mansbridge 1990, 1995). 
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Rational choice theory has elicited as many critics as supporters, profoundly shaping 
the study of political participation. Even those who could in one sense be deemed 
critics go on to modify rational choice and incentives theory rather than reject it 
outright for the discussion of participation. Thus Terry Moe (1980) argues that 
Olson’s almost exclusive focus on economic incentives offers a picture of only a 
sliver of human motivation, and then goes on to use the same basic concept but 
broaden the motivational spectrum to include beliefs and emotions as important for 
participation as well.  Overall, this is the approach largely taken to explain why 
people participate in collective endeavors such as movements, parties, and 
organizations: a combination of incentives based on material benefits, ideological 
benefits, and process benefits (e.g. Katz 1990; Norris 2002; Seyd and Whitely 1992; 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995 among others). 
While rational choice then tends to frame and then answer one central paradox of 
participation – why do people participate against their own economic self-interest? – 
it also leaves other paradoxes untouched or, in some cases, creates new ones. The 
most important result of this framework with respect to the research agenda of this 
thesis is that by focusing on individuals as self-interested, instrumental, and rational, 
rational choice downplays the other ways that individuals are or may perceive 
themselves – as members of a collective group, as creators of inter-subjective 
meaning, and as producers and beneficiaries of collective knowledge, norms, 
practices and ways of doing participation.  
This oversight can be demonstrated to turning back to Norris’ micro-, meso-, and 
macro-level framework. The meso-level of ‘agencies’ ostensibly covers the role of 
parties, movements, and the like. Yet the discussion in the chapters on meso-level 
organizations still uses the rational choice incentives framework to ask why people 
get involved in participation. Thus instead of addressing what could be collective 
practices, patterns, understandings, or cultures, the ‘meso’ level chapters are devoted 
to explaining why individual participants take part in collective agencies. Even when 
authors such as Scarrow focus on what parties do, it is still within the rational choice 
framework and therefore focused on the provision of rewards for individual benefits. 
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This research is important and insightful in its own right, but it also represents a 
missed opportunity to discuss collective aspects of participation. 
My final two subsidiary research questions address this oversight. What meanings, as 
well as motives, do participants draw from participation? And how do participants 
learn to participate? Each of these questions aims to access and understand those 
aspects of participation which exist intersubjectively and collectively and thus are 
outwith the ability of rational choice and incentives frameworks to fully explain.  
To recap, I have identified two main research questions and five subsidiary research 
questions. These are summarized in Box 1.2. Each of the subsidiary questions 
articulates a specific dimension of looking at participation in practice and relates it to 
paradoxes or gaps between existing literature on political parties and participation.  
 
Box 1.2 Primary and Subsidiary Research Questions 
Primary research questions:  
How do campaign volunteers and workers understand their own participation?  
What do participants do when they are participating? 
Subsidiary research questions: 
What does party organization look like from the viewpoint of grassroots 
participants? 
What meanings, as well as motives, do participants draw from participation? 
How do participants learn to participate? 
What are the qualitative similarities and differences between different forms of 
participation? 
Does participation in party campaigns produce democratic benefits similar to those 
theorized for civic engagement? If so, how?
 
The plan for the thesis 
The next chapter discusses the research design, including the research questions, 
aims, and strategy; the case study and criteria for assessment; and data collection and 
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analysis methods. Chapters three through seven present the primary analysis of data 
and research questions.  
Chapter three begins by asking about party organization. Within the context of asking 
about participation, the interaction between individuals and organizations is framed 
as a solely instrumental relationship. Participants come to organizations in order to 
achieve their goals, and organizations attract members by providing incentives for 
participation. However, this seems to address only one way of imagining 
organization, and it does not take into account the actual fact of multiple grassroots 
organizations that participants take part in. Chapter three thus addresses the question 
of how participants perceive and take part in ‘organization’ at the grassroots level. I 
start by looking at participants accounts of the pathways they take into politics and 
the antecedents to participation, not in order to ask about motives but to ask about 
which grassroots organizations feature prominently in these experiences. I then look 
at participants’ reports of organizational involvement over a longer period of time 
and sketch out a participatory context that consists of several organizations and 
personal networks spread over a period of involvement that may stretch beyond any 
one campaign season to months and even years. I finish by linking these experiences 
with a cultural view of organization which foregrounds the shared norms, practices, 
and knowledge that participants develop of the course of a career of participation. 
Using the question of first getting involved to discuss organization instead of 
individual motives presents an alternative to the usual construction of understanding 
motives as prior to political activity. In order to really understand why participants 
describe the motives they do and find participation meaningful, the reader must first 
know about, and understand, the context in which participation takes place. 
Chapter four picks up where chapter three leaves off with the concept of joining an 
organizational culture. This chapter focuses specifically on the learning that takes 
place after participants have first joined, and can be built up through the practice of 
participation over one or several campaigns. While this issue of learning is 
theoretically included in the concept of socialization, I find scant empirical research 
on the issue of learning in political and party participation, owing in part to the way 
rational choice theory puts attitudes and motivations as the decisive factors over 
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other aspects of socialization. Therefore, chapter four aims to address this oversight 
and examine how participants collectively learn and know through practicing 
participation. I discuss the skills, training, and ways of knowing that participants 
develop which allows them to transition from first joining the community of 
practitioners to belonging to it. I build on the distinction between rational-scientific 
knowledge, on the one hand, and local-specific knowledge on the other, finding that 
volunteers and organizers have access to and emphasize different ways of knowing in 
their respective roles. However rather than being unrelated or oppositional ways of 
knowing, I return to the voter list as an artifact to emphasize the connections between 
these ways of knowing. Furthermore, the list serves as an underdetermined ‘boundary 
object’ in which participants can interact with the same object in different ways 
according to their needs. 
In chapter five, I address the motives and meanings that participants find in and 
through practicing grassroots campaign participation. The chapter starts by looking at 
the incentives framework in greater detail and how some of the specific critiques 
about rational choice translate into problems of concept validity in empirical 
research. Essentially, the problems with conceiving influence outlined in rational 
choice theories of collective action, and the general inability of such theories to 
account for collective dimensions of experience, skew the categories used to 
summarize the reasons participants give and either reduce whole concepts to parts 
that lose some of their explanatory value, or overlook the ways in which participants 
distinguish between short-term collective goals and long-term, enduring beliefs and 
values about political participation. With these problems in mind, I report on the 
meaning and gratifications that participants discussed as part of the reason for their 
participation. Rather than fitting some reasons into ill-suited incentives categories, 
however, I build categories from the specific reasons participants report. I argue that 
the categories used to summarize participants’ motivations should account for the 
way in which participants distinguish and identify doing short term collective goals, 
and should not try to squeeze shared collective beliefs and ideas about the good life 
into a narrower conception of ‘policy outcomes.’ Rather recognizing how these 
beliefs shape ideas about life well beyond the narrow political arena. 
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In chapter six, I come back to the broader question of what field work canvassing and 
participation produce that may be of relevance for debates about civic and political 
participation. Using the concept of ‘linkage’, I outline how grassroots party members 
and volunteers are often described as having a key function to fill in linking party 
elites with less engaged voters and citizens. Once again, however, the use of a 
rational choice theory framework limits the conception of linkage to an exclusively 
instrumental relationship or concept of exchange, whereby voters and grassroots 
party members convey their policy choices to elites, who then act on those choices in 
order to receive support from the grassroots. I argue that this ‘thin’ notion of linkage 
misses out on the ways in which face-to-face interactions are productive of trust and 
political solidarity between voters, campaign participants, and elites. I return to the 
concept of the practice and skills of participation to discuss how participants actively 
endorse and promote political elites, represent those elites among citizens, and 
translate broad and abstract policy positions into concrete, real, and immediate 
implications for everyday life. In the accounts of participants, this process both uses 
and produces trust between campaign participants and voters, and contributes to a 
sense of building a collective political community. I argue that this trust and 
collective political community is a form of political solidarity that is distinct from the 
concept of trust and social community used in the debates about civic engagement 
and social capital. As such, political solidarity can be understood as part of a ‘thick’ 
linkage between citizens and elites, and which campaign participants play a key role 
in producing. 
Chapter seven addresses the common distinction between vocation from avocation in 
political participation. While heuristically useful and the basis upon which many 
empirical research endeavors limit their sample of participation – and hence the range 
of experiences which qualify as ‘participation’ – I argue that the separate treatment of 
professional and amateur participation misses the commonalities between the two 
groups. Further, these profiles of participatory types are crucially linked to the 
models of parties or political systems in which the participation takes place. As such 
in order for the types to be understandable one also needs an understanding of the 
organizational model. Without it, the abstracted ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ type 
loses its conceptual value. I thus use chapter seven to present a summary of the data 
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on what qualitative similarities and differences were found between organizers and 
volunteers. I connect these observations with the possibility of a changing model of 
party organization emerging in the Democratic Party, and finish by discussing the 
implications of these new forms and organizational models for civic engagement. 
In sum, in each of these chapters I review one of the predominant ways of addressing 
a key issue regarding participation, discuss the shortcomings, and offer an alternative 
way of approaching the issue. Where party organization is viewed as solely a matter 
of instrumental relations, I emphasize the cultural and collective dimensions of 
organization. Where the literature on party socialization misses out on collective 
ways of learning and knowing, I fill this gap and show how participation is a form of 
expert practice. Where incentives models of participation are limited in their ability 
to account for collective beliefs and (ironically) instrumental action for discrete 
collective ends, I retool the categorical frameworks to take account of these 
dimensions. Where the concept of linkage is limited to an instrumental view with no 
relation to the questions and literature on civic engagement, I flesh out a concept of 
‘thick’ linkage with important implications for the debates and issues in civic 
engagement. While the professional and amateur are useful heuristics, I point out the 
importance of understanding the link between the type of participation and the model 
of organization in which it takes place in.  
Taken together, rather than viewing participation as solely organizationally-bounded, 
state oriented, instrumental and individually motivated, I present a conception of 
participation that emphasizes how it is networked, collective, learned, meaningful, 
expert, citizen-oriented, productive and contextually situated. The participation and 
organization of political parties, including campaigning organizations has important 
consequences for questions regarding civic decline. Participation in party activities 
may produce connections between campaign workers, voters and elites that addresses 
the problem of frayed links between citizens and elites. And the changes in the forms 
and arrangement of participation presently happening in grassroots campaigns 
problematizes the association of professionalization with civic decline, instead 
indicating that it is the broader ways in which participants in all forms work together 





this distinction from the material in each of the chapters, and point to where these 
observations and analysis may lead to new lines of enquiry in future research.  
Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
In this chapter I present my research design. Yin describes research design as “the 
action plan for getting from here to there” (1984: 28). This includes the research 
questions, aims, strategy, and methods. I begin by recapping the research questions 
and elaborating on the research aims outlined in the introductory chapter. How do 
campaign volunteers and field organizers understand their own participation? What 
do participants do when they participate? These questions have the aim of 
understanding the views and experiences of participants, and are further linked to 
theory generation about political participation. I will adopt an interpretive and 
constructivist position in approach this research, and use a case study of participation 
in Massachusetts Democratic primary campaigns. I discuss the implications of this 
choice of case study for generalizability, and discuss further assessment of the 
reliability, credibility, and ethical issues regarding the trustworthiness of the research. 
I then present the research methods used, including using a multi-method approach, 
stages of the data collection, interviewing technique and sampling, and data analysis 
techniques. I finish with a discussion of ethical issues and implications for research 
participants. 
 
Research questions and aims 
Box 2.1 restates the primary and subsidiary research questions. All of the research 
questions are phrased as either ‘what’, or ‘how’ questions. How do participants 
understand their own participation, and in what do they do when they participate? 
The focus on ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions will have important implications for the 
research design. Compared to ‘why’ or ‘how much’ questions, the emphasis is on the 
social world of grassroots campaign participants and how they experience it. 
Thus the aim of the research questions is ‘reason’ explanation and understanding of 
grassroots participation. Blaikie defines explanation as “making intelligible the 
events or regularities that have been observed and which cannot be accounted for in 
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existing theories” (2000:74). ‘Reason’ explanation is understanding arrived at by 
exploring the reasons people give for their actions. Unlike causal explanations, 
reason explanations work with and from the world view of actors or an inside view, 
like Weber’s concept of Verstehen (Blaikie 2000: 75, Bryman 2008: 16). In other 
words, reason explanation, or understanding, asks about the interpretations which 
social actors provide about their world. 
These research aims of explanation and understanding stem from two related 
motives. The first is, as described in the last chapter, the desire to better understand 
and explore what was (to me) an entirely new social and political world. The sense 
that something very timely was happening with Democratic Party political 
campaigning was exciting, new, and very immediate in a way that I was fascinated 
by. It is almost possible to identify a campaign office by its very smell – part pizza, 
part donuts, part sweat and part collective stress – and seemed to me intrinsically 
worthy of study. 
 
 
Box 2.1 Primary and Subsidiary Research Questions 
 
Primary research questions:  
How do campaign volunteers and workers understand their own participation?  
What do participants do when they are participating? 
Subsidiary research questions: 
What does party organization look like from the viewpoint of grassroots 
participants? 
What meanings, as well as motives, do participants draw from participation? 
How do participants learn to participate? 
What are the qualitative similarities and differences between different forms of 
participation? 
Does participation in party campaigns produce democratic benefits similar to 




More broadly, my aim of understanding how abstract political concepts like 
‘participation’ are constructed by people through their everyday experiences and 
understanding extends to contributing to discussions about what these political 
concepts mean in their scholarly contexts. Rather than just leaving such research on 
topics that were intrinsically worthy (to my mind) as its own piece, connecting an 
understanding of everyday politics with the academic theories is an important 
motive, and thus the aim of the thesis as a whole. 
 
Research strategy 
In order to achieve these research aims and answer the research questions, I adopt a 
strategy that is somewhat broadly referred to as ‘qualitative’ but more specifically is 
interpretive and constructivist. ‘Qualitative’ research is often used in so many 
different ways as to be somewhat imprecise, sometimes referring to  just data 
collection methods, such as open ended or semi structure interviews, or sometimes 
refers to the ontological and epistemological standpoint of the researcher. Indeed, as 
Bryman points out, the sheer volume of texts on qualitative research makes it 
difficult to even pin down one ‘qualitative research strategy’ (2008: 366). More 
specifically, then, I outline the epistemological and ontological stances adopted in 
this research which are often correlated with ‘qualitative research.’ 
The first conflation comes is between qualitative research and an interpretative 
approach. Broadly speaking, an interpretative approach “requires the social scientist 
to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman 2008: 16). In more 
accessible language, the work of interpretative approach is the interpretation of 
interpretations (Freeman 2008) – by research informants, by academic and research 
texts, and by researchers themselves. This contrasts the positivist presumption of 
only one analysis with the possibility of many analyses. Interpretative researchers 
work across the social science disciplines, and are increasingly contributing to policy 
and political studies. 
While spread across many disciplines and adopting a variety of different methods, 
Wedeen identifies four characteristics that all interpretativists share in common. 
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First, all “question ‘the power presumed to accompany… science’” (Wedeen 2004: 
284, citing Foucault). In order to create powerful explanations of social reality, 
alternative methodologies to the positivist tradition are necessary. Second, 
interpretativists are interested in language and symbolic systems, e.g. culture 
(Wedeen 2004: 284). Blaikie identifies this interest in language and symbolic 
systems as a focus on the intersubjective meanings people create through interaction 
in the social world (Blaikie 2000: 115). Third, they are constructivists in the sense 
that they view the world in which these meanings are created as socially made, “so 
that the categories, presuppositions, and classifications referring to particular 
phenomena are manufactured rather than natural” (Wedeen 2004: 284). Finally, they 
collectively eschew the individualist orientation of the behavioral and traditional 
rational choice approaches to research8, instead advocating for the necessity of 
understanding individuals within their social context. 
These general characteristics of an interpretative approach are useful in highlighting 
the common commitments and similarities between researchers, but they mask vast 
differences of beliefs and opinion regarding the use of scientific methods, theory 
building, and the relationship to other methodologies. Like Wedeen, I believe there is 
a strong case to be made for methodological pluralism. Behavioralist and rational 
choice accounts of social reality are incomplete, but they provide useful knowledge 
as part of the social scientific endeavor that is beyond the scope of interpretive work 
(Wedeen 2004: 284). Ultimately methodological pluralism can enhance our 
understanding of such broad topics like ‘participation.’ Indeed, in focusing on 
understanding everyday meanings, in the theory building components of the thesis I 
compare and contrast these with generalizations and theoretical accounts of 
participation from rational choice, and in some cases building on these concepts 
rather than rejecting them outright.  
In this thesis I use an abductive research strategy, which Blaikie identifies as a kind 
of inductive research strategy. The inductive approach poses a different relationship 
                                                            
8 Some posit that such a criticism engages with a ‘straw man,’ in that very few contemporary rational 
choice scholars adhere to the original concept of people as self-interested, utility-maximizing 
individuals. Indeed, Ferejohn, in the same volume as Wedeen, argues that rational choice theory is in 
itself the articulation of a particular world view and constructed social reality, one shared by 
informants and researchers alike (Ferejohn 2004). 
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between theory and practice than the deductive approach (Bryman 2008: 11). The 
latter starts with theory and then moves to observations and research findings in order 
to judge hypotheses. On the other hand, an inductive approach starts with 
observations and findings, and conceptualizing theory from this is the purpose of 
research. Of course, as Bryman (2008) notes, a deductive approach uses research 
results in order to come back to theory in the end, and often times an inductive 
approach may include data, theory, and then more data collection again. 
An abductive research strategy is much more oriented towards understanding the 
experiences of people than the broader inductive approach. “It is the everyday beliefs 
and practices, mundane and taken for granted, which have to be grasped and 
articulated by the social researcher in order to provide an understanding of these 
[social] actions” (Blaikie 2000: 115). Lay meanings and socially constructed 
accounts are elevated to the central location in an abductive approach to social 
research and theory (Blaikie 2000: 115), although researchers differ on the ways in 
which lay meanings should be related to theory. 
Interpretative approaches also share some common methods and commitments with 
grounded theory. Grounded theory “gives the researcher a specific set of steps to 
follow that are closely aligned with the canons of ‘good science’” (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1998: xviii) and departs from other interpretive approaches in that there is an 
explicit commitment to theory development and verification.  This accurately 
describes the approach to the relationship between science, theory, data, and 
interpretation that I take in the thesis. Although grounded theory varies somewhat 
from the strong hermeneutic foundations of the abductive research strategy, Blaikie 
accepts that grounded theory can be used within the abductive strategy, and generally 
accommodates his desire for theory building (2000: 70). Described as within the 
sensitizing tradition, grounded theory is akin to an ongoing conversation between 
existing theory and the accounts which emerge from data. It combines the “concepts 
and hypotheses that have emerged from the data with some existing ones that are 
clearly useful” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 48). Concepts are loosely described at the 
beginning of the research process, and re-evaluated and refined throughout the steps 
of data collection and analysis.  
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One important distinguishing feature of grounded theory is the source of concepts 
and theories and the role of the researcher as interpreter. In the hermeneutic and other 
interpretive traditions, concepts and theory are exclusively derived through exploring 
the everyday lay meanings which people use (Blaikie 2000: 138). In contrast, in 
grounded theory “the concept is the researcher’s” (Blaikie 2000: 138). The researcher 
will rely on the everyday meanings people create to build concepts and theory, but 
ultimately, conceptual development and even naming is clearly within the 




In this thesis, the case is the participation in Massachusetts Democratic Party 
grassroots primary campaigns, where, for the purposes of focusing the scope of 
analysis, participation is operationalized as the act of attending one or more events 
organized by the Massachusetts Democratic Party or a candidate competing in a 2006 
Democratic primary election. This operationalization concept is markedly different 
than the sensitizing one I propose as one of the main research processes in the thesis, 
and the distinction is simply that the research must start somewhere. In order to 
sensitize, it helps to start with a thin definition of the concept, which is sensitized 
throughout the research process (Blaikie 2000: 137).  
While some authors like Yin (1984) argue that the case studies must be temporally 
and organizationally bounded entities, or Blaikie, who defines the case study as a 
social unit that must be treated as a whole (2000: 215), others are less strict. Mitchell 
offers a broader definition of the case study as simply the observer’s data (1983: 
191), and Stake describes the case as the choice of object of study (1998: 86). By 
defining the case as participation in Massachusetts Democratic Party primary 
grassroots political campaigns, I use a definition closer to Mitchell and Stake’s broad 
sensibility. As Yin notes, this broader, potentially unbounded type of definition of the 
case is not without consequence (1984: 31). Closely linked to this is the 
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complementary issue of defining a clearly bounded organization within in which 
participation takes place, covered in the next chapter.  
Defining the case as participation in grassroots political campaigns both narrows and 
broadens the case study in important ways. It cuts out participation in other manners 
(such as donating money or writing a blog), in other parts of political campaigns 
(such as media or research) and other actors (such as media consultants or staff, 
reporters or consultancy agencies). Nor is the case study of the Democratic Party per 
se – the focus of the study, and therefore the case, is the people who do participation 
on grassroots campaigns. To the extent that some of this place and context is in 
official Democratic Party organizations, then it is about the Party. But there many 
parts of the Party or campaign organizations which are not about or accessible to 
grassroots participants – finance meetings, executive staff, etc – and therefore are not 
the focus of the study. These organizational dimensions of the party and campaigns 
are addressed in further detail in chapter three.  
In another sense, however, this definition of the case as grassroots campaign 
participation and the immediate context in which it takes place broadens the case 
beyond clearly identifiable organizational boundaries. It is unbounded in the sense 
that there are no card carrying members to distinguish who is officially participating 
from those who are not, nor can participation be restricted to any one organization. 
Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that the case is situated entirely within 
Massachusetts, and that for purposes of generalization some of the specific 
dimensions of participation in Massachusetts merit explication. In this next section, I 
cover some of the key components of Massachusetts, including its economic and 
political dimensions, which are relevant to the question of what kind of case is 
chosen and its relevance for generalizability. 
 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts today has many similarities with other postindustrial states and 
countries. By some indicators it boasts a strong economy with a high median 
household income, high rates of education and low unemployment. The three largest 
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job sectors are health and education, covering Massachusetts’ many hospitals and 
universities, trade, transport and utilities, and business and professional sector. It also 
has a strong biotech sector and growing creative economy. However, this masks a 
more mixed economic picture. Job creation between 2001 and 2006 lagged behind 
national levels, and real wages dropped during the same period. Moreover, 
population growth is slow, and only gains made through immigration have offset the 
increasing loss of young adults who move out of state. Finally, the economic gap 
between the richest and poorest residents has widened during the same period.9 
Geographically, the majority of Massachusetts’ 6.4 million residents live in the 
eastern half of the state, dominated by the metro-Boston area. With a number of 
universities and hospitals, Boston boasts one of the densest city centers in the United 
States. Boston also has a healthy financial services and banking sector (or had, until 
very recently), if much smaller than in previous decades. Metro-Boston is also more 
ethnically diverse than the rest of the state, although some 2nd and 3rd tier cities such 
as Springfield and Lawrence have similar diversity. Overall, fully 90% of housing 
units in Massachusetts are in urban areas.  
In partisan terms, Massachusetts is somewhat more mixed than the uniform blue on 
recent Electoral College maps. In fact, there are almost two political portraits of the 
state, although both favor Democrats. Voters consistently send Democratic Senators 
and Representatives to Congress, and the last time a Republican was among the 
state’s congressional delegation was 1975, when Paul Tsongas finally won the 5th 
district. On the state level, Democrats similarly dominate the State House and Senate 
chambers: in 2004, 137 of 160 members of the State House were Democrats, and 34 
of 40 State Senators. In 2006, that number increased to 141 house members and 35 
State Senators. Yet the Governor’s office had been held by Republicans for 16 
consecutive years up until the 2006 elections. 
In terms of the partisan identification of voters, the last major realignment of voters’ 
partisan identification occurred as a result of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
presidency, which broke the Republican Party’s hold on the state. Voters registered 
with the Democratic Party constituted 37.2% of the electorate in 2006 (Boston Globe 
                                                            
9 For more detailed information, see Appendix 1. 
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2006), far stronger than the 13% registered with the Republican Party. However, the 
number of voters who do not register with any political party (‘unenrolled’ voters) is 
and has been higher than the national average since FDR’s time. Unenrolled voters 
made up 49% of the electorate in 2006, and have consistently been between 35-40% 
since the 1940s (Denison 2006). This is remarkably higher than the national average 
of 24% of voters registered without a party affiliation. 
One Boston-based think tank put together a political geography that helps to account 
for some of this diversity. By dividing the state into ten political regions, 
CommonWealth Magazine highlighted the diverse economic, demographic, political, 
and ideological dimensions of the state produce a more complicated and hard-to-
predict landscape for statewide elections.10 These ranging from ‘lefty liberal’ areas 
which are “to Massachusetts what Massachusetts is to the United States – more 
liberal, more Democratic, better educated, less populated by nuclear families, and 
more often on the losing side of close elections” to staunch Republican ‘Cranberry 
country’ on Cape Cod with the highest proportion of registered Republican voters; 
from the libertarian north shore area to moderate and conservative Democratic 
middle sections of the state (Sullivan 2006). Thus the deep blue hue of 
Massachusetts’ elected representatives at the state and federal level is not matched by 
an equally deep blue electorate.  
 
The 2006 Electoral Campaigns 
Grassroots political activity in Massachusetts in the 2004 presidential elections and 
2005 local elections was more extensive than in previous recent years. In addition to 
the many volunteers who participated in the 2004 Democratic presidential campaign, 
voter turnout and campaign activity was widely perceived to be markedly higher 
during the 2005 local elections. Several incumbent mayors and city councilors lost in 
the nonpartisan primaries to newer political candidates who all used a strong 
grassroots field work campaigns as part of their strategy. Leading up to 2006, then, 
there were good indications that grassroots activity would be extensive. 
                                                            
10 See Appendix 2. 
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While the exciting elections in Massachusetts in 2006 were at the state and local 
level, national politics provided a back note of activity. Both the Republican 
Governor Mitt Romney and John Kerry in the early stages of 2006 considered 
running for President in 2008.11 Neither of these pre-campaigns generated much in-
state activity, but Senator Ted Kennedy used his re-election campaign as a way of 
jumpstarting grassroots campaign work. While Kennedy’s seat was never in any 
doubt, he combined his re-election campaign with the statewide coordinated 
campaign, providing concrete activities for grassroots participants to complete (such 
as gathering signatures for the ballot) and a charismatic figurehead for the early 
stages of 2006. 
In the end, it was the gubernatorial race that was the real star of the campaign season. 
Because Governor Romney was not running for re-election the race was for an open 
seat, whoever won the Democratic nomination would face Republican Lieutenant 
Governor Kerry Healey in the general election. It was by no means the assumption 
that whoever won the primary would win the election. On the contrary, electability 
was a topic of debate throughout the primary campaign season. 
The Democratic gubernatorial primary started out as a contest between Attorney 
General Tom Reilly and Deval Patrick, a relatively new figure to the Massachusetts 
political scene. Reilly was widely considered a party insider and had a formidable 
lead in the polls and in money in the early months of 2006. While Patrick had served 
at the higher levels of the federal government under Clinton as the head of the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division 12 and was a prominent corporate lawyer, he had 
never held elected office and had a relatively low profile within the state. Both 
campaigned essentially from the 2005 state party convention in June, and were joined 
by latecomer Chris Gabrieli in the winter of 2006. Gabrieli was the Democratic 
nominee for Lieutenant Governor in 2002 and a very wealthy entrepreneur who 
largely self-funded his campaign to the tune of over $7.5 million, a state record 
(Mooney 2006). 
                                                            
11 Kerry did not run again, but Romney did join the presidential primaries. 




The Democratic primary election for Lieutenant Governor also shaped up to be a 
competitive race. Tim Murphy, Mayor of Worcester, Deb Goldberg, a supermarket 
millionaire heiress and Brookline town selectwoman13, and Andrea Silbert, a 
businesswoman and entrepreneur, all ran for Lieutenant Governor. Incumbent 
Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin faced progressive challenger Jon 
Bonifaz, and while the race did generate attention, especially among progressive 
participants, the margins were never as close for the Secretary of State race as for 
either Governor or Lieutenant Governor. Finally, the other statewide race was for 
Attorney General. Incumbent AG Tom Reilly did not run for this as he was running 
for Governor, so widely popular Middlesex County District Attorney Martha 
Coakley ran as the uncontested nominee. In addition, State Senators and 
Representatives, District Attorneys, Registries of Deeds, and a host of local offices 
were all on the ballot, many of which ran grassroots political campaigns as well. 
 
The US Democratic Party and national politics: the state of affairs 
While the case study is decidedly about state level politics, a brief overview of the 
state of affairs nationally and how it looked for Democrats is useful in order to 
address issues of the suitability and generalizability of Massachusetts as a case. 
Additionally, taking note of several national-level political dynamics at this point can 
assist understanding what participants were doing and the national context in which 
this participation was taking place. Most important for the thesis is that in from 2004-
2006 the Democratic Party was nationally out of power, holding neither Congress nor 
the Presidency; the broader debate about the direction of the party should take in 
order to regain power; the steps that national level political elites were taking to 
make that return to governing a reality; and especially the technological changes 
related to campaigning tactics. 
After Kerry lost the 2004 elections, Democrats woke up to face a largely red map of 
America (Figure 2.1) and, in the words of Bush campaign mastermind Karl Rove, the 
prospect of a slow but steady rolling Republican realignment. Not only did President 
                                                            
13 A committee of three selectmen or women often substituted for a single mayor as the chief 
executive in city and town governments. 
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Bush win re-election, but the Republican Party made gains in both the House and 
Senate. While the picture was somewhat less bleak at the state level – Democrats 
picked more seats in state legislatures than Republicans did, and won a number of 
governor’s seats – the overall impression was one of being soundly beaten.  
Not unsurprisingly, and as is often the case after sound defeats, Democratic Party 
members from elite elected officials down to the least involved voters entered a 
period of intense navel gazing, trying to understand what went wrong and what 
needed to be done to regain power. In advance of the election for Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) Chair in December 2004, the New York Times ran op-
eds from leading Democratic strategists, thinkers, former and current officials 
outlining what the Party should do to stop a rolling realignment from gradually 
pushing Democrats further back into their coastal and great lakes enclaves. 
 







Broadly speaking, opinion on this matter generally fell into two camps. On the one 
hand were those who felt that the primary problem was the recent Party messenger. 
There was nothing fundamentally wrong with the Democratic Party or what it 
offered. After all, Kerry had won more votes than any other nominee in the history of 
US elections – Bush just happened to get more (Bai 2005). Clearly something was 
working to get so close in the Electoral College and popular vote count. But, in a 
somewhat contradictory point, the real problem was that electorally the party was 
limited by an effete, elite, liberal and French-like candidate who failed to connect 
with the average voter. Voters wanted someone they could sit down and have a beer 
with, and clearly Kerry was not that kind of guy. What the Democrats needed was 
not some fundamental shift but a clarification of the message, better delivery, and a 
better candidate. Someone, maybe, more like Bill Clinton. 
The second camp found something fundamentally wrong with the Party, especially in 
the ranks of the Washington insiders who had lost touch with what Democrats were 
really about, what voters really wanted, and had essentially moved the Party away 
from its fundamental values and run it into the ground. This group, broadly speaking, 
perceived the vote of many prominent Democrats in favor of the authorization of the 
use of force in Iraq as a complete pushover and betrayal of Democratic supporters 
like themselves. This view was articulated most strongly by those who rallied around 
Democratic presidential primary candidate Howard Dean and his call for the 
unilateral withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. They could be found running the new 
‘blogs’ and organizing online – they were the netroots, they were mad, and, to 
paraphrase the words of one leading netroots progressive, it was time for the 
barbarians to storm the gates of the Washington elites (Armstrong 2006).  
While this opposition was largely against Democrats’ role as handmaidens to the Iraq 
War, the opposition went well beyond any one policy area. A larger perceived 
problem was the triangulation that Clinton practiced relentlessly and effectively as 
President. As Matt Bai describes, some of the outspoken netroots activists did not 
want any part of reaching a hand across the aisle when the other side of the aisle 
played so ugly (2006: 141). Equally, part of the problem was the reliance on what 
was perceived to be a small core of professional consultants who had no interest in 
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the actual policies and integrity of the Democratic Party, but who simply worked for 
their paycheck, advocated spending more money on advertising so they could receive 
a cut and paid little heed to what might be appropriate for a given race (Armstrong 
2006). In this view, if Democrats were going to find their way back into power, they 
were going to have to get a spine and start changing the way they practiced 
campaigning. 
The netroots activists, having had their favored candidate lose in the primary, and 
then watching as their grudgingly accepted Democratic candidate lost all too closely 
in the general election did get one consolation prize in the election of Howard Dean 
as DNC chair. Dean won that office, in part, on the promise of funneling more 
money into state party organizations in order to invest in long-term party growth, 
including infrastructure and rebuilding the Democratic ‘brand’ at the grassroots level. 
Yet as Galvin points out, the anti-establishment backed Chairman Dean in many 
ways benefitted from the rebuilding work that started with none other than Bill 
Clinton and was carried on by his allies (Galvin 2008). These previous 
establishment-type chairs paid off the national and state party organization’s 
longstanding debts, raising huge sums of money in order to do so. They invested in 
new infrastructure, including a nationally-based voter database, and convinced 
begrudging state party leaders to hand over their lists of supporters. By the time Dean 
announced the DNC’s ‘50 state strategy’ for the 2006 mid-term elections, in which 
they would give money to each and every state party in order to invest in coordinated 
campaign full-time field organizers, staff, and further infrastructure, he was largely 
able to do so because of the groundwork that had been painstakingly laid and 
implemented since 1996. 
In large part, all of these developments from 2004 to 2006 were related to the rapid 
development of the internet and the attendant new technologies and related 
campaigning practices. While opponents of the Iraq War staged traditional protests 
and did what other movements do, war they also found an increasing ability to 
mobilize online, taking previously non-partisan organizations like MoveOn.org and 
transforming them by rallying around war issues. Both the John McCain campaign in 
2000 and the Howard Dean campaign in 2004 experimented with online organizing, 
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from small Meetup.com groups to building a network of small dollar donations into a 
record breaking fundraising machine. Voter databases also became increasingly 
sophisticated over this period of time, so that the Bush campaign in 2004 was able to 
micro-target their messages so that consumptions habits could be used to identify 
very small slices of the electorate. This was by no means new, but according to 
participants at the time the extent to which they were able to target was increasingly 
sophisticated.15 Finally, the voter databases used in field work for identifying and 
mobilizing voters was increasingly mobile and accessible. In 2004 Americans 
Coming Together, the 527 organization largely responsible for getting out the vote 
for Democrats in Ohio were knocking on doors using palm pilots that listed a 
residents name, address and could give the canvasser the option of playing specific 
advertising messages based on what voters reported was important to them. 
Canvassers could then enter in the voter’s intentions (for Kerry or Bush), and the data 
would be uploaded back onto a central database server at campaign headquarters (Bai 
2005). While this specific model of playing videos on palm pilots was abandoned 
after 2004, it is but one example of how get out the vote campaigns were using 
increasingly sophisticated technology and database software to run and organize their 
efforts. In more recent years, this kind of software technology has become 
increasingly easy to use, sophisticated, and targeted. 
While none of these dynamics are directly addressed in this thesis, they do situate 
some of the immediate issues which are examined. The database technology, for 
instance, backgrounds how participants learn about and know about how to do field 
work, and the debate running through the Party nationally, and especially the 
progressive movement, features as part of participants conceptions of party loyalty 
and anti-party sentiment. It is also useful for understanding why Massachusetts is 





15 Harvard Institute of Politics Seminar with Democratic and Republican strategists, November 2004.  
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Evaluating case studies 
Case selection 
At the time of case selection, one of the main reasons why Massachusetts seemed 
like a good place to look at grassroots campaign participation because ‘something’ 
was going on, even if that something was not entirely clear. In hindsight, the 
argument for the case being an extreme or unique one (Bryman 2008: 55) seems 
much more clear. First, the number of competitive gubernatorial and lieutenant 
gubernatorial campaigns in the primaries, plus Kennedy’s re-election campaign/the 
statewide coordinated campaign, plus down ticket campaigns offered a host of 
opportunities for grassroots participation. While there is no way to compare with 
other years from primary observation or secondary sources, accounts from 
participants who had been involved for more than one state-wide election cycle 
reported that the level of grassroots organizing was much more extensive in 2006 
than it had been in 2002, and much more than the almost non-existent grassroots 
campaigning in the 1998 gubernatorial elections. Therefore, the extent to which 
grassroots participants were participating more and across different campaign 
organizations may very well be more extreme for this case than it would be for 
others. In this sense, this case provides a unique opportunity to understand the 
dimensions of grassroots participation that happen not just in one organization but 
the parts that exist in between and beyond any one organizational structure. 
Also important is the relationship between the Massachusetts primary campaigns and 
the 2008 Democratic Presidential primary and general election campaigns. As was 
widely reported in the national news media, Deval Patrick (who went on to win both 
the primary and general election) shared a chief strategist with Barack Obama in 
David Axelrod. The similarities between the two candidates and the campaigns they 
ran are numerous: each candidate is of African-American descent and dealt with the 
issue of race in similar ways; each man framed their message of hope and change in 
broad language,16 and each used the resources brought by early and enthusiastic 
supporters to challenge a better funded and better known candidate to get a toehold in 
                                                            
16 Indeed, during the primaries in 2008 Obama even used some of the same slogans and speech texts 
as Deval Patrick in 2006, much to the delight of his opponents.  
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the primaries. Strategically, both Deval Patrick and Barack Obama used caucus 
systems to their advantage, in which a small band of organized supporters can have a 
greater impact compared to primaries.17 Axelrod was quite candid about the fact that 
Deval Patrick’s campaign was a dry run for the Obama campaign in 2008 (Kaminski 
2008). Although there was no way to know it at the time, the 2006 gubernatorial 
primaries was unusual in that it literally provided a preview of the campaign strategy, 
including grassroots campaigning and participation, that would be used by the 
winning candidate of the Democratic presidential primary in 2008. Although the 
campaign strategy of neither the Patrick campaign nor any other is really the focus of 
the case study, it does point towards the relevancy of the case for issues of 
generalizability. 
This logic of generalizability is distinct from the kind of generalizability used in 
quantitative and survey research that is based on representativeness. In the classic 
positivist tradition, a case or cases are selected based on shared characteristics with a 
larger target population. In survey work, this is done through the use of identifying a 
sampling frame and through a randomized selection process or, alternatively, through 
quota sampling, and the characteristics found in a sample can be reasonably extended 
to the larger target population. The logic of an extreme or unusual case, however, is 
based on the notion that it may have an intrinsic value, as is the case here with the 
Patrick campaign, the Obama campaign, and the relevance of grassroots campaigning 
to pertinent national political questions. 
The second relevant logic of generalizability that is applicable here reframes the 
question of generalizing to a larger target population in order to come to conclusions 
about that population to a question of generalizing for the purpose of theory 
generation. When the research objective is theory generation, the case and site 
selection strategy and thus claims to generalizability are different (Blaikie 2000: 
256). The claim to generalizability is not based on the characteristics of the cases or 
sites as holding the same characteristics of a parent population, but of the creation of 
                                                            
17 Barack Obama won the Iowa caucus in 2008, which took away Hillary Clinton’s argument of being 
the inevitable and invincible candidate. Similarly, Deval Patrick’s supporters won many more delegate 
spots to the 2006 state Democratic Convention (which are decided through a caucus system) than did 
Reilly or Gabrieli, giving Patrick an early victory which challenged Reilly’s claim to inevitability. 
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a theory of general utility, which can then be tested, tried, and grounded in further 
study.18 Since the research aims explicitly include theory generation – regarding the 
relevancy of political campaigning for civic engagement, for the conception of 
similarities and differences between different kinds of participation, and the concept 
validity of incentives categories, among others – this logic of generalizability and the 
case selection is well suited to the research questions and aims. This latter focus on 
theory development is crucial to assessing the strength of research. Mitchell (1983) 
argues that the ability of a case study to generate theory is in fact the chief 
assessment criterion.  
 
Further criteria: Trustworthiness and authenticity 
Beyond the specifics of the case study approach, if interpretive work does not play by 
the same rules as the positivist traditions, on what grounds should such research be 
judged? One area of debate is the extent to which concepts like validity and 
reliability, built up in the positivist social sciences, are appropriate for assessing 
research conducted with an interpretative approach. While some have adapted 
positivist terminology to suit interpretative and/or constructivist research (e.g. Kirk 
and Miller 1986), others have adopted separate terminology in order to make these 
differences in criteria clear. Bryman (2008) summarizes and contrasts the positivist 
terminology of generalizability, internal validity, objectivity, reliability and 
replication with the constructivist terminology of relatability, credibility, 
confirmability, dependability, and replicability. These latter concepts all build into 
what Guba and Lincoln describe as ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’ (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994, cited in Bryman 2008: 377). The difference in the terms and concepts 
used is meant to convey the ontological and epistemological differences between 
positivist and constructivists approaches. By emphasizing confirmability over 
objectivity, and dependability over reliability, Guba and Lincoln make apparent the 
lack of claims about an objective social reality which can be accessed and revealed 
by social scientists. 
                                                            
18 This point has also been made about case study research more specifically. See Yin (1984). 
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In assessing this research, I focus specifically on credibility, transparency, and ethical 
considerations in addition to generalizability, addressed above. Credibility refers to 
the extent to which a researcher is able to account for and present a myriad of 
perspectives and points of view of social actors. It can be established by “ensuring 
that the research is carried out according to the canons of good practice” and through 
respondent validation (Bryman 2008: 377). Similar to Bryman’s good practice, 
Glaser and Strauss set the criteria for judging scientific rigor in “the detailed 
elements of the actual strategies used for collecting, coding, analyzing, and 
presenting data when generating theory” (1967: 224). In the research methods section 
I will describe both the methods used and link them to accounts of established ‘good 
practice’ in order to make a case for the credibility of the research. 
Second, throughout the research period in the field, I shared results and ideas with 
respondents in a spirit similar to respondent validation described by Bryman. In 
addition to using pilot interviews as a way of identifying key concepts and issues, 
described below, I also solicited input from informants. These questions included 
queries along the lines of whether an issue was important and worth asking about, 
what their take was on the course of events, and sharing ideas about what the 
research was about with key informants and gate keepers. In addition, I have shared 
ideas in the writing up process with three informants on an informal, conversational 
level over email or in person.19 While more limited and informal than the methods of 
respondent validation described by Bryman (2008: 377-8), this does have several 
advantages. Unlike the more formal methods of sharing a completed paper or 
research report, these conversations transmit the basic concepts in an understandable 
way to informants. Such an informal process of translation thus avoids the possible 
“can’t understand a bloody word it says” reaction that Skeggs reports (1994: 86) 
which is both unhelpful and, possibly, alienating.  
In terms of assessing research, there are two additional issues which crop up in a 
number of descriptions and across research done in different traditions. The first is 
transparency as the root of replicability, dependability and confirmability, (or in the 
natural science tradition, replication, validity and reliability). Transparency can be 
                                                            
19 A more extensive dissemination of research results is planned with all informants in the form of an 
executive summary report. 
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achieved through a careful documentation of the research process, including 
everything from question and problem formulation, through data collection and 
analysis, and through the sharing of research results. This helps other researchers to 
judge whether good practice was followed, whether concepts are about what they say 
they are, and whether a study could in theory be done again (even if the contours of 
social research make replicability a near impossibility in practice).  
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations have important professional, moral, and legal dimensions. A 
researcher has responsibility not just to her professional community, but to the 
research participants and, although it is only rarely that they must be addressed, legal 
duties regarding the regulation of scientific research. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance that ethical considerations be fully addressed. 
My attention to these responsibilities fall into four linked areas: establishing my 
identity as a researcher, dissemination of information about the research process, 
informed consent, and ensuring the anonymity and confidentiality of research 
participants. Establishing my identity as a researcher was the first important 
consideration, especially since I worked in electoral politics in the not so distant past, 
and already had acquaintances and colleagues in the network of Democratic politics. 
In order to make it clear where ‘work’ ended and ‘research’ began, I followed two 
rules: none of my experiences while in the employ of any political campaign or 
group was participant observation, and second, with the exception of the friends who 
gracefully served as informants in the pilot interviews, I did not interview any 
informant with whom I had previously worked on any campaign. I should also note 
that the participant observation did not happen in the same physical spaces as my 
previous working experiences.  
Disseminating information about my research and informed consent will be 
discussed below, but the issue of confidentiality requires further elaboration here. In 
the informed consent, I guaranteed informants confidentiality. This was a key feature 
for building trust and rapport during the interviews. Sometimes while answering a 
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question telling a story, informants would comment that, ‘well, since this is 
confidential’ and proceed to share a potentially sensitive piece of information, or a 
view that was different from one they had taken publicly. Generally these facts are of 
little interest other than to those directly involved, but for either the informants 
themselves or those discussed it was of obvious importance. Given the density of the 
Democratic politics network, in some cases informants could potentially be identified 
by these tales, and thus no stories or specific accounts which could easily jeopardize 
confidentiality are included in the presentation of the data. 
Further, I have made the specific campaigns, organizations, and locations of 
informants similarly anonymous. While categorical information is included in the 
analysis (e.g., town or ward committee involvement, gubernatorial campaign 
involvement, state rep race, etc), I do not specify which town committee or campaign 
the participation refers to. Indeed, given that some participants were relatively elite 
within one or more organization, identifying the organizations at this level of 
specificity would similarly jeopardize confidentiality. These choices provide 
safeguards while not compromising the integrity of the analysis. 
Does this organizational anonymity jeopardize the generalizability of the research 
findings? After all, there are differences between campaigns, and part of the case for 
generalizability relies on the relationship between having looked at the Deval Patrick 
campaign in 2006, which shared a number of similarities with the Barack Obama 
campaign in 2008. However, the key feature of each of these is not the specific way 
in which they did the campaigning, but the mere fact that both used field work so 
prominently at all. As I will discuss in chapter three, there is a strong case for arguing 
that some norms and aspects of this particular grassroots political network stretch 
beyond the activities of any one organization. 
Ethical issues and a reflexive approach to the researcher’s own standpoint are also 
important assessment criteria for evaluating the case study itself. Are a researcher’s 
own concerns and/or biases incorporated into the research design? Is this done to the 
detriment of good practice? And how are these ethical dimensions approached? Of 
particular concern, as noted by Bloor (1997), is the ability of the researcher to be 
critical about the research subject. Could my previous ties to Democratic campaigns 
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compromise my own ability to be a critical researcher, and report on negative 
dimensions of my subjects? 
There are several possible points which in which a researcher’s own biases, 
judgments or feelings about the research subject could matter. The first is the 
argument that the very selection of a research subject entails the judgment that it is 
worthy of study in the first place (Crenson 1971). In this respect the research reflects 
my own biases, because I do think that participation in campaigns is worthy of study. 
However, this is not so different from the choices that many other researchers make, 
and therefore is not outside the realm of ‘good’ research practices. The second and 
possibly more troubling question is regarding the ability to be critical about the 
research findings. In other words, as a researcher who had previously been involved 
with Democratic campaigns, did I shield my research subjects by only presenting 
data which puts them in a positive light? 
The first point is to detail the extent of my own biases and their relationship with the 
research subjects and design. First, while I have worked on both a national 
Democratic general election campaign (for President) and on non-partisan local 
races, I had not previously worked on any state level political races nor on any 
primary races. This has two important effects. First, it was relatively easy to make 
sure (as I describe below) not to interview anyone with whom I worked on a 
campaign. This avoided having to make any potentially compromising decisions in 
order to ‘shield’ close personal contacts. In the majority of cases, data was collected 
among participants with whom I had only met whilst conducting the PhD research. 
Further, the commitment to an interpretative approach foregrounds understanding 
multiple points of view. In some cases this meant finding areas where participants 
saw things differently and where there may be conflicts between different actors. 
Where these conflicts and/or different ways of seeing situations are apparent, I 
address them in the thesis.  
The second possible place where bias could come in would be by siding with one 
campaign or candidate over another. However, the decision to keep the organizations 
in which participation takes place anonymous for the reader does the protection work 
for participants as well as campaigns. Given the relatively small size of the grassroots 
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political world and the extent to which different participants know each other, this 
confidentiality was crucial to establishing trust among informants and ensuring the 
anonymity of individual participants. In terms of the integrity of the research, it also 
helped to ensure that bias was an issue in one less case. 
Third and finally, there could be the issue of trying to shield the Democratic Party 
itself from any adverse or negative findings. In this final respect I was greatly aided 
by respondents themselves who felt free in pointing out whatever shortcomings they 
felt were present. This meant that my job as a researcher was, once establishing a 
space in which they could speak comfortably and honestly, making sure that those 
answers collected were analyzed in a transparent and consistent manner. So in terms 
of ethical issues and concerns about bias, the approach for dealing with them is really 
the same as for assessing and dealing with other potential problems: well established 
practices shared by a community of researchers and transparency in the research 
process. 
In sum, using a case study of grassroots campaign participants and the context in 
which they participate in the 2006 Massachusetts Democratic primary campaigns is 
well suited to the research questions, aims, and strategy. While the specific way in 
which grassroots participation is defined as the focus of study is not without potential 
problems in terms of the case definition, I believe the benefits of using a less-well 
bounded case relate in important ways to the research questions and aims. Further, 
while recognizing how the case is an unusual one makes it more relevant to questions 
of current events that have intrinsic value, this does not take away from the 
usefulness of the case for generating theoretical and conceptual developments. 
Finally, the credibility, transparency, and ethical issues are outlined as additional 
important criteria by which to judge the quality of research. In the next section, I 
elaborate on the research methods used. 
 
Research Methods 
Selecting a case study in no way guarantees how data will be collected in that case, 
nor how the data will be analyzed. In this section I address adopting a multi-method 
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approach to data collection and analysis, the stages and methods of data collection, 
and analytical tools used. 
I collected data using a number of tools, including interviews, questionnaires, 
participant observation, and documentary analysis. The main advantage of using a 
multi-method approach is that it provides the researcher with greater opportunity to 
corroborate reports or interpretations gained through one form of data collection, like 
interviews, with accounts offered via other forms, such as documents or observation. 
While a multi-method approach may present difficulties for the researcher, namely 
using tools with very different ontological presuppositions, they can also successfully 
be combined within one strategy (Blaikie 2000: 266). Multiple accounts can 
corroborate a consensus around a specific meaning, or throw into relief the existence 
of differing and even conflicting interpretations of events, language, and accounts of 
meaning (Blaikie 2000: 266). Multi-methods can be useful for elaboration and 
initiation (Wilson 1985, cited in Blaikie 2000: 267). Elaboration occurs when an 
initial understanding reached via one method is expanded using another (Blaikie 
2000: 267), for instance when an observation from canvassing was followed up on in 
an interview, or a description or interpretation from an interview corroborated 
through observation. Initiation occurs when non-convergent data are used to spark 
off new interpretations and suggest future areas of research (Blaikie 2000: 267). 
 
Stages of data collection 
Data was collected in two main stages, after an initial period in the field articulating 
and refining my research questions and the scope of inquiry. During this initial 
period, I formulated research questions and became familiar with the Democratic 
politics in Massachusetts through a combination of immersing myself in group 
discussions and events, reading news accounts, and generally hanging around. No 
official data collection or participant observation was undertaken during this period 
(roughly January – April 2005), but I did keep informal notes, continued reading 
scholarly work on the topic, and sketched out areas of inquiry to pursue in my 
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research.20 I tested and refined my interview schedule during a period of pilot 
interviewing, at which point I also began collecting primary documents and 
observing political events. This was followed by the main period of data collection, 
from April to September of 2006. I collected primary documents such as public 
records and news accounts throughout the research period. 
 
Table 2.1: Research timetable 
Research question formation January – April 2005 
Stage 1: Pilot interviews  January – April 2006 
Stage 2: Interviews, questionnaires 
participant observation 
April – September 2006 
 
Stage 1 
The pilot interview stage was critical to achieving good scientific practice in the data 
collection. Pilot interviews, along with some limited participant observation, 
provided the opportunity to ‘test’ and improve my interview questions. It also 
provided the opportunity to improve my skills as a researcher. 
I made a number of changes to the interview schedule during the pilot stage, 
substantially cutting down the number and scope of questions, and shifting to a more 
semi-structured format. While it was always my intention to use a semi-structured 
interview with more open ended questions, during pilot stage I refined the questions 
into subject areas which could be pursued in a more semi-structured manner. 
Initially, I started off interviews with a written questionnaire as a way of picking up 
routine and standard data points such as age, hometown, and the groups individuals 
participated in. However, during the pilot interviews it became clear that informants 
were conscious of the answers they had just given as to their previous and current 
involvements, and in some cases made reference to or excused how little experience 
                                                            
20 The ethical considerations of this stage of research were discussed with my supervisor, and 
guidelines for these practices set. 
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they had. As such these routine questions were moved to the end of the interview. 
This aided establishing rapport at the beginning and gave the experience more of a 
conversational feel. The other substantial change I made was to specify the scope of 
time which the questions referred to and/or when they referred to participation in 
specific organizations or campaigns, as opposed to their experience in general. I 
discuss the importance of these changes more in the section on Stage 2 interviews.  
The pilot stages also proved incredibly helpful in providing the time and space for 
improving and reflecting upon my own interview techniques. I listened to the taped 
interviews and made notes on specific practices, such as interrupting or making sure 
questions were asked in a neutral and balanced manner that needed improvement. 
This latter technique was extremely important when discussing potentially sensitive 
topics such as diversity within the Democratic Party and negative items such as their 
dislikes about the campaign work. In the early stages of interviewing, some friends 
and former colleagues who were involved in politics agreed to be interviewed. While 
it was clear that such personal connections would not be appropriate in the non-pilot 
interviews, speaking to someone I trusted helped to build my confidence as an 
interviewer. These interviews were followed by a ‘debrief’ session, in which the 
informant evaluated my performance, indicating where they felt lost by the 
sequencing of questions and thought things jumped around, topics they thought were 
interesting but we did not spend much time discussing, and my own comportment, 
including body language, note taking, conversation style, and attention span.  
Overall, the pilot interview stage provided a critical opportunity to focus the scope of 
my interview schedule, improve my interviewing techniques, and start off the 
interview data collection period feeling confident in my own abilities. Several of the 
pilot interviewees continued to be helpful throughout the research process, including 
referring me to other potential informants. Some were also critical for providing their 
own interpretations or analysis of events I did not entirely grasp the meaning of on 
my own, indicating fruitful lines of inquiry for follow up questions within interviews 
and aiding my understanding of the broader political dynamics of key races and in 





During the primary stage of data collection, I collected and analyzed documents, 
conducted participant observation, and recruited and undertook interviews. The 
interviews constitute the bulk of my data and provided the richest accounts. I review 
the primary documents and participant observation here before moving onto the 
interview solicitation, sampling, and related issues in the final section. 
Primary documents constitute an important source of data in qualitative research. I 
collected newspaper and media accounts, political and economic analysis from local 
nonprofits and think tanks, website content, political flyers, and materials from 
participant observation. I use these documents in two main ways, in providing 
context and corroboration. Some documents were helpful in, for instance, providing 
an account of the economic and political context of the research locale, included at 
the beginning of this chapter, and providing an ongoing paper trail of events through 
news and media (including websites) throughout the primary election period. Others 
were useful in corroborating interpretations provided by informants, particularly in 
conjunction with the analysis of campaign skills, in chapters four and seven. This 
latter use of primary documents was done through a content analysis, subjecting the 
language of written accounts to the same analysis as interview transcriptions.  
Participant observation was the most limited of the three data collection techniques in 
terms of the quantity of data collected; in quality they are a crucial component of the 
multi-method approach and provided a rich source of data. Participant observation 
included taking part in small group discussions about politics, attending meetings and 
rallies, and taking part in door-to-door canvassing. In dealing with the ethical 
implications of participant observation, I adopted two strategies. First, I disseminated 
information about my research as widely as possible. This included talking about my 
research to individuals with whom I was in direct contact (for instance, during 
canvassing and in small group meetings). I also sought out important gate keepers, 
and discussed my research with them so that they were aware of what I was doing, 
even when they were not actually present at events or in charge of events. Second, 
where possible, I obtained permission for participant observation. It was not always 
possible to identify the gate keepers for a specific event, like a rally or large public 
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meeting, but when gate keepers were identifiable I obtained verbal consent. Given 
the openness of the system and the ethos of encouraging participation, this was never 
a problem. Like the documentary analysis, participant observation was useful for 
providing context and corroboration. It was also key for elaboration, for instance 
supplementing discussions of campaigning organization, techniques and skills. 
Interviews were the prime source of data collection and of gathering participants’ 
accounts of their experiences, in their own words. A copy of the schedule is included 
in Appendix 3. After initial contact to solicit an interview, often by way of a third 
party introduction, the interview process started off with ‘small talk’. Often this 
included discussion of how I knew the person who introduced us, which provided the 
opportunity to make connections and begin to establish trust and rapport. By coming 
through a trusted source, I found that many informants were quick to accept my role 
as a researcher and assume I had some bare knowledge of the political world. In 
some cases I was already a familiar face from participant observation. After small 
talk, I would review an informed consent form, explain the research aims, what the 
content of the interviews would include, and how the interviews were used. 
Informants were given a copy of this cover page, which included my contact 
information, to keep. The consent form established that interviews were confidential, 
that is, they would not be identifiable in any of the published materials, and all 
primary data would be kept securely21. This period also provided the opportunity for 
informants to ask any further questions, in some cases they did, but in most cases did 
not. I also asked to record the interviews, using either an audio cassette or digital 
voice recorder (DVR). Some participants declined to be taped, and on two occasions 
the DVR broke before or during the interview. On these occasions I took detailed 
notes during the interview, and immediately returned to type out a narrative of the 
interview after it finished. In addition, I took notes on the interview schedule during 
all interviews. Interview transcriptions were produced after returning from the field, 
partially transcribed by myself and partially by a professional transcription service.22 
                                                            
21 Interview audio files, transcripts, questionnaires, and notes are stored in a locked filing cabinet at 
the University of Edinburgh. 
22 Transcription audio files were labeled using an alphanumeric system which anonymized the 
participant’s name. The transcription service was located outside the research locale, and the 
transcription contract included a statement of confidentiality. Approximately one fifth of the forty five 
hours of interview tape was transcribed professionally. 
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I also jotted down notes and thoughts on the interview after it was completed. 
Interviews lasted between 25 minutes and 3 hours, with the majority averaging 
between 40 and 50 minutes. 
At the end of the interview process I included a questionnaire, which included a 
series of open-ended questions about what other groups or organizations participants 
were involved in. The purpose with these was to establish a broader context of the 
participant’s experiences outside the focus on the immediate 2006 primary campaign 
participation. While the questions were open-ended, this section did not go into the 
level of detail as the rest of the interview. Informants identified the other groups they 
were involved in,23 and additional civic and political activities they had done in the 
past year. Thus the interview in almost all cases produced four documents: an 
interview schedule with notes taken during the interview, a questionnaire, an 
interview recording and transcription, and notes of my impressions and thoughts 
from the interview after it was completed. 
I constructed my interview sample through a combination of snowballing and 
solicitation at various campaign and committee events. I attempted to ensure a parity 
of gender and ages. I also endeavored to get a fairly even distribution between 
participants who were involved as a staff organizer and those who were involved as a 
volunteer. Although many more of my informants lived in the greater Boston area, a 
significant portion of informants were from outside this area. Table 2.1 summarizes 
these distributions.  
There were some sampling issues which were brought up during the pilot stages of 
the interview. First, my assumption that participation could largely be defined as 
being within one campaign or organizational setting did not coincide with how 
people were describing their current participation in the interviews. Some early 
participants reported doing an activity which could be described as participating in 
several groups at once. For instance, one participant described running on a slate as a 
delegate to the state Democratic Party convention in June 2006. 
 
                                                            
23 I used the same operationalization of ‘participate’ as in the rest of the case study, as having attended 
a meeting. A separate question covered political, non-profit, and charity donations 
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Table 2.2: Interviews 
Men 53% (24) 
Women 47% (21) 
Under 35 47% (21) 
Over 35 53% (24) 
Residence in metro Boston area 67% (30) 
Residence outside metro Boston 33% (15) 
Present campaign organizer 31% (14) 
Previous campaign organizer 31% (14) 
Volunteer 38% (17) 




They coordinated with the candidate’s campaign organization to be listed as part of 
the slate, went to their local town Democratic committee meeting to be elected, and 
then represented the town/candidate at the convention. With the exception of the first 
coordination with the candidate’s campaign, each of these activities could 
alternatively be described as participating in the candidate’s campaign or 
participating in the state party organization. Other informants more explicitly 
described their canvassing as being for multiple candidates or covering more than 
one role.24  
Indeed, some informant had trouble articulating which was their ‘primary’ 
commitment during the primaries, or unsure of their own role, or how it fit into a 
larger organizational context. In some cases, I was referred to an informant as being 
involved in one organization, only to find out that they were mostly concerned with 
their participation in another. In a couple of instances I was referred to interviews 
with informants who had no clear organizational role or title, and yet appeared to be 
somehow running or shaping an entire field division and strategy. So the lack of clear 
organizational boundaries and participants own ambiguity about their roles was in 
marked contrast to my initial assumptions.  
                                                            
24 While this practice was, as far as I know, not encouraged by campaign organizers and staff other 
than the coordinated campaign, it was not uncommon for respondents to report combining asking 
about a voter’s preference for candidates in gubernatorial, lieutenant governor, and additional 
statewide or legislative races. 
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At the same time, snowballing interviews was proving to be an effective method of 
gaining more interviews at both the staff and volunteer level, but it clearly did not fit 
with the idea of a sample restricted to just a few campaigns, or even the greater 
Boston geographical area. Often the recommendation would be to an individual in 
another town or area of the state, as organizational ties (i.e., participation in the same 
organization) and personal networks spread across the entire state.25 Given that some 
races were state-wide, and in some cases colleagues or friends were involved in the 
same organization but lived in different locations, this made sense. These experiences 
and observations led me to frame my understanding of the case as being clearly 
bounded at the state-level rather than the regional or local level. While I still had the 
choice to pursue a research design which limited the data collection to one 
organization or one geographical area, in my estimation this would clearly exclude 
understanding of the context in which people participated, and thus was out of step 
with my research aims and methods. Indeed, the grounded theory process of 
conversation between theory, including concept definition, and data, is as I describe 
it here. 
Of course, saying that the Democratic Party was not as clearly organized in practice 
as it looked on paper is not an entirely new proposition. In creating his party 
definition, discussed in the previous chapter, V.O. Key (1964) noted the difference 
between a clear party organization on paper, and a comprehendible and clear 
organizational hierarchy in his study of party workers. However, this observation of 
organizational and participatory overlap has not been applied to the work on civic or 
political participation more broadly. I will return to this issue again in the next 
chapter, but for now, it is suffice to say that I modified my interview recruitment 
strategy, and thus research design, during the pilot and early stages of the main data 
collection, as I became more aware of some of the problematic assumptions I brought 








All data was labeled and indexed in a Microsoft Excel document for ease of review. 
Paper copies of primary documents were also filed. Overall, I collected 1,132 
documents, including primary documents, field notes, questionnaires, interview 
schedules, and interview transcriptions. 
In the data reduction and presentation, I make use of some simple frequency tables in 
order to ease the interpretation of the qualitative data. This reduction is of the most 
basic kind, and can be used within an abductive strategy or framework (Robson 
2002). The distinction from a positivist tradition and survey-based design is in the 
claims not made for generalizability to a larger population, the form of concept 
validity, and replicability. 
Transcribed interviews and field notes were analyzed using QSR NVivo software. 
Overall, two methods of analysis are used throughout the thesis. First, NVivo was 
used in order to sort, code, and group documents and interview transcriptions in order 
to build concepts and categories. This process is not unlike clustering (Sage 2004), 
open and axial coding as in grounded theory (Bryman 2008: 543), or just plain 
coding (Lofland and Lofland 1995). The process of coding early, reading through 
transcripts (in the majority of cases, doing the transcribing), repetition, review, and 
revision into broader categories, as outlined by Bryman (2008: 550-2) was followed. 
In light of the problems with fragmenting data through coding, often sentences or 
long passages were coded, so that, for instance, the long description in chapter five of 
rewards and work involving ‘pebbles in a bucket’ were kept intact. This made it 
possible to go back and look at passages as a whole for further analysis, but also to 
compare passages or statements across all interviews within a particular code. In 
some of the analysis, particularly as in chapter four, five and seven, these codes were 
then grouped into broader categories which expressed a common theme.26 The codes 
within a category are linked most often by similar kinds of descriptions or phrases, or 
in some cases, by similar use of language (Bryman 2008: 555). Categories, then, 
provide a way to organize codes into broader themes and link the data with existing 
                                                            





research on participation. I discuss this process in more detail as relevant in the 
coming chapters. 
In addition to using language in the formation of categories, metaphor analysis in 
particular is used as a form of data analysis. Following Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
basic premise that meanings are expressed through metaphor, the specific metaphors 
that participants used are analyzed and unpacked. Metaphors are grounded in 
experience, structure ways of thinking and express complex meanings in compact 
terms (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Attention to the metaphors that people use in their 
everyday language highlights these meanings and structures of thought.   
In sum, this chapter states the research questions, aims, strategy, and methods used 
for the thesis. In order to answer the questions about how campaign volunteers and 
field organizers understand their own participation, and what they are doing when 
they participate, I adopt use an abductive strategy and an interpretative approach to a 
case study of participation in grassroots Massachusetts Democratic primary 
campaigns. While these questions are posed because I believe they are intrinsically 
worthy in their own right in the context of current affairs, the research is undertaken 
in order to contribute to scholarly discussion about what participation is and means, 
and how the specific participation studied here may relate to broader questions about 
civic decline, parties, and organization. The criteria for assessing good research 
practice are outlined, including issues of credibility, generalizability, transparency 
and ethics. Finally, the data collection and analysis methods are stated. I address a 
subsidiary research question in each of the following chapters, returning to the 
implications of the research and reflecting on the research methods in the final 
chapter. 
Chapter 3: Organization 
 
Party organizations have long captured public imagination, and the US Democratic 
Party is no exception. When Will Rogers made his quip about the Democrats 
throughout the 1920s and ’30s, he was capturing the sense of a party that no longer 
had the strength of an earlier, pre-progressive, bygone era. Yet big city machines like 
that of TJ Pendergast in Missouri, Richard Daley in Chicago, or the remnants of 
Tammany Hall in New York would continue to be the topic of political discourse and 
public interest in presidential elections and party politics for decades to come. 
Clashes with students and protestors at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago 
would later recast the image of the Party into one at war with itself, but both of these, 
of course, are a far cry from the highly organized stage-craft of the 2004 national 
conventions, where not a hair on John Kerry’s head could be seen to move out of 
place in what was a methodical presentation heavy on symbolism and short on 
excitement.   
Depending on one’s political predispositions, each of these images of the Democratic 
Party can provide preferred heroes or villains. Intimately linked with whichever 
villain or hero one chooses is a particular image of organization: organized, 
hierarchical, and powerful; fractious, bickering, and disarrayed; or centralized, 
vacuous and irrelevant. These images of organization inform the normative 
judgments about politics, and parties, that we subject them to. 
There is another way of seeing parties as well, that is, the view from those who build 
it, participate in it, and make it by their very actions. This ground-level view lacks 
the clarity of distance that a birds-eye perspective offers, but allows one to see an 
organization as unfolding, discovering its pieces in the way that one learns through 
participating over the course of several years and election cycles. How do these 
builders, these people on the ground get involved in party campaigning? And what 
do they get involved in?  
In this chapter, I explore these dual questions as a way of opening up enquiry into 
what exactly grassroots party organization is. I begin by presenting an overview of 
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the literature on getting involved in collective participatory organizations, and the 
problems of understanding how some of those organizations, namely political 
campaigns and parties, are conceptualized as being separate or linked. In this chapter, 
I depart from the predominant way of treating this question of engagement as 
essentially being about motivations, leaving that subject for chapter five, and instead 
use the question of getting involved as a way to enquire about what participants are 
getting involved in: what they first did, where, with whom, and how that involvement 
developed over time. Next, I present a description of campaign organizations, and 
focus specifically on the field work part of a campaign, including the roles that 
participants take in campaign field work. This primary focus on campaigns follows 
the trend that most participants engage first in a campaign, and then gradually 
become involved in the party organization and a network of participants. While this 
is essentially an ideal-type presentation, it sets clear parameters for the scope of 
enquiry for the rest of the thesis, marking off what is to be studied here and what is 
left for others to study elsewhere. I devote the penultimate section of the chapter to 
describing this loose network of organizations and individual ties within a 
community, and well as the differences in this community for those who are field 
work organizers and volunteers. Finally, I conclude by contextualizing this view of 
grassroots campaigns and campaigners within the organizational studies literature on 
organizational culture and communities of practice.   
 
Getting involved  
The first question about participation is often, why do people do it? Looking at the 
literature on first getting involved can be informative for the topic here by focusing 
on how motives are sometimes framed as a supply-demand or push-pull issue, and 
what this tells us about images of collective political action organizations. That is, do 
people provide supply for organizations due to their own internal motives, desires 
and attitudes that would push them into action, or is participation dictated by the 
demand an organization has for participants, thus pulled into action by the incentives 
offered by specific organizations and organizational leaders, or by the course of 
public and political events at a given time? Much of this literature uses the logic and 
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language of rational choice, framing participation as a calculation of costs and 
benefits that, when added up together will predict whether or not people will be 
involved. More recent efforts within this tradition have attempted to marry supply 
and demand explanations to provide a more dynamic account of participation. What 
is important to note here is how this kind of analysis also frames narratives about the 
development and degeneration of party organizations. 
Supply-side explanations focus on individual-based reasons for why and how people 
first come to be involved in collective political action. Some, such as Aldrich (1995) 
and May (1973), develop a general theory based on the intensity and extremity of 
policy motives – in short, those who care or whose views are the furthest from the 
mainstream will have the greatest incentive to get involved, far outweighing the costs 
(time, aggravation) of being involved (see also Fiorina 2004 for a more recent 
version). Others such as Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) develop a ‘resource 
model’ of participation which highlights how pre-developed skills and higher socio-
economic status lower the costs of participation. In their explanation, knowing people 
who are already politically engaged and thereby extend invitations to join, 
developing skills through previous civic participation, and more time and money to 
spend on voluntary civic and political engagement all contribute to raising the 
benefits and/or lowering the costs of participation. 
On the demand side, the question about people becoming involved in participation is 
focused on the incentives that organizations have for attracting members, and the 
ways in which they work to mobilize and persuade individuals to get involved. Susan 
Scarrow approaches the question of falling rates of volunteer membership and 
participation in British and German political parties by investigating whether and 
how the parties’ need for members (and volunteers) has shifted over a thirty year 
period (Scarrow 1996, 2002). She argues participation can be explained in part by 
looking at what parties think volunteers have to offer them in terms of resources – 
free labor supply for distributing materials and identifying voters, additional 
communication outlets, and a pool for fundraising outside state-based funding 
streams. Contrary to the belief that parties no longer have any need for volunteer 
members in the mass communication era, she argues that parties still do need 
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participants, though they may not have the power that they once did in previous mass 
party systems (Scarrow, Farrell and Webb 2002). Thus continuing participation can 
be explained in part by the fact that as long as they can still find them, parties will 
continue to try to attract party members and volunteers for strategic purposes. 
Much of the work on social movements, and especially resource mobilization theory, 
foregrounds the micro-context in which people become involved (Gamson 1975, 
Scott 1990). This broadly emphasizes macro-structural components (political systems 
and how open they are; see also Norris 2002) related to participation. McAdam and 
others have also highlighted the micro-structural, in particular the role that 
organizations play, in inducing individuals to participate, and in particular the role of 
political entrepreneurs within groups who work to bring more people into politics 
(McAdam1988). As Bennie points out, resource mobilization theory is still 
compatible with rational choice models, and Della Porta and Diani emphasize that 
social movement theory still sees actors as inherently rational beings (Bennie 2004: 
69). As such, supply side theories which focus on organizations and contexts all do 
so within the framework of costs and benefits, and approach participation as a choice 
given certain incentives and structural arrangements. 
Paul Whitely and Patrick Seyd (Seyd and Whitely 1992, 2002; Whitely, Seyd and 
Richardson 1994), meanwhile, have adapted the several-supply side models into a 
‘general incentives’ model which takes into account motives, resources, and 
availability of opportunity. In so doing, they literally translate the costs and benefits 
into complex mathematical calculations, providing explanatory statistical models of 
rates of participation and incentives. Getting involved, then, is a matter of calculus, 
of costs and benefits, opportunities, supply and demand. When a certain number of 
benefits add up and costs are overcome, the transition from ‘not participating’ to 
‘participating’ is achieved.  
The image this leaves one with is of organizations and individuals as primarily 
instrumental beings. Yet as Gareth Morgan (1986) famously points out, there are 
many ways of seeing organizations – and such an instrumental view is only one of 
many. The instrumental view of organizations has also dominated studies of parties, 
in no small part because parties are instrumental organizations. There are, of course, 
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many who have problematized or diversified the model of what parties are 
instrumental about beyond the immediate goals of getting elected (e.g., Muller and 
Strom 1999), but the frame is still,  predominantly, one which focuses on structures 
and instrumentality.  
 
Parties and campaigns 
As will be clear in the following section, participants describe getting involved in 
campaign field organizations and party organizations. In the literature on American 
political parties and campaigning, these two entities are often treated separately, with 
specialized texts and journals devoted to each. But are parties and campaigns really 
all that separate? The difference to some extent turns on which definition of party one 
uses. If parties are defined structurally – the party in government, organization, 
electorate – then campaigns are in the present day entities distinct from any of the 
party structures. Indeed, this is one of the important mid-twentieth century changes in 
party organization discussed in the introduction, where most candidates now have 
their own campaign organizations that are legal entities and structurally distinct from 
any one of the party structures. In a sense, each campaign organization consists of its 
own party triad: a candidate or representative in government, an organization, and 
voters in the electorate. 
From a functional point of view, however, parties and campaigns are more difficult 
to separate, and appear more closely intertwined. Campaign organizations are 
organizations, but their function, like state party organizations and local or regional 
party committees, is to get candidates elected. As Herrnson points out, the party 
bureaucracy can organize local party volunteers into GOTV “auxiliaries” for a 
candidate, effectively merging party and candidate campaign organizations 
(Herrnson 1994). This is also the approach more often taken in the literature on 
political participation, where participating in a candidate’s campaign (especially in 
the absence of card-carrying party members) is taken as de facto participation in the 
party. Huckfeldt and Sprague take this one step further, arguing that the decline of 
‘party’ participation only holds if one takes the narrowest of definitions of party 
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organization. Their South Bend, Indiana study of social networks and participation 
used working within a candidate’s campaign as an indicator of party activity, leading 
them to be much less cynical about the decline in the quantity of party activity in the 
1980s (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, 1995). In short, the participation literature 
essentially uses a functional definition of party when participation is defined 
functionally (doing a campaign activity) instead of structurally (being a card-carrying 
member). In this thesis I adopt a similar view, seeing campaigning as a party function 
and falling broadly under the definition of parties. This is not to say that the link 
between campaign and party organizations is still not a problematic or messy one, 
but merely that in the present case it makes the most sense to treat parties and 
campaigns as conceptually and inextricably linked.  
 
Getting involved: the view from participants 
All interviews started off with the same question. “So, how did you get involved in 
politics?” I would ask, and in almost every case it evoked a story. These stories were 
a good way to begin the interview in that almost everyone had a story or a reference 
for how they first became involved and they were familiar ice breakers, as one would 
be asked the same question by fellow participants in new campaigns or organizations. 
They provided a form of context, identity, and a way of knowing who you were 
working with if you knew who they first came in with and for what reasons. In this 
section, I present three of these stories that participants shared: one woman who went 
from anti-war volunteer to rookie staffer to campaign veteran in about three years; 
one man whose story starts with a friend’s family being involved in campaigns; and 
one man who started participating in college, ended up a lawyer and when we spoke 
was still involved. From these and other stories, I pull out some common themes of 
this first getting involved, and then present an ideal type drawn from those stories, 
highlighting commonalities in material circumstances and reasons given for first 
becoming involved. ‘Getting involved’ was not the stark choice that rational choice 
theories would suggest, but involved a period of developing political awareness and 
views, followed by action – sometimes at the invitation of other individuals or 
organizations – and then the development of a continued pattern of engagement. 
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Importantly, these stories show how campaigns are predominantly the point of entry 
into party politics for people who end up participating in myriad different roles. Later 
in the chapter, in the section on organization, I discuss these roles in more detail.  
 
The junior staffer 
Jen was never particularly political growing up, and in fact the first vote she cast was 
for a Republican in an open primary. Then with the Iraq War she got involved, at 
first with a group protesting the war. That turned into an internship with the Howard 
Dean campaign in the primary, and then working in a swing state for John Kerry in 
the 2004 general election. After recovering from having “curled up and died” after 
the end of that race, she was a journeyman staffer on several municipal and city 
council races, before eventually moving to the state to work on one of the statewide 
campaigns this time around. At the time of our interview, she had no plans for 
anything past the campaign except a booked vacation. 
 
The veteran volunteer 
“I believe it was 1968, I think I was fifteen years old and I had a classmate, a close 
friend of mine, whose brother was running for state senate that year,” Dave told me. 
It was just “stuffing envelopes, holding signs on street corners, going to rallies, you 
know canvassing, leaflet drops, that type of thing.” Through that – “jeepers that was 
almost forty years ago, huh?” – Dave met a bunch of people that he’s still friends 
with from the campaign, and has been involved ever since. “You get involved in one 
campaign and you find this sort of network of people, that you know are politically 
active, and you just get become part of that group.” Presently, Dave worked in 
municipal government, was chair of his local democratic city committee, working on 
a statewide campaign and preparing mainly for the general election. He was 
supporting one of the gubernatorial candidates, while also (and mainly) working to 




The occasional strategist 
“Setting aside like age 4 [holding signs] at the subway station with my parents in 
New York,” Bill explained,  
The first real involvement was 94, when I was in college, volunteering on a 
state senate campaign in New York state. During the summer, you know, I 
just didn't have a job, I didn't wanna go home, so I did that instead. I just got 
hooked up with it by someone who knew that this campaign needed 
someone, and I was just, you know, sticking labels on things, nothing 
substantive.  
 
The following summer he interned in Congress for a Senator, then worked on 
Senator Kerry’s re-election campaign in 1996, then worked at the state house for a 
couple of years. That was followed by law school. When we met at a fundraiser over 
a summer for one of the gubernatorial campaigns via introduction from a mutual 
friend (who also knew I was looking for people to interview), he was working for a 
lawyer and not heavily involved in this year’s campaigning – the exception being 
some advice giving and organizing for one of the down-ticket candidate’s field 
strategy and organization.  
Each of these stories, as we shall see, involves some common aspects of the getting 
involved stories from all the participants I spoke with. I divide these commonalities 
into several sections. I present descriptions of the antecedents to their campaign 
participation, and then first participation in collective action, which was 
predominantly in campaigns.  
As in the case of Bill, many participants (64%) started their account of how they got 
involved in politics by mentioning early experiences with party or electoral politics 
either through a family or school setting or both. For the former, this included 
experiences such as one description of being taken into the voting booth as a child 
and being told to ‘always vote Democrat and union,’ or standing outside subway 
stops to hand out leaflets for a reform mayoral candidate forty or fifty years earlier. 
One woman in particular related how she was volunteered for the Kennedy 1960 
presidential campaign by her parents, who failed to participate themselves but 
thought that her labor was as good a donation as any to a worthy cause and ‘the 
future of the Democratic Party’. Still others had a neighbor, relative, or close friend 
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who ran for local office and helped out on their campaign. In fact, friends and family 
members played a significant role in participants’ initial experiences, as eighteen of 
the forty-six interviewed (40%) reported their first involvement as happening along 
with or because of someone they already knew.  
Descriptions of school influences or general interest were also common, with a high 
school history course or participation in student government featuring strongly. In 
these cases, participants found that they had a certain aptitude or liking for politics, 
history or civics, and so went on to seek out such opportunities either while in high 
school or college. For one woman, this was a case of meeting a group of like-minded 
people in her introductory political science classes in college. In other cases, it was 
the experience of participating in student government that piqued their interest. 
These accounts fall broadly along the lines of what we know from prior research, 
where political socialization primarily takes place in the context of home and school 
life during the early and especially adolescent years. The importance of friends, 
family, and personal networks operating as a recruitment avenue into political 
activity is also well documented (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The main 
point worth noting is that the all participants who described some experience such as 
this had some link to politics previous to their engagement – either directly through a 
friend or family member who was involved, or via a broader interest in politics. Thus 
when they first came to participate in a campaign or party group, it was almost never 
the first time they were engaging with politics. 
 
First collective action groups 
Just as presidential campaigns are the most common “jump” into participation for 
voters (Campbell 1966, Gimpel et al 2007) so it is for participants as well. 
Campaigns are by far the most common first experience that respondents reported 
taking part in, with over half doing so (see Table 3.1). One third (16 of 45) of all 
respondents reported volunteering on a campaign as their first activities. Another 
four were involved with an anti-war candidate’s campaign, three worked on a 
campaign first, and two interned on one. All that these numbers suggest is what is 
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patently clear from participant observation, or to anyone who is familiar with the 
experience of campaigns: they are a major gateway for those who are new to party 
politics to get involved. 
 
Table 3.1 
First Activity and Group* Number of Respondents reporting (of 45) 
Volunteered on campaign 16 
Movements/Anti-War candidate 8 
Interned on campaign or in rep’s office 6 
Active in local/community politics 5 
Joined Democratic group 5 
Worked in politics or on campaign 4 
Went back to school for political career 1 
* - includes responses of activity undertaken whilst under 18 
If one counts those who volunteered or worked for an anti-war candidate along with 
other anti-war engagement, then we see that getting involved through anti-war 
movement politics is the second most common form of first engagement. Eight 
people in total responded that they first became involved either through activity in an 
anti-war movement (both anti-Vietnam and anti-Iraq War 2003) or supporting an 
anti-war presidential candidate (McCarthy 1968 and Dean 2004, respectively). In the 
four cases where people reported working for an anti-war candidate, it was very clear 
that this activity was undertaken with the intention of trying to find some way to 
protest the war, which appeared to be qualitatively different from the intention of 
trying to get a particular candidate elected. As one respondent explained it, it was 
after a particularly frustrating moment of feeling helpless about what was happening 
in Iraq that he decided to help out the Howard Dean campaign. This kind of account 
was more similar to those who described organizing an anti-war hearing or media 
event than those who described deciding to join a campaign in that they both were 
expressed and explained with reference to personal convictions. Thus as a first 
experience with being active in politics, it seemed to merit the distinction from other 
forms of early campaign experience. 
The remaining first experiences included being active in a community group or non-
partisan political issue (such as a school board or planning commission), and joining 
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a democratic group. Of the five who joined a group first, three joined one of the 
Young Democrats or College Democrats groups while at university. One participant, 
who had previously always paid attention to the news with his parents, got involved 
with the College Democrats club at his university in order to get tickets to a Bill 
Bradley- Al Gore debate in the 2000 primary. And for one woman, involvement in 
organized party politics only followed after years of working as a community 
activist, when she was approached to run for office. Finally, another participant also 
described her choice of transitioning from a career as an environmental engineer to a 
decision to join the political process in order to work towards environmental goals 
and as such had just started law school in order to qualify as a lobbyist. In this 
particular case the choice of going to law school was linked to political action; her 
involvement in campaigns and political groups followed this first choice. 
Taken together, these accounts provide several insights. First, it should be pointed 
out that the step into participation was often oiled by the fact that people were 
already relatively politically aware and often had friends or family who were 
involved. In this sense, becoming involved was not necessarily a hard and fast 
moving from one category into another. Indeed, in these explanations it is 
occasionally difficult to pinpoint where non-participation ended and participation 
began. Second, by far the single most prominent kind of collective action that 
individuals began taking part in was campaign organizations. They are much more 
prominent than party committees and standing organizations, in terms of first-time 
participation. While this may partially a case of pointing out the obvious, campaigns 
are not the only political organizations within a party, as we shall see. In the 
following section, I address campaign organization, and the role participants have 
within those organizations. I then discuss the other organizations that participants 
also get involved in.  
 
Campaign Organization 
For Anderson, joining the campaign for the gubernatorial candidate meant seeing that 
candidate speak at a local function, and then working with the fellow Democrats in 
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his town and campaign field staff to organize his local ward for the caucuses. He 
worked from home at night, calling local voters from a list of voters he downloaded 
off the campaign website. James joined the campaign he was presently working on 
when a colleague of a friend from another campaign called him up to interview for a 
staff position. He spent most of his days in the campaign office or out on the trail 
with the candidate at public events, town hall meetings, or local Democratic 
committee meetings. Bill received a call from an old friend from another campaign 
who was pitching one of the statewide candidates. At the behest of the friend, Bill 
started taking calls from the campaign field manager on how to organize getting 
enough signatures to get on the ballot, then went to the convention and spent 72 
hours straight organizing votes to make sure the candidate did get on the ballot. Other 
than the convention, most of his time was spent on the phone from his office.  
Audrey, on the other hand, simply went down to the state party headquarters and 
started making phone calls for whatever event or list that needed indentifying on the 
days she was there. She also did some organizing for her ward for one of the 
gubernatorial candidates, but that took up much less time. She also – of her own 
volition – compiled a list of civic and political groups for some of the campaign staff 
to get in touch with. Finally, Pattie spent most of her time working on environmental 
issues, but was so impressed when she heard one candidate speak that she dragged 
her husband to a fundraiser and had been busy helping out the campaign (in between 
her environmental work) ever since – organizing regional meet the candidate events, 
marshalling (and then keeping in line) all of her friends to support the candidate, 
decorating a float in the town parade with the candidate’s signs and bumper stickers, 
“yapping” to her doctor, the toll booth worker, and anyone who would listen about 
what a great guy this candidate was.  
Each of these individuals joined the campaigns they were working on in different 
roles, occupied different geographic and physical spaces, and were assigned different 
tasks. Together, they all made up part of the campaign field organization. And 
though in each of these cases this was not the first campaign they were working on, 
these vignettes illustrate what is not markedly different from the spaces, places, and 
roles that many described occupying on their first campaign. 
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Table 3.1 presents an ideal type of a campaign organization for a candidate 
competing at the statewide level. It is an ideal type because it identifies those roles 
and functions that every campaign must fill, and in an ideal world there would be one 
or many staff members devoted to each role. On campaigns pressed for resources, 
and especially for smaller campaigns, these roles (especially at the paid staff level) 
would likely overlap so that one person would do multiple jobs. It does, however, 
give a sense of all the roles and functions that make up a campaign organization.  
Any campaign involves fundraising, media, and research work, in addition to having 
the candidate himself or herself, and the candidate’s support staff. On a small 
legislative campaign or in a municipal race, these roles will be much more ad hoc – 
often a campaign manager, probably paid, some friends to help advise on strategy 
and a band of more friends, volunteers and supporters to do most of the work without 
pay. The ideal type here refers more to the larger, statewide campaigns which have 
the money to hire more full-time staff (the same general model would also apply to a 
presidential campaign, though functional groups would be divided across states as 
well). Down ticket statewide races or high profile legislative races would fall 
somewhere between the ideal and the smaller-scale version.  As noted in the table, 
most of the media, fundraising, and polling work on a larger campaign would be 
done by contracted staff or consulting firms.  
The field work would be done by a combination of some paid staffers and managers, 
usually volunteer organizers for the smaller districts (a city, say, or a precinct) and 
volunteers to do the actual work of contacting voters. It is this last section, of the 
campaign field work, that I will focus the thesis on. It is useful to know what the 
other sections of a campaign include, especially as there are some field staff 
interviewed who filled these other roles in addition to doing field work. However, it 
is really with the combination of field staff and volunteers that the thesis is 
concerned. 
An ‘organizer’ is defined as any full-time member of a campaign organization who is 
responsible for organizing and marshalling volunteers. Usually this involves being 
responsible for volunteers and voters in more than one district, and usually this is 






‘internship’ or for a friend, or on a short-term (one month or more) but full-time 
basis. A ‘volunteer’ is someone who is largely responsible for contacting voters via 
door-to-door canvassing or phone contacting. In all the cases of individuals 
interviewed, this was done on a volunteer basis although theoretically one could be 
paid to do this work.27  
Some volunteers could, in fact, be responsible for organizing a relatively small 
district – that is, a precinct, neighborhood, or town. These organizers are grouped in 
with the ‘volunteers’ because they shared more similarities with those who were 
primarily canvassing in other respects – they usually lived where they 
organized/canvassed, they did it part time, most of their actual time with the 
campaign was spent out in these neighborhoods or precincts, and often the organizing 
work was done at home with the help of a laptop and mobile phone. Like Anderson, 
these participants were responsible for organizing a small region, sometimes in 
conjunction with other volunteers from the area. They also tended to actually do 
much of the voter contact as well, unlike a more full-time campaign/staff organizer. 
The staff organizers, in contrast, would spend more time in the office, with the 
candidate, or in contact with the precinct/city organizers, and less time directly in 
contact with voters.  
The third role outlined in 3.2 is that of an ‘informal advisor’. Like Bill, these 
individuals were usually volunteering, and usually would spend most of their time 
only in contact with the campaign staff – even the managers of smaller campaign 
organizations. They did not necessarily do their work in the office, however, and 
would often work via phone from their own home or office space. Their hours 
worked were shorter than the full time staff, and more on par with other volunteers.  
 
 
27  Indeed, one statewide campaign was well known for using hired phone banks. However, this 
seemed to be more the exception than the rule in Massachusetts. 
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In terms of how a campaign organization looked, then, it could be quite different 
depending on the role in which one came in. For volunteers, the campaign might be a 
distant office that one went to only occasionally, with contact happening through one 
primary staff contact and otherwise consisting of fellow Democrats, friends and 
family in the same area. For organizers, it would primarily be an office experience 
shared with other staff members, some of whom did the same work and some of 
whom might be responsible for other areas (fundraising or media, for example). 
Informal advisors occupied a space that was physically and organizationally ‘other’ – 
neither entirely of the full time campaign staff, nor rooted in the places and 
interactions with voters in a specific constituency. The organization28 is thus spread 
over a wide geographic area and incorporates senior managers, mid-level organizers, 
informal advisors, foot soldiers and volunteers.  
 
After the campaign:  What next? What else? 
If campaigns are the front door to party participation, then what comes after one 
passes through the doorway? As it happens, the next step involved much more 
organizational variety than the first step. More participants joined their local town or 
city Democratic committee compared to their first engagement. Others went on to 
more campaigns, found additional political groups, or stuck with a group of people 
they had originally worked with across a variety of organizations. Since it is after this 
first engagement that many people reported getting involved in the party 
organization, I present its features here. Table 3.3 summarizes the different roles and 
functions of the chartered Massachusetts Democratic Party sub-groups. 
In addition, there are a number of organizations that fall under the Democratic 
National Committee charter but are also active at the state level, including the Young 
Democrats of America, National Federation of Democratic Women, and College 
Democrats of America. Further, some of the more rural and suburban areas organized 
their town or city committees into regional groups that covered all groups in a state 
                                                            
28 Having recognized the other campaign organizational components, hereafter ‘the organization’ will 
be shorthand for ‘the field organization,’ excluding the other campaign divisions 
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legislative district. While not formally chartered, these committees acted as the de 
facto town committees for several groups. 
Of all the chartered Democratic Party organizations, the town and ward committees 
are by far the most common ones to be involved in among the participants I spoke 
with, followed by the Young Democrats. 27 of 45 participants I spoke with were 
involved in their town or ward committee, 13 were involved in the Young 
Democrats, an additional 4 were members of the state committee, and 3 members of 
a regional committee and Democratic National Committee caucuses respectively.29 
These proportions are not meant to be representative of overall participation rates or 
patterns across the state, but simply give an indication of which organizations the 
participants I spoke with were involved in.  
The party organization groups are also significant because in the absence of active 
field campaigning work to do, these are the main forums for participation and 
voluntary party activity. Several participants who were chairs of their town or ward 
committees described organizing meetings around election calendars, so that 
participants would have something to do in the absence of campaigning, but regular 
meetings would be suspended during the general election so that all members could 
devote more time to working on candidate’s election campaigns. The party also holds 
an annual convention. In election years all candidates must receive 15% of the 
convention vote to have their name placed on the party primary ballot (in addition to 
receiving a number of signatures on the petition). In non-election years the party 
would have an “issue” convention where delegates would vote on the party platform. 
While highly important to some participants30, several others told me that “nothing 
happens” there – these off-year conventions simply serve to keep the grassroots 
involved. In other words, in one participant’s estimation, the issue conventions were 
basically participation for the sake of keeping participation. So at the very barest 
minimum, the party organizations assisted with candidate campaigns by urging its 
                                                            
29 Some participants were involved in more than one party organization group and others not at all. 
Thus the sum total of party organization participation does not match the number of participants. 
30 One participant I interviewed was involved in an effort to pass a “Scorecard” which would rate 
legislators based on how often they voted for measures supported in the State Charter, and make it the 
Scorecard part of the party’s documentation. 
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members to get involved in these campaigns, and they provided participants a place 
to gather and socialize in the absence of any campaigning work to do. 
 
Table 3.3: Party organization roles and functions 
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The participants I spoke with were no wall flowers. In addition to being involved in 
campaigns and party organizations, many were involved in other politically-oriented 
groups and civic organizations. These political groups ran the spectrum from running 
fully-fledged field campaigns in support of endorsed candidates and running their 
own candidates in the primaries to researching and endorsing candidates for elective 
office across the country. Both local and national, these groups provided an 
opportunity for participants to specialize on whatever issues or causes they were 
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most interested in. Finally, most participants also reported belonging to civic 
organizations. Table 3.4 summarizes the average number of groups that the 
participants I spoke with were involved in. The median is slightly lower, at a total of 
5 groups rather than 6.  
Table 3.4: Average number of groups participating in 
  Party Volunteer group Campaign Political Civic Total
Average groups 
participated in  1.33 1.41 0.59 2.04 5.85
 
Differences by group – organizer, volunteer, and informal advisor 
Having identified three different roles in field work organizations let me highlight 
some differences in the experiences as patterns discussed so far. As discussed in 
chapter two, participants were assigned to one of these three groups based on their 
primary role in the most important campaign that they were involved in at the time of 
the interview. Placing people into groups based on the ‘ideal type’ roles works in 
large part because the ‘ideal type’ is built from the collective accounts of experiences 
participants gave. In the course of the interview, they were asked to identify the most 
important campaign they were presently involved in as well as providing a 
description of what they did and, if applicable, the title they held for what they were 
doing (more often than not, most people did not identify a specific title, rather 
described what they were actually doing). Two clear trends emerge from looking at 
the data by role. First, while organizers and volunteers will share many experiences, 
common ways in which they started, or functions completed, there is also an 
additional set of activities, experiences, and ways of first getting involved that are 
exclusive to the organizers. In this sense, they operate as a sub-group within the 
common experiences of those participating in field work. 
Second, while informal advisors are in many ways in between the volunteers and 
organizers (in ways which will be explored more in the next chapter), they are 
exclusively drawn from the ranks of those who have served as campaign staff in the 
past. In other words, previous campaign staff experience is a necessary precondition 
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for working as an informal advisor. Having been socialized as organizers their 
experiences and explanations are more like the organizers than volunteers. Where, in 
the coming chapter, I compare only organizers and volunteers, informal advisors 
have been grouped into the organizer category. 
In terms of early experiences, the participants I interviewed who were currently 
working as organizers or informal advisors were more likely to cite interest in school 
or a sense of aptitude for what they were doing compared to volunteers. Conversely, 
those who were currently volunteering were much more likely to mention family 
members or friends who participated and got them engaged in politics. From the 
start, then organizers were more likely to frame their awareness of politics as one 
stemming from a sense of aptitude or thinking about involvement in terms of a 
career. 
In terms of first group involvement, an equal number of organizers were first 
involved in campaigns as volunteers (seven volunteered at first compared to six who 
interned full time or were hired). However, of the twenty five currently volunteering, 
seventeen started off volunteering. An additional six volunteers went on to work full 
time on another campaign and were now volunteering again. Of the six informal 
advisors, four began by volunteering and went on to work on campaigns, while only 
two started off working. What all of this tells us together is that of those who started 
off volunteering on a campaign, about as many went on to either work on a campaign 
or continue volunteering. Present organizers could have started any number of ways. 
However, if one started off working, it was extremely unlikely to then end up 
volunteering (as only two of the forty five participants did). One could move ‘up’ 
into working, but rarely did one move ‘down’ into volunteering if one did not start 
there.  
Finally, organizers were involved in fewer different campaigns at the time of 
interviewing when compared to volunteer and informal advisors were involved in 
even fewer campaigns and party organizations. This is not surprising – given that 
organizers were working full time (which often meant more than an average work 
week) they had less time available to work on other campaigns, whilst it was easier 
for volunteers to combine working for more than one candidate at once. However, 
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they were otherwise no less likely to be involved in party organizations, other 
political groups, or civic organizations. In sum, organizers and informal advisors 
have some distinguishing common experiences and explanations, compared to 
volunteers. But they also have a fair number of shared characteristics. There were no 
characteristics that were exclusive to volunteers. 
 
Discussion 
Taken altogether, what does the Democratic Party grassroots organization look like 
from the perspective of participants? Several key features stand out. First, although it 
has been mentioned only relatively briefly, personal ties play a prominent role in 
both pulling individuals into party participation and, for those participants who have 
been involved for more than one campaign cycle, continuing involvement “network 
of people,” as Dave called it. These networks include friends and acquaintances that 
one sees in and out of the different organizations. For volunteers, this was often the 
same group of people in a given geographic area; for organizers and informal 
advisors it can involve a network of friends and colleagues who are full-time political 
organizers and staff spread across the state. In this sense it was a relatively stable 
group of people who broadly were all on the same side and intermittently re-arranged 
themselves into different ‘teams’ (campaign organizations) – sometimes competing 
against each other in the primaries, often on the same or complementary teams in the 
general election.31 While the teams may not be exactly the same each time, they are 
from the same pool of players, some of whom have played together previously.  
Second, as noted, candidate campaigns figure prominently as points of entry and as 
places of continued engagement. This is complemented by party and other political 
organizations and civic organizations as places of grassroots participation. As such 
participation in grassroots organization is really participation in grassroots 
organizations. Depending on the time of year or point in the election cycle, some 
organizations will feature as sites of more activity than others. However, the 
networks of personal connections are, notably, not matched by formal ties between 
                                                            
31 I am grateful to Eva Sorensen for sharing this metaphor with me. 
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organizations. While those organizations laid out in the party charter are formally 
linked to one another, there are technically no formal links from party organizations 
to candidate’s campaigns (other than broad language about supporting candidates), 
nor are they linked to the non-party and non-candidate political groups. Nor are there 
any links between separate candidate campaigns. Moreover, in some cases 
organizational leaders are at pains not to coordinate activities with one another. 
While some town committees do endorse primary candidates others choose not to, 
and some unopposed candidates may work with party organizations in the primary 
and general election but this is on an ad hoc basis. Structurally, there is no 
relationship to speak of, functionally they may all do the same thing but only 
sometimes in a coordinated manner. The organization of organizations does not 
happen at a formal level between organizations. 
Third and finally, participating in grassroots campaigning involves a certain set of 
activities that are relatively constant across organization and election cycle and are all 
centered on contacting voters. These include going door-to-door to speak to voters, 
phoning voters, holding signs for a candidate and putting up lawn signs, and speaking 
to one’s circle of (less engaged) friends, family and colleagues about a candidate. It 
also involves organizing candidates, keeping track of voter IDs in a database, and 
recruiting fresh volunteers.  
Given these multiple organizations, their lack of coordination, and very non-
instrumental image created by all this, what are participants participating in when 
they do grassroots field work? This gets back to the question of what organization is. 
If one considers organization solely as structure, or coordinated instrumental action, 
then clearly there is nothing organized about grassroots field work beyond any one 
candidate campaign. But if one sees organization as something else –a body of 
activities and functions, a relatively stable group of participants who share short-term 
and long-term relationships with one another, and – as I shall show in the next 
chapter – a shared body knowledge, understanding, and sense of how to do those 
practices and activities, then one can see grassroots field organizations as a network 
of participants connected by personal relationships, practices, and understandings. In 
this sense, one can see it as an organizational culture. 
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I argue that the grassroots network of campaign organizations operates in many ways 
as a culture. There are many ways and means of defining culture, but here I follow 
Schein (2001) and his clear working concept of organizational culture. He defined it 
as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way 
to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein 1993, reprinted in 
Shafritz and Ott 2001: 373-4). The major categories of phenomena that fall within 
organizational culture include, among others, group norms; espoused values; formal 
philosophy; rules of the game; embedded skills; habits of thinking, mental models 
and/or linguistic paradigms; and shared meanings (Shafritz and Ott 2001: 372). 
While most of the rest of the thesis will not focus on the culture of these grassroots 
organizations and their participants, it is a useful organizing concept for highlighting 
what they have in common and the phenomena that are part of the focus of study. It 
is useful for framing and thinking about how the enquiry is conducted.  
Participants are bound together by common tasks, tacit understandings, ways of 
knowing, norms, relationships, and styles of engagement. To extend the team 
metaphor, these players not only play on the same teams over and over again, but all 
develop a common repertoire of playing, norms about how to play the game, and 
beliefs about the best way to play the game. Highlighting this network of participants 
as a culture serves two purposes. First, it allows us to work with existing literature on 
organizational culture to foreground and focus the analytical lens on some aspects of 
participation that are, in other cases, neglected or overlooked. Saying that something 
operates as if it were a culture engages the researcher in a form of interpretative 
research (Yanow 2004); saying that these grassroots participants operate as if it 
was/they were a culture renders these ‘cultural’ elements visible. This extends the 
concept of what participants participate in beyond both a structural and functional 
conception of parties. In other words, participation is not just fulfilling a campaign 
function, and therefore operating in an implicitly narrow, instrumental fashion. 
Participation involves being part of a network of people, and a series of organizations 




Understanding participation as participation in a culture that extends beyond any one 
campaign organization or party committee also has important implications for 
defining a party. From the idea here of participants bound by common sense of how 
to do common tasks, a functional definition of a party makes more sense than one 
which emphasizes just organizational structure. Yet this only covers part of what a 
party is. Placing this network of grassroots participants and what they do under the 
umbrella of being part of ‘the party’ expands the definition of what the party is to 
include customs, norms, ways of thinking, and habits or behaviors as well as simply 
structures, rules, and/or organized instrumental action. It provides the basis for re-
interpreting the role of grassroots participants as part of the party and what the party 
is and becoming in the early part of this new century. It complements Galvin’s 
(2008) account of a changing Democratic Party organization nationally. Where he 
highlights the rejuvenation of state party organizations, both financially and in their 
ability to conduct grassroots campaigns, this thesis provides an image of what, in the 
case of Massachusetts, has grown up from below, around, and through this 
investment in the state parties. In this sense organization, like participation, is not 
solely about instrumentality and functionality, but about networks, relationships, and 
teams of people who work together in changing configurations. 
Importantly, Schein (1993) does not conceptualize organizational culture as a 
monolithic entity in which every single person shares the same norms, habits of 
thinking, or embedded skills. Indeed, it is important to speak of sub-cultures as well. 
In this sense there are limits to the notion that the network of grassroots participation 
observed here is meaningfully part of the Democratic Party, as there are some 
participants who, despite working for party candidates and regularly attending party 
ward and town committee meetings would decidedly not consider themselves part of 
‘the party,’ nor would they be interested in working for the party. Some participants 
consider themselves working only for a specific candidate or in opposition to the 
party, and I will argue in chapter six that the campaign organizers in many ways 
operate as a sub-culture unto themselves. Neither of these arguments in and of 
themselves undermine the concept of shared activities, assumptions, and norms, but 





I will return to the issue of contextualizing this combination of party organization, 
and especially bureaucracy, and grassroots networks alongside other studies of 
participation in similar organizational combinations in the final chapter, and the 
implications for situating the study of political parties. In the next chapter, I’ll 
explore what Schein identifies as embedded skills and group norms. Embedded skills 
are the “special competencies” that group members learn and are passed on without 
necessarily needing to be written down, and group norms are the “implicit standards 
and values that evolve in working groups” (2001: 372). I focus more closely on 
canvassing and doing field work, and what participants learn, how, and the 




Chapter 4: Learning 
 
A canvass: 6 August 200632 
I got an email from Joe last Wednesday, after having gotten a phone call 
from him on the previous Saturday, which I ignored as I was out of town. So 
I emailed back right away and said I’d come canvass this weekend. 
At 3:40 on the day of the canvass I got a call from Joe just checking in (we 
were supposed to meet at 3:30). When I finally made it to Joe’s house and let 
myself in to the back, I found Joe there along with his wife and Karin, 
another canvasser, all ready to go. There were clipboards laid out for 
canvassing, with literature attached, pledge cards, a walk sheet, 
buttons/stickers for us to wear, a map of where we were going (handwritten, 
with the number of houses on each street), bottled water, bumper stickers, 
and pens. After Joe introduced me to the group, it was agreed that I would 
team up with Karin, who had canvassed for this candidate a couple of times 
already. 
We went over the walk sheets, where Joe had put on every registered voter 
at the different streets, including Unenrolleds33 and Republicans. The idea, 
what the campaign wanted, was to knock on the doors of all the D and U 
houses… Joe explained the coding system,34 and what to do with the pledge 
cards, and we chatted for about fifteen minutes before heading out. We 
hopped into Joe’s Prius and I asked if this was strong territory for the 
candidate. Joe reported that the last time they went out they only met one 
person who supported another candidate, and that was a guy who said you 
know, I would be voting for him [our candidate] but one of my good friends 
is very good friends with one of the other candidates, so I sort of have to 
vote for him… 
I manned the board, looking at who was registered at a house and telling 
Karin the names so when she rang the bell, I went to the next door, and so on 
– leapfrogging doors was a trick for covering more doors in less time used 
on one of the last campaigns I worked, and we put it to good use here. The 
first house we went to was on a dead end street. No one answered the door, 
but there was someone out on the porch35 – foreign, though, so we just left 
literature. The second house, everyone was taking a nap (and we already had 
one supporter down at that house) so we left some more lit with the guy at 
the door. As we left I noticed a car with a bumper sticker for the candidate in 
the driveway. And so on – we didn’t talk to anyone on that street…  
We stopped by a house where there were already a couple of supporters, I 
stuck my head in and said hello, we’re in the neighborhood. The man was 
amused but said hello and thanks for coming by. There was a couple sitting 
                                                            
32 Adapted from field notes 6.08.06 
33 Houses with registered Democratic (D) and Unenrolled (U – no party affiliation) voters 
34 1-5 indicated voting preference (1 strong for the candidate, 2 lean, 3 undecided, 4 lean against, 5 
strong against), Not home/left message, wrong address/moved away/deceased. 
35 Many houses in this area had three units in them, making the porch a communal area. 
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outside in a garden, house sitting for whoever’s place it was, but they were 
not registered voters. We also talked to a guy who came bounding down the 
stairs to the door wearing a blue Wisconsin Democratic Party shirt. He said 
oh yeah, he’s our guy, right? And he was enthusiastic and happy to see us. 
He, however, was registered in the next city over, and the other folks in the 
house were registered in California, and wanted to keep their registration 
there. We swapped stories, and he offered his house as a rest point if we 
needed a bathroom, or water or anything… I talked to a nice guy who was 
unfortunately Canadian, while Karin went to the next door where she knew 
the woman, as they were in the neighborhood alliance together. After a long 
discussion about some local maps that were just printed up, the conversation 
turned the race we were canvassing for. She said you know I’m just not 
convinced. After more conversation that wasn’t going anywhere, Karin 
agreed to help out with distributing the community maps, and we headed 
on… 
A couple more not homes, and Joe caught up with us, said that there were a 
couple of houses we had missed, as one of the walk sheets wasn’t in his 
pack. We headed back to the car get the extra sheet. I asked if he had gotten 
anyone home, he said not many. But the good thing about doing this now, 
Joe said, was however many doors you knocked now you didn’t have to get 
them done in September. I agreed… We all headed back, and talked about 
the next time we’d do stuff. No phone banking, but the state rep who was up 
for re-election was doing some work on Friday doing voter registration. My 
weekends were going to be busy (they were also going out canvassing for 
the next two weekends, weather permitting) but I would join them for the 
Friday event. I grabbed the unused voter registration cards – two house 
mates still had to register – and we all headed home. 
 
In reviewing my field notes from this and other canvassing trips, I was amazed to see 
how many of the little tricks, the lingo and the pacing of field work have faded from 
memory in the intervening time since returning to write up the PhD thesis. 
Leapfrogging houses, finding people from outside of the district, how individual 
voters are referred to by their voter ID code (“She’s a 3”) were all everyday parlance 
for doing fieldwork, made rusty for lack of use. Yet at one point, I did know an awful 
lot about canvassing – knowledge that was shared by my fellow canvassers, tacit, and 
unremarkable. 
How do people learn to do field work? Who teaches them, where and how? What is it 
that people need to learn, or feel they need to know, in order to do field work well? 
Do all people learn the same things, or are there differences between what is learned 
for people in different parts of the field work organization? And, what can that 
learning and teaching tell us about the organization and participation more broadly? 
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In the last chapter I introduced the concept of the grassroots political campaigning 
organizations as a culture, and in this chapter I explore learning as what happens after 
participants join grassroots campaigning organizations. Political participation takes 
place among a network of people who often know each other, share norms and ideas, 
and have developed ways of practicing politics. Becoming part of this group involves 
learning these norms and ways of practice. This chapter picks up from where chapter 
three leaves off with joining. It focuses on becoming, on the transition from 
participating for the first time to knowing how to participate well, from joining 
organizations to being a part of organizations. 
While the literature on political parties and socialization does theoretically cover 
learning, in practice very little research has been done outside the focus on 
socialization of attitudes and beliefs. This focus reflects a broader research agenda on 
political socialization which foregrounds acquiring attitudes, beliefs and party 
identifications, but learning how to actually practice participation is by and large 
ignored. Instead, I turn to the literature on learning as developed in organizational 
studies, drawing particularly on Wenger’s concept of communities of practice and 
Yanow’s work on organizational learning and culture. Each in their own research 
emphasizes aspects of learning that are applicable to my material and data of 
volunteers, organizers, and informal advisors doing field work campaigning. After 
reviewing some of the salient aspects of these approaches, I present data on learning 
amongst grassroots campaigners. By building on the focus on practices, roles and 
organizational learning, I show how participants learn individually and an 
organization learns to campaign. Importantly, while there is room for conflict 
between those in different organizational roles, such conflict is by and large avoided 
through the multiple and changing roles individuals take and the presence of informal 
advisors. I finish the chapter by reviewing the concepts of local and scientific 
knowledge, finding that it is more a case of differences of scale of knowing than the 
quality of knowing when specific to grassroots campaigning. By focusing on the list 
of identified voters that a grassroots campaign produces as an artifact of 
organizational knowledge, I show how scientific and local knowledge can be 
complementary in their application and theorization. Finally, by focusing on learning 
I add another aspect to the reconceptualization of participation beyond its 
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instrumental focus, showing how participation is work, and therefore benefits from 
being analyzed like work and the insights gleaned from studies of work and 
organizations.  
 
Socialization and learning 
Socialization is the process through which individuals come to acquire the “attitudes, 
values, norms, behaviors and knowledge customary or desirable” for a group of 
people (Dodson 1990: 1122). The literature on political socialization has, by and 
large, tended to focus on the question of how people gain the political attitudes and 
orientations that they do. This may include attitudes towards authority, the law, and 
policy thinking, as well as partisan preferences and voting habits (Merelman 1973; 
Almond and Verba 1963). This tends to take place during adolescence and early 
adulthood, highlighting the importance of family and education (Almond and Verba 
1963) in the process of socialization.  
Previous research on the socialization of US party activists focused on the influx of 
unconventional, amateur participants into the party system, and the problems this 
presented for norms of party loyalty and organizational maintenance (Dodson 1990; 
Miller and Jennings 1986). Using survey and limited interview data, research showed 
that new party participants initially held hostile attitudes towards the party 
establishment, and Wilson (1960) and Kirkpatrick (1976) were among the most 
forceful in arguing that the changing motivations for party activism and attitudes 
about the party presented a fundamental challenge to the survival of American 
political parties. However, panel data suggested these attitudes were transformed into 
more traditional patterns of stronger party loyalty and identity, so that the potential 
threat to party organization and maintenance from new activists never actually 
materialized (Abramowitz 1983; Dodson 1990; Miller and Jennings 1986). In short, 
this research portrays socialization as the changing of attitudes about the party itself 
for a particular group of party activists over a twenty year period. 
Presumably, if socialization provides the attitudes, norms, values and behaviors for 
people in a particular group, then it is a learning process. Yet as Dodson remarks the 
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socialization process itself remains “shrouded in the proverbial black box” (1990: 
1123). The focus on attitudes and beliefs essentially overlooks process and practice. 
This can partially be explained by the theory of incentives and rewards for 
organizational participation which underpinned Wilson and Kirkpatrick’s prediction 
of party downfall (Kirkpatrick 1976, Wilson 1963). In other words, if the problem 
with new activists is that they lack the norms shared by other party activists (e.g. 
loyalty and party identity) which are crucial to maintaining the current party system, 
then of course these attitudes regarding the party are of primary importance for 
researchers. However, this still leaves learning practice (as opposed to attitudes) 
overlooked. Essentially, the instrumental view of participation which focuses on 
rewards for set motivations skews the research on learning towards attitudes and 
away from other topics. 
In order to ask about how participants learn about practicing politics, then, I draw 
from some of the learning literature in organizational studies that is consistent with 
the view of organizational culture set out in chapter three. To recap, Schein identifies 
embedded skills and special competencies that organizational members learn and are 
passed on as part of organizational culture (Schein 1993). More specifically, Lave 
and Wenger (1991) developed the concept of situated learning, emphasizing how 
newcomers learn through legitimate peripheral participation (see also Wenger 1998, 
2000), and Yanow (2004) has emphasized the role differences and kinds of 
knowledge differences, as well as the unique aspects of looking at organizational 
learning as a collective endeavor.  
Wenger defines practice as what people “develop in order to be able to do their job 
and have a satisfying experience at work… It is doing in a historical and social 
context that gives structure and meaning to what we do” (Wenger 1998: 47). 
Practice, for Wenger, is always social practice, and he defines it as being composed 
of several parts: meaning, community, learning, boundary, locality, and knowledge 
(Wenger 1998: 47). Crucially, being part of a community of practice involves 
engagement and doing with others; membership in a community of practice is not 
denoted by formal role so much as by engaging in practices and actions together.  
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Earlier, Wenger developed this concept of practice along with Jean Lave in Situated 
Learning. In that study, they focused on apprenticeships as a form of legitimate 
peripheral participation (Lave and Wenger 1991), by which they meant that 
apprenticeships were initially organizationally peripheral, providing newcomers the 
opportunity to learn practice by doing. Through the process of situated learning, 
newer apprentices become more central to a community of practice until they are in 
turn running it and teaching new apprentices (Lave and Wenger 1991). For Wenger, 
learning and organizational movement are part and parcel of the same process. 
While Yanow notes that in many respects her work and Wenger’s overlap, especially 
an emphasis on the collective quality of learning, she finds that learning is not 
necessarily coupled with organizational movement  or progress within an 
organization (Yanow 2000: 260). On the contrary, individuals can learn simply to 
stay in the same role and in the same place and in order to do a job well. By taking 
the concept of learning beyond the apprenticeship model to look at how participants 
learn in all areas of an organization, such as in Cook and Yanow (1993), one can 
view learning as more about movement into an organization rather than through it. 
More broadly, Yanow sets out an interpretative approach to organizational learning 
that sees organizational learning as not just the sum of individuals learning all 
together or anthropomorphizing organizations (Cook and Yanow 1993, Yanow in 
Shafritz and Ott 2001). Rather, it is focusing on “the collective and its situated acts 
(including language use) engaging the artifacts of daily work related practices, 
including the non-exclusively cognitive (such as tacit and kinesthetic36 knowledge) 
and the non-exclusively change oriented” (2000: 256). One important point here is to 
note the role of artifacts as repositories of organizational learning. Flutes, to take one 
example, are artifacts that reflect the learning of each of the flute makers who know 
how to make one valve or fit two specific pieces together; a completed flute is a 
repository of collective organizational learning (Cook and Yanow 1993). 
Recognizing the collective aspects of organizational learning, however, does not 
mean that organizational knowledge is necessarily uniform or agreed upon. 
                                                            
36 Derivative of kinesthesia, “awareness of the position and movement of the parts of the body by 
means of sensory organs in the muscles and joints” (OED), often referred to as muscle memory. 
Olympic athletes, for instance, have highly developed kinesthetic knowledge. 
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Organizational knowledge may vary across organizational roles, so that those at the 
organizational peripheries may be privy to specific, situated, local knowledge that is 
neither understood nor valued by central organizational managers and leaders. 
Instead, these latter organizational actors may favor scientific knowledge, that is, 
knowledge that is generalizable, classroom taught, explicit and theory-based (Yanow 
2004: S12). Note that the concept of organizational learning as cultural-collective 
applies only to local knowledge and not the scientific kind (Yanow 2004: S21). In 
some cases, these differences in learning and therefore knowledge can overlap or 
contribute to tension within an organization between central and peripheral 
participants (Yanow 2004: S14). In other cases local knowledge may be disregarded 
or simply unknown (Yanow 2004: S9). 
Thus while seeing organizational learning through an interpretative analysis as a 
collective endeavor this does not preclude the possibility of also recognizing multiple 
kinds of learning, or multiple ways of knowing in an organization. As I will show in 
the coming pages, both of these ways of knowing are present among grassroots 
organizers, though tension was not a key feature of organizational knowledge. 
I start with what training programs and ways of learning participants engage in once 
they join a campaign, and the skills that they learn in order to do their job well. To 
employ a team sports metaphor again, these skills include both techniques (how to 
pass a ball) and ‘game sense’ (when to pass a ball and under what circumstances), 
and the most successful teaching practices focused on game sense rather than 
technique. I then explore how these skills, techniques, and trainings are different for 
organizers and volunteers, including the specific, contextual and local knowledge 
that more volunteers and informal advisors have access to, and how informal 
advisors serve as translators internally to campaign organizations. Finally I explore 
the list of indentified supporters as an artifact of organizational learning and use it to 
reconceptualize scientific and local knowledge. 
Overall, participants did not think that field work was particularly complex, and “it’s 
not rocket science” was an often repeated phrase when I asked participants about 
how they did it and doing field work well. As one participant put it, “It's just a lot of 
grunt work, making the calls, using common sense.” Or as another said, “So creating 
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phone caps [quotas], I mean, it's nuts and bolts.  It's not rocket science.  And whether 
it's city council, state rep, or presidential, really when it comes to field and GOTV 
and voter ID, it's not that different.” Essentially, field work is field work and what 
participants learned had become taken for granted to the extent that they saw nothing 
remarkable in what they did. Indeed, in a very narrow sense what field work entailed 
was not difficult at all – picking up the phone and calling someone, knocking on a 
door, or just holding a sign is relatively straightforward. However, these are simply 
the techniques through which field work is accomplished. Understanding how to do 
these tasks – these techniques of field work – involves other skills and knowledge. 
These include game sense, how to handle oneself and be part of an organization, role 
expectations, and more. By asking about training and doing field work well, these 
additional aspects are brought into focus. 
 
Training 
Although a number of campaigning organizations offered some form of campaign 
training session, most participants learned on the job, while doing their first 
campaign participation. For organizers this could take the form of an ‘internship.’ Of 
those who did do a formal campaign training, most did not find them helpful. The 
sense that field work is not adaptable to book learning and teaching highlights the 
contextual, knowing-in-practice nature of doing field work.  
 
Learning on the job 
One informal way of teaching participants how to canvass is the process of pairing 
up new and old participants on the campaign trail. This was the case in my 
canvassing session with Karin. Even though I already had extensive canvassing 
experience before, because that August day was my first time with this particular 
campaign I was paired up so that I could learn how this group of people did things. 
This canvass was described as slightly different because they were casting a wider 
net (to include the unenrolled voters) and wider purpose (attempts to persuade, and 
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not just ID/turn out the vote).  Pairing up new and old volunteers provided the 
opportunity for supervised doing under the watchful eye of a more experienced 
participant. 
At one point, before another canvass, Joe actually organized a mini on-the-job 
training before heading out to go door knocking. Newer participants were given a 
chance to practice the canvassing script through role play, first by watching Joe do it, 
and then trying it themselves. This was an opportunity to recognize different 
scenarios – when a voter was a strong supporter and might be receptive to becoming 
a volunteer, when a voter was undecided and how to deliver a persuasion message, 
and when they were hostile and clearly not interested. This session was unusual in 
that it was the only time I saw or heard of using role play to prepare for a canvass. It 
was a way of practicing the ‘main scenarios’ option that was one step further than 
what was available through the canvassing information packet and still attempted to 
provide a practice-based learning environment.  
This kind of practice, even as an exception, was more about previewing potential 
situations and thinking through one’s response than it was about memorizing a 
canvassing script or a set of facts that were outlined in the campaigning packet. 
Rather than a replacement of learning what to do on the campaign trail it was more 
like a supplement, the way an athlete might try a certain kind of pass before the game 




A similar practice-based approach to learning is evident through the experience of 
internships for many of the participants who went on to become organizers. As 
described in interviews, these internships involved not only learning the nuts and 
bolts of field work, but it was when they identified learning about the norms of doing 
field work in terms of the expectations for long hours put in for low pay, and  how 
they gained access to personal networks, which produced future jobs. In this way, 
internships (and to a lesser extent shadowing on the campaign trail) function in much 
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the same way as apprenticeships in providing the space for legitimate peripheral 
participation (Lave and Wenger 1991).  
Nine participants reported having completed some sort of internship, six in 
congressional or representative’s offices, and three on campaigns. These internships 
were a key way to gain access to job and become part of a community of 
practitioners. Rather than controlling intake through any formal professionalization 
or guild, such as through the licensing of doctors and lawyers, the boundaries of a 
community of full time campaign practitioners are maintained through largely hiring 
individuals who are already a part of the network. Internships, then, are the key way 
of joining the network so that one may be eligible for future job opportunities. One 
participant, who had done all of his internships and college Democratic work in 
another state, highlighted his lack of local internship experience as a problem: 
I found that it was difficult for me to actually break into the state house. It 
took me like two years almost literally to get in because I didn't know, I had 
no internships, you know I had all these years in New York. So I was kind of 
an outsider. I applied for a few things but didn't get them. 
Access to networks was similarly described by those who had campaign internships 
starting out. But in addition, they described another feature: the rapidity with which 
‘intern’ turned into ‘full time job’. One respondent described why he decided not to 
do an internship early on in the context of explaining the different expectations he 
perceived between volunteering and managing: 
I helped out on a state senator's race, and I was going to be a paid intern, 
where they were going to give you like $200 a week, but you know, poverty 
wages, but then we were expected to work 12 hours a day. And at the time, I 
wasn't ready to do that. I didn't know what I was getting into. I didn't know 
that was going to be the expectation. And so after a week I was like don't 
pay me. I'm going to be a volunteer instead. 
In terms of the actual activities that interns undertook either on campaigns or in 
representatives’ offices, most of them described the work as basic or “clerical,” 
“open the mail, that kind of thing” as one respondent put it. One who worked on a 
campaign as part of a university curriculum said “it was an internship, quote unquote, 
and you know just helping out with canvassing, and phone banking, that kind of 
thing.” The use of ‘quote unquote’ here was meant to convey that the work he 
actually did, which was either informal or rote, was not the same as his expectation 
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of what an internship would provide in the way of career training. Given that the 
internship had been recommended by the university career services office, it seems 
reasonable to expect that he came into the internship with the expectation of career 
development but did not find any career development in the tasks he did. 
These accounts of internships highlight how something that is ostensibly about 
learning how to do tasks (like internships) in fact functions as a gateway for 
becoming a member of a community of practice. In the case of the participant whose 
internships were done out of state (e.g., in another community of practice), it did not 
mean that this participant lacked the necessary skills and practice for doing political 
work, in the strict sense – but what he did miss was the opportunity to participate 
legitimately in a peripheral way for a particular community of practice, so that more 
central participation could become a possibility.  
Similarly, the implicit lesson that both of the campaign interns gained had to do with 
the job expectations much more than how to actually do the campaigning work in 
terms of discreet tasks. Indeed, ‘long hours’ is the way to do campaigning work. In 
this sense, what is being taught via practice involves how to get things done – and for 
campaigning, getting things done involves very long hours, for low pay. This theme 
emerged again in discussion about skills learned, and will be explored further there. 
 
Formal training sessions 
A number of campaigning organizations offer training sessions for participants, 
ranging from DNC sponsored trainings on how to run campaigns to local progressive 
organizations on all aspects of local campaigning. Overall, however, most 
participants did not use these sessions. Further, of the eleven participants who did 
one, only three of reported it being useful. An additional three explained that they 
knew about the trainings, but avoided them on purpose. As one participant 




The first issue for why these training sessions were not useful is the point at which 
they were offered and when participants found out about them. As noted, most 
participants began their participation on a campaign. However, the party and 
campaigning organizations often offered the training sessions as a way to keep 
volunteers engaged in the campaign off-season. Therefore the training was targeted 
to people who had already learned how to campaign on the job. As Joe put it, “I 
already felt I was proficient. Part of it was, I felt the trainings – well those two things 
are really the same. The trainings are geared to entry level. And if you're already way 
beyond that, it's not that helpful.”  
The second issue was one of content. One participant, who had a particularly 
negative view of the party organization overall, described the sessions as “not skill-
based,” and little more than anointed campaign gurus sharing war stories. More 
broadly, however, participants shared the observation that “politics is not that 
clinical. I mean you can't get a textbook on doing field, and again unless you're at 
scale where you can sort of, divide up the pie and the responsibilities in a very sort of 
technical manner, it's much more on the fly.” In other words, the actual practice of 
politics did not relate to how campaigns were presented in text. Indeed, the ideal-type 
description of the campaign I offered in chapter three accurately captures the major 
components of a campaign, but rarely are campaigns work in such a segmented 
manner. As one experienced participant summed it up, “I did attend some of those 
but quite honestly I found that most of my experience, most of my skills and 
knowledge is just from working on other people's campaigns. I kinda feel like it 
really can't be instructed by a class, it really has to be experienced.” 
The accounts of the three participants who did find training useful further supports 
the idea that most learning takes place in a kind of situated learning, apprenticeship-
style approach. Two of the three who found courses useful described themselves as 
outsiders: one as a progressive challenger to more established party Democrats in his 
area who took a course by a non-party progressive campaigning organization, and 
one postgraduate student who used what he learned in a course on campaigning to 
help a candidate in a district in another part of the state. Importantly, he only came to 
this particular campaign through a third party organization which was assisting the 
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candidate. Thus in both cases, then, the campaigning courses were useful for 
participants who did not appear to have access to the types of legitimate peripheral 
participation (through internships, previous participation of a similar kind, or through 
a mentoring relationship) in which they would learn how to organize and run 
campaigns. Finally, the third participant, who had been involved in campaigning for 
over thirty five years, liked the campaign training sessions offered by the party 
specifically because he liked learning how to use the new voter database files. The 
very exceptionalness of these experiences serves to remind us that for the majority of 
participants, learning was done on the job and often in a legitimate peripheral role. 
In sum, the emphasis on practice-based learning foregrounds several important 
components of field work. First, it coincides with the notion of learning and knowing 
as something that happens in situ. The idea of a generalized, book-based and 
classroom taught knowledge did not mesh with what most participants described as 
their way of learning. Indeed, very few actually articulated a process of learning at 
all, but rather just described what they did as natural, the thing that was done. Only 
when they were asked about relating to new participants, or reflecting on how they 
might have changed practices from when they first started, were they able to 
articulate specific skills and ways of getting things done. The very tacitness of this 
knowledge and skill base thus underscores the extent to which knowing goes beyond 
the ostensibly cognitive to include those kinesthetic, aesthetic, and contextually 
based ways of knowing that Yanow emphasizes.  
 
The Skills 
If practice is what a community develops in order to do the job, then what is it that 
participants develop? Wenger emphasizes that practice includes a host of tacit as well 
as explicit functions, including the “conventions, rules of thumb, perceptions, 
sensitivities, [and] embodied understanding” that assist in getting the job done 
(Wenger 1998: 47). In order to uncover what some of these conventions, rules of 
thumb, and embodied understanding are I asked participants what skills they thought 
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they needed in order to do field work well.37 By emphasizing the ‘well’ part, I hoped 
to enable the articulation of how participants practiced field work. The result was 
often a rich description of practice, stories about how to do field work, and examples 
of successful campaigning.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the thematic skill groups that participants reported. The main 
themes that emerged from responses to this question are interpersonal skills, work 
ethic, organization, and leadership. One (somewhat surprising) result was also the 
number of answers relating to representing. Although these results are reported in 
table 4.1, I leave it aside here in order to take it up in much greater detail in chapter 
six. 
 
Table 4.1: Skill and knowledge themes 





Interpersonal skills All 41 30.0%
Work ethic All 32 23.5%
Representing38 All 20 14.7%
Organization Organizer 39 28.7%
Leadership Organizer 4 2.9%
Total   136 99.8%
 
Interpersonal skills 
The importance of being outgoing and friendly, along with organizational skills, was 
the most common theme. Interpersonal skills are grouped into four subgroups: 
outgoing and friendliness; enthusiasm and the ability to motivate; ability to take 
rejection; and engendering trust and making connections.  
An outgoing, friendly demeanor and ability to talk with other people constituted the 
largest sub-set of the interpersonal skills group, accounting for 11 of the 41 answers. 
                                                            
37 I also asked the opposite question, asking if what would make it more difficult to do field work well. 
Although these answers were less rich and expansive, they were still informative, and the results are 
folded into the section below. 
38 Discussed separately in chapter six 
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One participant summarized this as “Somebody that can talk to people. That will 
listen to people and is friendly.” In the long hours of canvassing and the few 
occasions of actually contacting a voter who might be receptive to the campaign 
message, being friendly was key to being heard. One campaign published a “top tips” 
for canvassing, with the top tip itself “Always Smile and Be Polite.”  
On the negative side, many participants saw shyness, a dry demeanor, or hesitation to 
engage with voters and volunteers as inhibitive to doing the job well. This manifested 
itself as both an observation of temperamental suitability and in terms of the initial 
difficulties that beginners had to overcome. One participant who had started off as a 
canvasser and moved on to be a field organizer reflected on how her timidity at first 
made the canvassing difficult, saying “It's definitely a really tough thing, socially, to 
go up and knock on someone's door and try to convince them that you know how 
they should vote. And I was definitely, for a very long time, very hesitant about it.” 
With practice, however, most participants saw this social awkwardness as something 
that could be overcome. 
Enthusiasm, motivational skills, and charisma were also cited as useful abilities. One 
participant gave the example of charisma as a way of getting volunteers to overcome 
their hesitancy to do the otherwise unpleasant aspects of field work: 
You have got to be a good people person. Charisma is very essential. 
You’ve gotta, because field work, at its essence - it’s not rocket 
science. It’s about getting people want to help who are maybe a little 
uncomfortable doing something, to do that, because that’s what you 
need them to do. People are initially uncomfortable knocking on 
doors, because you’re interrupting people’s dinner, or calling people 
on the phone, because some of them are going to get pissed [angry] at 
you and hang up, and there’s plenty of people don’t want to do that, 
and they’re all busy and they don’t want to come into the office, so 
it’s about motivating people to come in and help out.  
Another participant joked that he was a “horrible cheerleader” and described the 
problem this caused: “My supervisor mentioned it when I was a field organizer in 
2002… She said you don't seem that enthusiastic. I'm enthusiastic just on the inside I 
am really [said while fake smiling].” That the lack of enthusiasm would be 
commented on by a supervisor indicates the expectation that it is a key skill for doing 
fieldwork. Even though this particular participant was not willing or able to muster 
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such enthusiasm in his work, he still recognized it as part of the expectations for 
doing the job. 
Both of these stories allude to a kinesthetic kind of skill and intelligence in that the 
process of relating the stories in the interview involves particular gestures and 
motions in order to actually convey what was being done. In the process of 
explaining how to be charismatic, Chris went on to give examples of how he 
encouraged volunteers to stay engaged, saying “Always after they finish their little 
shift congratulating them and giving some pizza and then being like oh and can you 
come back … excellent. And sign up here.” Giving the specific example of how this 
was done, he flashed a winning smile, leaned in and pretended to hold a clipboard 
with a sign-up sheet. Similarly, the organizer who was not good at being a 
cheerleader demonstrated his problem by offering up a humorous “false” smile, 
demonstrating how bad he was at being a cheerleader.  
A third participant was much more explicit about this kind of interaction and how it 
related to field work, saying “well, as everybody says, there's no better way than to 
make your case than touching people. And quite literally, touching [he touches my 
shoulder]. People like touching, holding their hand, shaking their hand, and that 
really is one of the great things about politics.” While the glad-handing style of old 
politics has often been the source of many jokes, the physical ability to present 
oneself as friendly, outgoing, and warm was a kind of embodied skill that 
participants explained through their stories and actions in the interview.  
In each of these interviews, the skills and knowledge being described were literally 
passed on to me in the most literal sense of being a kinesthetic, or motion-based 
communication, through the engaging smile, the humorous self-effacing failure, and 
the hand on the shoulder. If such embodied friendliness is key to doing field work 
well, no wonder that it was not perceived as ‘teachable’ in a classroom or through 
book learning – because most books (and at least not any campaign manuals I 
encountered) did not address the issue of kinesthetic knowledge and skills.  
More broadly, this outgoingness and friendliness was an important way to establish a 
connection or bond with voters. One participant described the single most important 
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aspect of doing field work well was establishing some kind of connection with the 
person you were speaking with – whether it was on the basis of common experiences, 
common heritage, or common concerns, it did not really matter as long as you had 
created some form of connection.  
Creating a ‘bond’ came up in another participant’s comments in a somewhat more 
cynical manner. One key for him was the ability to have “twenty second 
conversations, fifty, sixty times a night” with potential supporters at campaign 
events. The key for him was the skill in the conversation of making that twenty 
second conversation stick in the potential supporters mind: “we are going in there as 
representatives of candidate not only try and sell yourself but also try and make that 
connection to you know get people to identify not only with the candidate but with 
the person you just had the conversation with.” 
While these participants spoke with a sense of both realism and pride about such 
interactions, another participant saw such short, repeated interactions as lacking 
depth and fulfillment: “You know the trouble is if you spend 30 seconds talking to 
somebody you can only always get to a very surface level talking about things. And 
you kind of repeat that next door, over and over again you never really get to - I 
mean the whole process encourages, or I should say discourages, any depth of 
thinking or conversation about issues.” Under such short and restricted 
circumstances, the ability to actually connect with voters was difficult, requiring a 
certain ability to engender feelings of trust or connections quickly and with 
conviction. 
Finally, taking rejection was seen as positive for coping with the many ‘no’s’ which 
occurred in between ‘yes’s’ in response to queries for both volunteering and votes – 
especially for those participants who felt shy or lacked confidence at first. For 
organizers, it could be a matter of getting ten no’s for every yes. For canvassers, it 
was a matter of high door knocking and call volume simply to reach people, only a 






The second theme expressed by participants in all roles was about hard work. The 
most prominent sub-theme was the ability to have persistence and patience, and the 
exhausting aspects of work were linked to the need for a strong work ethic. One sub-
theme that stands out clearly here is also a sense of willingness for doing field work. 
Rather than being a sense of broader desire or interest in issues and politics, this was 
expressed as a participant’s actual willingness to do the immediate and concrete tasks 
of going and knocking on people’s doors or call them unsolicited.  
Dedication, persistence and patience together was the largest cluster of answers 
within the work ethic theme. One participant summed this up as “You need to be 
dedicated, and tireless, and that's pretty much it.”39 Another reported that the best 
thing he learned over the years was the need to own good shoes – a nod at the 
amount of time and hours one has to spend walking from door to door. One organizer 
referenced to his blue collar roots and his desire for participants with a similar work 
ethic, saying “give me a kid who went to a working class school over an ivy leaguer 
any day… If you’re gonna work for me, you better be aggressive and willing to go all 
out.” 
In terms of the willingness to do the work, one volunteer said, “you need people that 
are willing to do the work. Because it's not glamorous. People walk into campaign 
headquarters and you know, if people are doing their work it's not glamorous. Like 
you said they're licking envelopes, and they're stuffing envelopes, and they're 
standing on street corners in the rain.” Willingness was discussed particularly with 
respect to new participants or first experiences. As one volunteer put it, “So as far as 
skills, the only skill is, you're willing to just kind of suck it up and go to that first 
house.”  In this sense,  ‘willingness’ is really too simple to even be a skill, but it was 




39 This participant then went on to give a much more detailed answer of a number of other skills which 




Organizational skills are grouped into four sub-themes: data-driven planning, 
analytical ability and assessment of what is practical, leadership, and preparedness 
and detail-orientation.  
The most straightforward sub-theme is the importance of following a data driven 
plan, and much of this related back to The List as the primary artifact of work. List 
production, in this sense, was perceived as being an organizational, date-driven and 
data-based task. One woman explained this, saying “[Former Democratic governor] 
Dukakis always says this is the most important part [Voter ID] and it is. You've got 
to get people out to vote, you've got to identify your voters in order to get them out.” 
The importance of a solid, well-organized and tracked voter ID program capable of 
producing a good list was paramount for many organizers.  
A few participants also highlighted the importance of leadership and an ability to 
give direction among organizational skills. While this was not too common, a couple 
of participants articulated this ability as being beyond mere management skills, but 
summed up the ability to inspire, direct, and manage at once.  As one organizer 
joked, this was not about giving many options, but one option at a time, saying things 
like “Oh you can’t do that because you have a broken leg and you can’t walk? Ok 
then we’ll put you on the phone instead. You don’t give them options, you tell people 
what to do [laughs].”  
Many participants also placed a premium on preparedness and organization, linking 
it with the ability to get other things done, like voter identification and volunteer 
management. Two women linked organization with the ability to follow up after a 
voter contact, one saying “you should be organized so you follow up, which is part of 
the persistence.” For organizers, preparation was part of managing volunteers well, 
so their time was efficiently spent and they would come back again.  Chris’ example 
of plying volunteers with pizza and sign-up sheets came in the context of “And also 
being extremely well organized, and organizing your volunteers in a very consistent 
way.” Being organized was, well, key to being an organizer. Being organized also 
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involved paying attention to all the details – pizza, sign-up sheets, reminder phone 
calls, and more. 
Indeed, in canvassing for two different campaigns, each provided a packet of five to 
fifteen pages, including multiple reminders of how to report data after the canvass, 
tips for canvassing, maps, voter identification information, talking points, backup 
instructions in case of rain, and the weather report for the local area. These detailed 
instructions are an example of the kind of information that organizers had to 
assemble for each volunteer or canvassing group on a weekly, if not daily basis. 
Unlike the kinesthetic sense and skills of applying personal charm that were part of 
the interpersonal skills set, the descriptions here capture a very different set of skills: 
organization, attention to detail, and adherence to sophisticated or data-driven plans. 
If the previous set could be characterized as personal skills exercised in an immediate 
physical and social context, the emphasis on data-driven plans and attention to all 
things non-personal provides a contrasting image on de-humanized activity. In this 
sense, the skills that participants needed in different roles were involved different 
kinds of knowing and knowledge. 
In sum, learning how to do field work well involved a variety of techniques and 
understanding of the field work as a complex game. While the techniques themselves 
were “not rocket science,” learning to use them involved learning the different 
situations one would encounter and how to make decisions about what to do whilst 
involved in field work. Moreover, doing field work well involved a number of 
additional skills, like friendliness and the ability to connect, a strong work ethic, and 
how to organize people and tasks. This knowledge was kinesthetic as well as 
conceptual or cognitive, and most people learned by doing rather than in a classroom 
based session. Of course, not all participants learned the same things, and there were 







In addition to having certain skills and sensibilities, participants explained the 
importance of having certain kinds of knowledge as part of doing field work well. 
Knowing a local community, including who the players were, the local customs and 
political traditions were also part of successful field work.  
Several volunteers and some organizers, especially those with experience in local 
campaigns, and those who helped in an informal advisory role emphasized the 
importance of tailoring that data-driven voter ID plan to a community. Joe described 
a lengthy argument he had been having with a statewide campaign organizer about 
the need to shift from what he saw as a rigid and impractical plan that was uniform 
for the whole state to something that was more carefully tailored to his area: 
I showed her the numbers. And I said I know you're going to be 
calling everyone so don't canvass voters. What you should do is 
register everyone you can, if there's one thing you can do in here, I 
can't speak for the whole state but here, [register voters]. 
The emphasis on tailoring voter ID plans combines the idea of a very data-driven, 
organized, segmented plan with knowledge about the community which could lead to 
improved plans. For experienced organizers, using a data driven GOTV plan was not 
mutually exclusive from incorporating community knowledge of campaigns; rather 
the two could be combined for a more efficient and effective operation.  
Similarly, according to the party Field Manual one of the most important things a 
ward committee member can do for a campaign is to help candidates use knowledge 
about a community in their campaign. In the section entitled “What can state and 
local committees do to help elect Democratic candidates?” and after descriptions of 
media, voter ID, and precinct captain work, a few sentences sum up the contribution 
of local knowledge: 
Sharing local knowledge and customs is probably one of the most 
important roles for a town or ward committee to play. Where it is 
customary for sign holders to stand, knowledge of local bylaws and 
customs for lawn signs, assistance with developing walk routes for 
candidates and notifying the coordinated campaign of events that a 
candidate or surrogate should attend are all examples of areas where a 
local committee's knowledge is invaluable (p. 18). 
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In interviews, bringing such local knowledge to campaigns was one of the tasks that 
many locally-based volunteers and informal advisors brought with them. One 
informal advisor described his job as telling the campaign staff, “do this, do that.” On 
follow up he elaborated, “Yeah, like how to get signatures. Where should we go? Go 
to the dump. You know.” The town trash heap is probably not the first place one 
would think of doing political campaigning – unless you know that in many suburban 
or rural communities there is no curbside rubbish collection or recycling, and so the 
one place that almost all town residents will have to go is the town dump. Another 
participant on a different campaign made the same kind of observation about 
knowing when and where to campaign in her community, saying “Where do people 
go? The post office closes at 12. And most people only can do it on Saturday 
mornings. So that’s a good time to be there.” Understanding a community for field 
work purposes meant understanding how everyday life was structured, the 
restrictions and patterns that fellow citizens and voters faced in going about their 
daily activities. 
Importantly, not all of this information can easily be translated from one community 
to the next. For instance, not all towns had dumps, and not all post offices closed at 
noon. In short, the local specificity which makes community knowledge so useful in 
a given place also limits its applicability to that particular community, making it 
difficult to generalize for application on a broader basis. In this sense local 
knowledge was more easily translated into practice in specific communities than it 
was for a campaign overall and therefore was of more use to those working on 
specific geographic regions – who were more often volunteers and precinct-level 
organizers than staff organizers. Informal advisors, such as Bill who talked about the 
town dump, aided campaigns by passing this knowledge on to staff organizers so that 
they may use it in planning and practice. Like Joe’s example, however, passing on 
this knowledge did not always mean that it was taken into consideration. 
The second emphasis within the community knowledge theme was on knowing the 
right people to recruit locally to support a given candidate. Opinion leaders are those 
individuals in a community to whom other people turn to for political opinions and 
leadership. Recruiting opinion leaders to supporting a campaign was seen as a useful 
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and efficient way of garnering support in a community. One participant succinctly 
summarized this as “knowing the community means who are the opinion leaders, 
hitting them first. Say what selectman40 is likely to be a Democrat, let’s get him. 
Let’s think, who is in the garden club, let’s get that person, because that person has a 
network, get them on your side.” For this participant, the implication of getting 
opinion leaders is that once they support a candidate, they can bring votes with them 
to the campaign.  
One participant described at length a local campaign won in part through the use of 
‘dear friend’ cards, in which volunteers send cards to all of their friends telling them 
who they are supporting in an upcoming election and asking for their support as well. 
I asked why the cards were helpful, and she replied “Opinion leaders.  To be honest 
with you, I probably have had 15 people ask me already who I'm voting for for 
Governor.  I mean, you want people who have influence over other people, who think 
this person or this issue is being supported.” One statewide campaign also used ‘dear 
friend’ cards, and it was a well known field work task among participants such that 
saying ‘dear friend cards’ rarely elicited a question for further elaboration. Another 
participant similarly identified himself as an opinion leader among his friends and 
family, noting that even while living out of state, he kept abreast of Massachusetts 
politics knowing because his friends and family would also ask him who to vote for.  
The concept of opinion leaders appeared in some of the very earliest research on 
voting, in the Columbia School studies. Berelson et al (1954) applied Lazarsfeld’s 
‘two-step’ model of communication to voter decision-making practices, finding that 
for those voters who had not made up their mind until relatively late in the campaign 
season relied on the opinions of those whom they respected or found more 
knowledgeable. These opinion leaders were found in all strata of society and acted as 
intermediaries between mass-media communication and individuals in the same 
functional relationship as with other forms of mass-media communication, most 
notably consumer information and advertising (Berelson et al 1954). While the two-
step model became one of the most important (and therefore controversial) theories 
in communications studies, and was translated into studies of political 
                                                            
40 City or town officer. Smaller municipalities are often run by a commission of three selectmen and 
women. Local elections are nonpartisan. 
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communication and social networks, these socially-based studies operate largely 
independently from previous focus on campaigns and party participation. So while 
the concept of opinion leaders is well established, the applicability of having opinion 
leaders as campaign participants deserves further enquiry. I will return to this subject 
in chapter six. 
For now, the key point is to recognize how doing field work well involved 
knowledge about specific communities – structure, local practices and customs, and 
who in those communities were the people to speak to about politics. This 
community knowledge is somewhat role specific in that it applies most directly for 
those who are working in specific geographic regions and communities, and is not 
necessarily well suited to the organizer roles that were responsible for a broader area 
and more general practices. One of the key roles that informal advisors played was 
alerting organizers to community practices and how understanding them could be 
incorporated into overall planning. 
 
Knowledge, learning and roles 
Throughout the chapter, I have described different kinds of knowing and ways of 
knowing – kinesthetic and cognitive, analytical, organizational, tacit, explicit. More 
broadly, Yanow has developed the idea of ‘scientific’ and ‘local’ knowledge, where 
the latter is “the very mundane, yet expert understanding of and practical reasoning 
about local conditions derived from lived experience” (Yanow 2004: S12). ‘Local’ 
knowledge should also be distinguished from the community knowledge, described 
above. While community knowledge could be considered a sub-category of local 
knowledge, ‘local’ encompasses a broader notion of situatedness and practice-based 
knowing that is not limited to knowing in a specific geographic locality. In contrast, 
‘scientific’ knowledge is theory as opposed to experiential based, technical-
professional, and academy based. 
Much of what has been described falls easily within the local knowledge concept. 
Individuals learn through practice and by doing, their ways of knowing go beyond 
cognitive forms to include kinesthetic knowing, techniques as well as game sense. 
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Local knowledge applies in different ways to those in different roles. Those who are 
volunteers and geographically-community based organizers are privy to, and make 
use of, understanding of “local conditions” including customs and people. But staff 
organizers engage with local and practice based knowledge too. They may do so with 
the very specific community knowledge (especially with the help of informal 
advisors), but they also develop their own expertise through practice and especially 
internships, rather than course or classroom-based learning. Highlighting the role of 
internships connects with Lave and Wenger’s (1991) work on legitimate peripheral 
participation and situated learning. While what organizers learn is organization and 
management, in the specific cases of the field organizers I spoke with, this was still 
practice-based learning of management. 
Nor is there any reason to think that organizers in Massachusetts are an anomaly if 
compared with groups of Democratic field organizers in other parts of the US. While 
there is now a professional school of political management at George Washington 
University, it is possibly one of only two available in the country, and does not 
appear to be a necessary step for becoming an organizer. Indeed, one participant I 
interviewed received a degree from the GW program but was disappointed to find 
that this had not yet helped with getting employment with any of the campaigns; 
instead he was offered volunteer work (much to his chagrin). In short, organizers 
learned how to organize in situated learning contexts, becoming experts through 
practice rather than classroom experiences. 
What, then, of the counterpoint to local knowledge, “scientific knowledge”? In 
contrast to local knowledge which is based on practice, common sense reasoning and 
actual events, scientific knowledge is located more in the academy and aligned with 
theorization. Yanow finds organizational-managerial approaches which value 
scientific knowledge are within the ‘rational-technical-scientific’ tradition where 
“knowledge is made up of detached, universal, generalizable facts that can be known 
objectively, absent the context of their origin” (2004: S18). Science implies 
generalizability, knowability, and certainty in a way that local knowledge can never 
really produce.  
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It is in this vein of thinking about the preferencing of scientific knowledge that we 
see some commonalities with the expressions of some organizers. One participant, 
who earlier noted that field work cannot be taught in a classroom, went on to say that 
at first “I didn't appreciate how much it could be brought down to a science.” He then 
gave the example of in an earlier race spending a lot of time and energy trying to 
register young voters for a down-ballot legislative race, only to find that most of 
them did not vote. Instead, he now understands how to divide his time between 
fundraising, door knocking, and other activities. “Science” here implied a rational 
approach to understanding the returns on the investment of his time and energy. 
The clear commitment to Voter ID and developing voter databases was also spoken 
of as key to winning by some organizers. The language and use of databases imply a 
kind of scientific certainty. However, a closer examination of how a database – 
essentially, a sophisticated list of voters – works and is used as an artifact of field 
work provides a different view. Rather than being exclusively a product of rational-
scientific thinking doing, and knowing, it incorporates and collates local knowledge 
of field work practitioners. The main difference between the ‘scientific’ knowing of 
field organizers and the ‘local’ knowledge is one of scale, and voter lists and 
databases act as a kind of boundary object which bridge the two. 
 
The List 
If the primary purpose of field work is to identify a campaign’s supporting voters and 
getting them to the polls on Election Day, then the primary artifact of field work is 
the list. The list is a database of names, addresses, party affiliation, and previous 
elections participated in. It should cover all voters in a given political district. It can 
have additional data points of varying degrees of specificity: previous campaign 
contributions, pro-life or pro-choice preferences, previous primary candidate choices, 
and any other piece of information which may indicate how a voter is likely to 
receive a particular candidate or campaign. The most important fact for any one of 
these entries, other than name and contact information, is voter identification: party 
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ID and whether they are a strong or leaning supporter of a particular candidate, 
undecided, and leaning towards or strongly for another candidate.  
Lists are an organizational product. In the canvassing narrative which started this 
chapter, we were given one section of the list, relating to the streets and houses we 
went to canvass. Like most campaigns, this campaign in particular had limits on 
access to data depending on one’s role in a campaign: precinct captains can see, 
enter, and print information in a certain area but not revise it; organizers are given 
access to a wider area and may revise; and only a few key people in a campaign will 
have access to all the information. In some campaigns, voter and contributor data are 
kept on the same database, with fundraising personnel able to access one kind of 
data, and field work personnel another kind.  
Lists are boundary objects, which “inhabit several intersecting social worlds and 
satisfy the informational requirements of each. They are both plastic enough to adapt 
to local needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust 
enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star and Giesemer 1989: 393). 
Lists change depending on who uses them, for canvassers they are a place to store 
rich details in the notes or which tell only part of an interaction with a voter, but for 
organizers they are columns of refined names, dates of contacts, and ID numbers. 
Star and Giesemer state that boundary objects are “weakly structured in common use, 
and become strongly structured in individual-site use” (1989: 393), and similarly 
only very few technicians see the ‘back end’ of a database which is common to all 
(the codes, rules, and syntax which make it run) but individual users will have well 
defined interface screens specific to their roles.  
A specific language revolved around aspects of lists and list management as well. Joe 
“cut” a list of streets and homes that we canvassed on that August day. Another 
participant, an organizer, described “breaking out walk kits” – a reference to putting 
together the voter lists, clipboards, and other material for doing door-to-door 
canvassing. Coding voter preferences could be short-handed by reference to a 
number, such as “she’s a 3.” At one point during my time in the field, a participant 
told a tale of canvassing in a heavily competitive district. When they arrived at a 
house door with their button or t-shirt identifying who they were canvassing for, the 
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resident did not even bother coming all the way to the door after seeing them, and 
instead yelled “I’m a one!”  before promptly turning back to whatever he was doing. 
One of the key problems that organizers and volunteers alike came across was in 
dealing with the quality of the lists they were working with, as different campaigns 
had different lists of varying accuracy. Lists could include the names of people who 
moved away, had changed party affiliation, or were no longer available. The worst 
situation a canvasser could come across was asking to speak to someone who was 
deceased, which was both a waste of time and could (often) offend the surviving 
family members. As such the quality of voter lists was a real concern. As one 
informal advisor complained, “I’d like to get one goddamn voter list that’s up to date. 
There are people who get paid good money to do this, and they’re crap.” Because 
most organizational lists were held by private companies, initial list quality was their 
issue.  
But, throughout the course of a campaign, lists were changed and improved through 
the use and input of volunteers and organizers, canvassers and staff – not just in 
terms of voter ID, but providing updates as well. One woman in an interview noted 
that she had half a dozen sticky notes of people to take off the voter list that had 
moved away or died in her community. The informal advisor who complained about 
quality of lists went on to remark that he often went to “local communities” to get 
better lists. In his particular area, a fair number of residents moved away for the 
winter. Results from canvasses carried out every weekend were entered back into the 
database and improved the accuracy of a list throughout a campaign. 
Indeed, in some campaigns the database technology improved to the point where 
participants could enter what they knew about voters without having to formally go 
canvassing at all. One afternoon, Joe showed a few of us how to set up an account on 
one candidate’s database system so we could log in and identify the votes of our 
friends, family, and network of people regardless of where they lived in the state. 
There were restrictions on changing information that was already there, but you 
could add voter IDs. While this is not practice knowledge in the same way that 
knowing who to see in a community and how to practice politics may be, it does 
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illustrate how lists were in fact a collective organizational product. No one person 
‘made’ a list, just as no one person personally found out who every supporter was.  
Thus producing the list with voter ID information requires the collective knowledge 
and action of everyone in a field work organization. It involves knowing how to do 
one’s own part of the job, and it involves ‘knowing’ a voter’s preference. Volunteers, 
precinct captains, and those who go door-to-door will know how to cover a street as 
quickly as possible and, possibly, who to ask first. They will also ‘know’ the voter ID 
of people in a given area through their door-to-door work (though we will come back 
to this knowing later in the chapter). Organizers and list managers will know how to 
tweak, filter, and cut lists, but not know the details for a smaller area; campaign, 
database or field managers will undertake routine database management, update files, 
and match information with existing lists. They may ‘know’ a voter’s preference 
based on prior voting record and whatever other information is available in a voter 
file. The list as end product – the one that is used for GOTV efforts – will thus 
involve and include the input of everyone in a field work organization.  
The list serves not only as an organizational end product, but a reservoir of collective 
knowledge and action. In order to build the list volunteers must know how to 
nominally enter data on a sheet and walk from door to door or how to make phone 
calls – but they also develop a much more extensive knowledge about how to get this 
done that is built up through interaction with other practitioners. Similarly, organizers 
will also learn how to manage lists and databases, and how to build and manage 
volunteer organizations that can complete good lists. To say that an organization 
learns how to build a list is to reference the skills, knowledge, and practices that 
organizational participants collectively build and use to make a voting list. From a 
distance, these databases have the appearance of being exemplars of a rational-
scientific approach to doing field work. Yet on closer inspection they can be seen as 
these reservoirs of collective knowing and learning.  
The absolute end product of a candidate’s list of supporters includes only the very 
essentials: name, contact information, and 1, 2, or 3. This essentialized information 
list lacks the richness of knowing, learning, and practices that have gone in to 
creating it. Nowhere on such an end list does it say that in order to reach those 
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supporters campaign field workers had to go to the town dump or the post office on a 
Saturday morning, and yet without that information the list might not have been quite 
so specific nor so accurate. Focusing on the richness versus essentialized versions of 
the list bring the issue of scale to the fore, and it seems that this is the key difference 
between organizers and volunteers in terms of how they engage and know locally. 
Participants in both roles learn in social contexts and are experts at what they do, but 
the need to cover a larger geographical area makes the specificity and richness of 
community difficult to sustain on a grander scale. As such, knowledge becomes 
essentialized down. 
The process of turning rich accounts and face to face interactions among friends and 
neighbors, between strangers in door to door exchanges and family members in 
conversation into names, voter IDs, and addresses is the fundamental translation and 
bridging work that lists do as boundary objects. Lists and list databases enable the 
systematic, geographically removed, and scientific world of GOTV organization to 
link with the situated, rich, and specific world of identifying voters through 
systematic door-to-door canvassing or informal enquiries in personal networks. 
The comparison of scale has important implications for understanding the 
relationship between scientific and local knowledge. While the two may seem to be 
at odds with one another (and especially in the way that scientific knowledge is often 
preferenced over local knowledge in other domains), in fact, to follow Dewey, no 
theory, scientific knowledge, or academy can ever come from anything but situated 
contextual experience (cf Menand 2001). Knowledge is not created out of thin air but 
out of experience; though a scientific-rational explanation may aim at generalizability 
to such an extent that context becomes less relevant it still comes from a context in 
the first place. Scientific knowledge – whether rational, academic, or otherwise – is 
simply local knowledge writ large.  
In the case of databases and field work, the paradox is that an interpretative approach 
is necessary to understanding how collective-cultural kinds of learning and 
knowledge can be transformed into scientific-rational knowing. What appears to be 
scientific knowing is, among the community of field work practitioners, the 





kinesthetic knowing, practices developed through situated learning and legitimate 
peripheral participation.   
 
Discussion 
Learning and knowing constitute important dimensions of participation in grassroots 
campaigns. Skills and techniques, learning and knowing in different forms help 
participants do field work to a standard that they consider good and make the 
experience less difficult. Learning constitutes an important component of the 
organizational culture of field work to the extent that these skills and tacit ways of 
knowing that are unremarkable makes participation in these grassroots campaigns. 
Imagine if, in the opening example, no one had undertaken canvassing before. There 
would have been no leapfrogging doors, no shorthand language, and no lists to work 
off of and improve. The practice would have been entirely different. 
Learning makes participation skilled, and turns doing participation into being a good 
participant. In this sense, learning actually makes instrumentality possible. In order 
for participants to be able to complete tasks or do the activities which are part of 
participation and lead to rewards, they have to know how to do those activities. So 
while the literature on socialization into political parties often overlooks learning, 
practice and process, it is crucial to the very instrumentality which skews research 
away from looking at process. 
In Wenger’s (1998) words, practice is what people develop in order to be able to do 
their job, and it is social. Beyond instrumentality, learning to participate involves 
becoming part of a community of practitioners. It is crucial to becoming a 
participant, to transitioning from first joining in an organization to being part of it. 
Where chapter three introduced the concept that participating in political campaigns 
involves joining not just structures or fulfilling functions but also becoming part of a 
community, this chapter fleshes out how some of the ideas which make the 
community of practitioners are learned, and demarcates sub-groups within that 
community. In the next chapter I will explore meanings and motives that participants 
expressed which, like skills, are not prior but learned and acquired through practice.
Chapter 5: Motives and Meaning 
 
Rational choice theory, as applied to political participation, is primarily geared 
towards explaining individual motivations in the context of collective action. 
Traditionally, the first topic would be ‘what are the motives and reasons for 
participation?’ That this question is addressed halfway through the thesis is in line 
with an alternative approach to understanding participation. Rather than seeing 
motivations as inherent and prior to action, I believe that they are learned, just as 
skills, ways of doing things, and participatory practice are learned. Becoming part of 
a community of grassroots participants involves developing motives and meanings 
for participation.  
Moreover, I believe that if questions about motivation are geared towards 
understanding why people participate, then the research questions need to unpack the 
concept of motivation. While the rational choice and closely related incentives 
systems theories which highlight the importance of motives have animated important 
research in participation, it is the consistent shortcomings of such theories, in their 
inability to see individuals as socially situated actors and contemplate individual 
influence on collective outcomes to which I turn my attention in this chapter. I aim to 
show how learning more about the meanings of participation for campaign 
participants can complement what we know about the role of motives in animating 
political participation. In the first section, I review the basic logic of rational choice 
theory and incentive systems models as applied to political participation, along with 
some of the salient critiques of these theories. I then show how the shortcomings in 
these theories translate into a problem with concept validity when applied to an 
analysis of motives for political participation. In the second section, I explain a 
different approach to data analysis which I apply to the interviews with participants. I 
then discuss the merits of not reducing ‘irreducibly social’ concepts into multiple 
analytic categories, taking a grounded theory approach to building categories out of 
reasons, and linking the different categories to one another, and finally I outline the 
differences between organizers and volunteers in the answers they gave. 
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By refocusing on motives and meaning, I aim to show how we can reach a more 
robust explanation for why people participate in political action. Whilst many 
scholars have done much to adapt a ‘thin’ notion of rational choice into ‘thicker’ 
versions which account for a variety of incentives, I believe that some of these efforts 
would be better served by not trying to make non-instrumental reasons sound 
instrumental. Rather, we would do better to on and modifying the inroads already 
made in incentives and rational choice theory by distinguishing between political 
practice for the sake of achieving ends and political practice as a socially and 
culturally situated set of activities rendered meaningful by socially and culturally 
informed beliefs.  
 
Rational choice models and incentives systems: insights and 
assumptions  
Mancur Olson’s argument in The Logic of Collective Action (1965) is now largely 
familiar. If an economically rational person can receive the benefits of collective 
action without having to pay the costs of participation, and if his participation is 
likely to have so low an impact on the outcome as to be negligible, then no rational 
individual would participate in collective action. Olson’s main contribution was to 
show how unless certain circumstances were met – that is, unless there was enforced 
participation via the closed union shop, or unless alternative incentives were offered 
– rational individuals would free ride over joining in collective action.  
As addressed in chapter three, this approach put collective action to a cost-benefit 
analysis for each individual: does the cost of my time and money outweigh the 
benefits I will receive from the intended policy outcome? Is my time and energy key 
to the outcome coming about, or will it happen regardless of my own participation? 
By emphasizing the high costs of participation and the low benefits, Olson highlights 
how individuals have so little influence with regards to collective outcomes as to be 
negligible.  
By posing the problem of collective action as why people would participate, Olson 
points towards the possible solutions for overcome collective action problems. One is 
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to offer selective benefits for participation, benefits available only to those who 
actually participate. This line of reasoning explains altruism by transforming it into a 
form of selective benefit. For Olson, altruistic behavior can be explained as a 
selective psychological or moral incentive, as when they act as a guilty conscience 
that must be assuaged through action, and they only work because “the crucial factor 
is that the moral reaction serves as a ‘selective incentive’” (Olson 1965: 61).41  
Clark and Wilson utilize Barnard’s neoclassical notion of human resources theory of 
organizations to link membership motivation to organizational goals. They invoke a 
similar intellectual turn to Olson whereby “the desire to achieve an abstract social 
good may, or course, be subsumed under the ‘egotistical motive of self-
gratification’” (Barnard 1938: 139, in Clark and Wilson 1961: 131 f2). From this, 
they create a framework based on material, solidary42, and purposive incentives for 
participation. Material rewards are those which have a monetary or cash value; 
solidary incentives have no cash value but “come from the act of associating and 
include such rewards as socializing, congeniality, the sense of group membership and 
identity, the status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the maintenance 
of social distinctions, and so on” (Clark and Wilson 1961: 135). Finally, purposive 
incentives are from “the stated ends of the association rather than from the simple act 
of associating,” including the “enactment of certain laws or the adoption of certain 
practices (which do not benefit the members in any direct or tangible way), such as 
the elimination of corruption or inefficiency from public service, beautification of the 
community, dissemination of information about politics or city life, and so forth” 
(Clark and Wilson 1961: 135-136). For Clark and Wilson purposive incentives are by 
definition ends-related, and they cannot be separated from those ends. Finally, in a 
point echoed in most empirical work, any particular organization can and does offer a 
variety of incentives to its members, for instance discounted theatre tickets, social 
occasions, and a (met) purpose of beautifying one’s city. 
                                                            
41 This may be somewhat misleading. Even though the quotation of Olson is accurate, the conception 
of selective psychological benefits he describes here is not usually associated with a ‘classic’ rational 
choice model. See McCulloch (1990) for a similar discussion, Mansfield (1995) for a more classic 
summary of rational choice models. 
42 ‘Solidary’ is Clark and Wilson’s original term. While most authors have changed the terms even 
whilst using the original system or similar concepts, discussed below, I will continue to use the 
original words throughout this chapter. 
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In both works, the authors relate the problems or puzzles of motivation back to issues 
of organizational maintenance. For Clark and Wilson, the rather scary prospect of 
broader social changes is that material and solidary incentives will no longer do; 
organizational leaders must turn to purposive incentives to attract members and 
thereby become constrained by the whims of their memberships. Olson, on the other 
hand, explored the necessities of creating artificial contextual conditions which 
would overcome the problems of free riding, such as the closed union shop or other 
coercive methods. However, while organizational maintenance was important to both 
of these authors, this focus on the role of organizations faded in subsequent studies of 
participation, such that the participation and motivations has largely become 
reframed as a question of individual motivations, absent any connections to 
organizational or contextual surroundings. 
 
Rational choice models and incentives systems: critiques 
Rational choice theory may only be utilized by a relatively small circle of researchers 
but, as Robert Grafstein points out, this paradigm has been, and continues to be 
critiqued by a much broader range of scholars (Grafstein 1997: 1040). Of the many 
critiques, three are of particular salience for the present discussion. First, rational 
choice theory emphasizes to a large extent a conception of the individual as 
completely separable from his or her social environment, rendering people as a-
contextual. Second, rational choice models and incentive systems create a false 
separation between the notions of ‘solidary’ and ‘purposive,’ where those two 
notions are intimately related to one another. Third, rational choice models, and to a 
lesser extent the incentive systems model, frames the question of rationality as 
related to whether or not one individual can change the outcome of a collective 
endeavor, thus assuming a priori that individuals have little to no influence in 
collective action.  
The first issue is that the benefits from ‘thin’ rational choice “come at the 
considerable price of imagining each individual as fundamentally separate from 
others” (Mansbridge 1995: 144). But when it comes to understanding reasons for 
political action of any sort, rational choice assumptions rely on a distinction of self 
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and other in order to hold up the most central tenet of action, that it is ‘self’-
interested. This is problematic because so many of the ways of thinking, framing 
issues, and language that is used to animate action and render it meaningful is 
“irreducibly social,” (Mansbridge 1995: 144), by which we mean those ways of 
thinking and ways of language are not exclusively the result of any one individual’s 
thoughts and language, but the shared language and meaning created through 
intersubjective processes. By focusing its analytical lens solely on the individual, 
rational choice models are unable to “see” these intersubjective meanings, and thus 
they remain “unknown” on a fundamental level even when acknowledge as important 
(Yee 1997: 1028). To the extent that individually-based rational choice and incentive 
systems models do not fit with viewing the individual as an essentially socially 
situated phenomenon, and to the extent that intersubjective meanings are not 
knowable, they will miss some aspects of understanding the meanings which 
underpin political activity. 
Certainly, there are some notable attempts to try and incorporate social norms and 
ideas into rational choice models. Riker and Ordeshook (1968), and Mansbridge 
points out, did actually note the importance of a sense of civic duty in motivating 
Americans to vote, although this notion of duty was later stripped of much of its 
power as a social norm in Riker’s later writing (Mansbridge 1995, Riker 1995).  
Ferejohn (1991, 2004) and Ferejohn and Satz (1996) have contributed much to a 
‘thick’ rational choice theory by incorporating social norms and ideas. Nevertheless, 
as Yee points out, even when such thick rationality models take social norms into 
consideration, fundamental questions about norms and ideas, such as their sources or 
means of transmission, remain unaccounted for, so that they remain ‘unknown’ in a 
fundamental way (Yee 1997).  
The second issue is the briefly made distinction between the categories of altruistic 
motivations labeled ‘solidary’ and ‘purposive’ reasons in Clark and Wilson’s 
incentives system in Mansbridge’s critique of rational choice theory. She points out 
that this is the same distinction that goes by other names in the work of Dawes et al. 
(1991), Jencks (1990), and Sen (1978), and which she elaborates as the concepts of 
‘love’, which is a nonprivate, nondyadic sense such as ‘love of country, and ‘duty’, 
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akin to commitment or conscience (1995: 140). According to Mansbridge, Monroe’s 
(1991) argument that in the case of some altruistic actors the sense of being a part of 
a common humanity blurs the boundaries between conceptions of the self is an 
example of the difficulty of distinguishing between doing something out of a sense of 
solidarity or of duty.43 Thus, the two categories of ‘solidary’ and ‘purposive’ reasons 
perpetuate the notion of ideas, outcomes, and purposive beliefs as also being 
disjointed from social context.  
The question of whether or not participants can have any effect on collective 
outcomes, has received the most attention of the three listed from scholars of civic 
and party participation. Theoretically, as Olson argues, the influence of any one 
individual on the outcome of a large collective action is so small that in a cost-benefit 
analysis no rational individual would conclude that the benefits of his or her action 
outweigh the costs.44 Despite the fact that Olson discussed at length the variables 
which could make participation rational, for instance if the input was large and the 
collective relatively small, the irrationality of participation is what stuck. As Verba et 
al explain, “according to the rational choice approach, activists who consider that 
they got involved in order to promote a collective policy goal are deluding 
themselves in imagining that their contributions would enhance appreciably the 
probability of achieving the joint end” (Verba et al 1995: 110). 
However, empirical research consistently shows that a large proportion of 
participants in collective civic and political activity cite the desire to have an impact 
on outcomes as one of their primary reasons for participation (Bennie 2004, Clarke et 
al 2000, Constantini and Valenty 1996, Conway and Feigert 1968, Kornberg and 
Smith 1970, McCulloch 1990, Miller and Jennings 1986, Nakamura 1980, Norris 
1995, Scarrow 1996). This leaves one with the troubling options that either most 
participants are “deluding themselves” or that rational choice theory got the efficacy 
calculation wrong. This, in turn, would cause some serious trouble for the clarity and 
efficiency of describing the free rider problem.  
                                                            
43 This point is less clear in Monroe’s original article (1991), where the emphasis of argument is more 




To get around this conceptual problem, some of the most prominent research has 
attempted to account for efficacy in a variety of ways which circumvent the actual 
question of whether or not individuals can have an influence on collective outcomes. 
In their studies of British political parties, Whitely and Seyd (and others) measure an 
individual’s sense of efficacy but make no mention of what the outcomes desired 
may be (Seyd and Whitely 1992, 2002; Whitely, Seyd and Richardson 1994). Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady, make the opposite choice and emphasize that “for some acts 
where the input is very large (a campaign contribution) and the scope of the desired 
outcome is not too large (a local election, a specific policy affecting the actor), the 
belief that an individual can make a difference may be less unrealistic” (Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1995: 103). So while Whitely and Seyd focus on the belief in 
one’s own efficacy rather than efficacy itself, for Verba et al, the question is not 
whether or not participation in collective action is ever rational, but whether it is 
possible that individuals may in fact be rational about their influence depending on 
the participation itself and context. 
More creatively, Finkel, Opp and Muller in different combinations have attempted to 
circumvent the question by theorizing that participants in collective action have a 
notion of group efficacy, so that a conception of a group’s ability to influence 
outcomes replaces the shortcomings in individual influence (Finkel 1985, Finkel and 
Opp 1991, Muller and Opp 1987, see also Klosko et al 1987). Nevertheless, the issue 
of individual influence remains problematic, so that they suggest future research 
should “investigate empirically the question of whether individuals are unaware of or 
misunderstand the principle that their own participation will have a negligible effect 
on the realization of their public-goods preferences or whether they consciously 
reject this principle in favor of an alternative general rule that success of collective 
action depends on the groups acting together as a unified whole” (Muller and Opp 
1987: 563). In sum, efficacy continues to be an issue where empirical data and 





Translating concepts and conceptual difficulties into research 
The problems of decontextualizing individuals, separating notions of social and 
purposive reasons from one another, and conceptualizing efficacy translate into 
problems with data analysis that empirical researchers must grapple with. 
Specifically, the problems come when attempting to assign the particular reasons that 
individuals give for their participation into the analytic categories used by researchers 
for analyzing their data.  
Empirical research in political science on motives for participation uses some 
combination of categories which sum up the individual reasons for participation. 
Researchers who rely on the incentives system theory assign specific reasons to 
solidary, purposive or material reason categories. Those who use Olson’s system 
assign reasons to collective outcomes, or selective social, selective psychological, or 
selective material categories.45 While some reasons are consistently assigned to the 
same categories, other reasons are consistently assigned to different analytical 
categories. Two of the specific reasons that participants give for their participation, 
civic duty and party attachment, are consistently assigned to the different categories. 
I argue this is because these categories are fundamentally incapable of 
accommodating the civic duty and party attachment reasons because they are the 
manifestation of the theoretical problems outlined above. 
If a participant says that by participating they are fulfilling their civic duty, what does 
that mean? Depending on which authors and incentive systems one uses, fulfilling 
one’s civic duty falls variously in the categories of party-related, other impersonal, 
selective civic gratifications, altruistic, cultural, and instrumental public goods 
incentives. For some of the researchers, the difference in category allocation depends 
on the consideration of influence. Thus Finkel and Opp utilize their notion of group 
efficacy to group civic duty along with other influenced, outcome-based reasons for 
participation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady also take ‘civic duty’ out of the realm of 
un-attainable collective goods by considering these answers to reflect the extent to 
which participating assuages a guilty conscience – thus it s a ‘selective civic 
gratification.’ So for both sets of authors, the civic duty reason has some direct 
                                                            
45 For a summary of these different systems, see Appendix 4. 
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selfish benefits for the individual. For all the other authors surveyed, civic duty does 
not have any self-interested benefits and is a form of altruism.  
Even further, among those authors who list ‘civic duty’ as a purposive or altruistic 
reason there are implicit differences as to the source of that incentive. Miller and 
Jennings list it under ‘partisanship,’ Whitely et al as ‘altruistic’, and McCulloch as 
‘cultural’ (Miller and Jennings 1986: 93; Whitely et al 1994: 94; McCulloch 1990: 
503). Only McCulloch elaborates his view of civic duty as a selective cultural 
incentive deriving from “the internalization of what Dowse and Hughes call a ‘sense 
of civic duty,’ that is, a cultural norm that the individual should participate in public 
affairs” (McCulloch 1990: 503). Following McCulloch’s logic, Miller and Jennings 
would then see parties as the font of feelings about civic duties, but elsewhere they 
make reference to “pervasive national political culture” in shaping the personal 
incentives of activists from both parties (Miller and Jennings 1986: 99). In contrast, 
Whitely et al place civic duty in the altruistic motives category, bypassing their own 
social norms category. By implication, are such civic duty motives not related to 
social norms, but just a sense of altruism?  
To summarize, if you wanted to know what it meant when an activist said they were 
doing their duty as a citizen, the meaning would change depending on which 
incentive system you utilized. The activist could either be acting out of an altruistic 
sense of doing good, with no direct benefits available to them nor any real benefits 
from achieving a collective end; they could be assuaging a guilty conscience, thereby 
getting some personal benefit from the act of participating; or they could be acting 
instrumentally towards to real achievement of a concrete goal, thereby fulfilling their 
civic duty in a most literal sense. The source for that civic duty could be a ‘pervasive 
national political culture,’ the political party which organizes the immediate 
participatory setting, or, possibly, an individualized sense of altruism. 
 
Party attachment 
Party attachment gets a similar scatter-shot treatment, like the notion of civic duty. In 
some cases it is treated as its own independent reason, separate from other categories, 
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in other cases it is treated as a social incentive, and in other research it is considered 
to be part of the purposive/ideological category. Two sets of authors treat party 
attachment as its own category (Finkel and Opp 1991, Miller and Jennings 1986), 
one as an “other” altruistic reason (Conway and Feigert 1968), and one as non-
allocatable (McCulloch 1990). Further, Whitely and Seyd first treated it as an 
altruistic reason in their research on the Labour Party (1992), but in their surveys on 
the Conservative Party describe party attachment as an “expressive” reason.  
Whitely and Seyd’s switch from considering party attachment as an ideological 
reason to one in which party attachment is an ‘expression of group belonging’ is also 
an interesting indication that probably party attachment is not solely social, nor solely 
ideological. Conway and Feigert depart from the social/ideological divide with their 
“other” category and assign to it both civic duty and partisan attachment reasons. 
Only Miller and Jennings and Finkel and Opp, who put party attachment as its own 
category, avoid this problem. In sum, party attachment crystallizes the problem of 
attempting to separate social and purposive reasons.  
Rather than attempt to fit square pegs into round holes, I apply a different approach 
to analyzing the reasons participants give for participation. During the interview, 
after asking about how participants got involved and discussing field work in general, 
participants were asked what they found most rewarding and least rewarding about 
field work on a day-to-day basis. At the end of the interview, they were also asked 
what their experiences meant to them at the end of the day, and why they kept on 
doing it. These questions differ in an important respect from the way motivation 
questions are often phrased in survey research. The questions used do not ask why 
participants first got involved – in part because in these interviews they were already 
asked how they first got involved. More importantly, others have noted the problem 
of possible post-hoc reconstruction when asking about motives for actions in the past 
– in other words, that people project onto those prior events the way they feel about 
them now (Verba Schlozman and Brady 1995: 106). This seems to be a problem 
worth taking seriously, in that it makes unpacking motivation more difficult by 
mixing up first reasons for joining and what may be different reasons later on. 
Instead, asking about what participants find rewarding and not so rewarding, and 
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what their reasons are for staying involved now, in the present tense, is both more 
precise and presents the opportunity for participants to reflect more broadly on the 
meaning of their participation.  
The following analysis is drawn from transcripts of the answers to both these 
questions. I start with the specific reasons participants gave and build up into 
categories which are logically coherent according to the answers participants give. I 
present the data in several stages, starting with the reasons that participants gave for 
their participation. I then attempt to put those reasons into categories, and discuss the 
issue of sorting the reasons, comparing the resulting categories with the incentives 
systems categories. The main departure is in distinguishing ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ 
solidary and purposive reasons from ‘abstract’ beliefs which encapsulate the dual 
love/duty notions, and are essentially intact as a reason. Then, I look at how these 
categories relate to one another, and the role of organizations in helping to translate 
‘concrete’ gratifications that come from activity into abstract beliefs about the good 
life, and back again. Finally, I review the differences according to participants’ roles.  
 
Data 
Table 5.1 shows the reasons that participants gave for participation. The numbers in 
the right-hand column show how many times participants gave that answer, giving a 
simple indication of how frequent different reasons were. In order to make the 
meanings that participants gave clear, here I present some of their answers in their 
own words, and tie them back to the concepts of social or purposive reasons, and the 









Table 5.1: Reasons for Participation 
Reason Number of 
times given 
  
Work on something I can make a difference in 23 
Hope/ belief in better nation/world 12 
Recognition/ respect from colleagues and peers 11 
Seeing people I like 11 
The game/excitement of politics 10 
Self-respect/responsibility/ duty 9 
Connecting/ convincing voters 8 
Being in a community that shares my views 8 
Elect Democrats/ Beat Republicans 7 
Make good policy/ concern w/ direction of country 7 
Politics is what I do/addiction 7 
Being with people who share my beliefs AND work for them 5 
Good for career 4 
Serving my community/ people like me 4 
Pass something on 3 
Good government/ Social justice 3 
Be informed 3 
Working with good people 3 
Faith in humanity 2 
May run for office 2 
Make my voice heard 1 
Total answers 143 
 
 
Work on something I can make a difference in 
The reasons grouped together under this heading were all similar in that they were 
related with a very specific notion of making a difference in mind and were by far the 
most common answer. One participant described the satisfaction of helping members 
of the public with particularly problems like getting a social security check, or 
accounts of feats accomplished on the campaign trail. For instance, one woman 
reported: 
The fact that we got all these delegates for her, and we got all these City 
delegates, that was big… we really made a difference. And she'll say that. 
We've really been her point people here in the City. So that's gratifying, 
when you can really make a difference for somebody.  
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In all the cases, it was the satisfaction of doing work with concrete ends that was 
satisfying. Unlike the conception of ‘influencing policy’ as used in much of the 
survey literature, the differences participants cited were those that were part of their 
daily experiences and doing political activities.  
 
Hope or belief in a better nation/world 
In contrast to the ‘making a difference’ reasons, these answers were all similar in that 
they were phrased in more abstract language, and did not convey a sense that 
participants thought about achieving a better world in the same concrete, goal-
oriented way which they thought about making a difference. Sometimes the 
explanations were simple, even point blank: “Hope.” “For a better tomorrow.” Pattie, 
who first got involved in politics via working on environmental issues, described 
how her belief in making a better world kept her going by offering an extended 
metaphor of adding pebbles to a bucket: 
What keeps you going? You can't get discouraged. What keeps you going is 
those people who burn out, they think, if I do this, it's going to win. If it 
doesn't, they don't see, they don't look at the problem or the issue in a 
different way, this pitcher or glass, and you're just adding this pebble, and 
eventually it'll fill. Although you maybe didn't stop the re-licensing [of the 
nuclear power plant], you have added a pebble that can maybe help someone 
who will be in that process next week, you can share what your learned, your 
emotions, your legal knowledge, to help them…When you go into any of 
these campaigns, for me it's clean energy, if you go in thinking this is it - 
you have to have a bigger picture. Have we won? No, it’s getting worse! 
[Laughs] You gotta look at it in a bigger picture, or you're going to burn out 
and not do anything. 
This respondent contrasts the short-term gains and goals such as winning an election 
with the longer term issue of finding clean energy The ‘bigger picture’ is an allusion 
to a notion of the world as a better place she describes at other points in the 
interview, as a world with environmentally friendly energy solutions. This ‘bigger 
picture’ is a very distinct concept of what the world should be – it is a vision of the 
good. She distinguishes the ‘bigger picture’ from the outcome of any one campaign, 
and for her the long term goals and beliefs in a better world are essential to staying 
involved because they balance out the highs and lows of short term campaigns. 
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Without a solid belief that her contribution can eventually make the world better one 
pebble at a time, one would just “burn out and not do anything.” 
She also has a particular place in this ‘bigger picture’ – she adds a pebble through her 
own actions, but her own role is conceived as relatively small. Others, too, provide 
‘pebbles,’ and unlike the short term losses and gains of specific campaigns, perhaps 
the big picture will not even be met while she is still involved. It may take the course 
of a lifetime or longer. These two conceptualizations of the ‘bigger picture’ and 
short-term campaigns afford a different role for notions of individual efficacy. The 
implication in “if I do this, it’s going to win” is a distinction between having the 
capacity to win a particular campaign (even if that result doesn’t always come about) 
and the capacity to create lasting change for the bigger picture. One can win a 
campaign and reach a particular goal, but the bigger picture is just that – it is larger 
than what any one person can achieve. In the short-term individual efficacy happens, 
but in the big picture one’s own role will not bring about the desired changes. 
While most participants did not explain their reasons for participation in as much 
length as this participant, all of the reasons in this cluster were similar in that the 
beliefs were linked to notions of the good, and were similar in that they described 
abstract ideas about a better world that were larger than what could be accomplished 
through any one campaign. Moreover, they lacked the specificity that the ‘making a 
difference’ answers had.  
 
‘Seeing people I like’ and ‘Recognition and respect’ 
The next two most common reasons emphasized different aspects of what was 
rewarding through direct contact with other participants. The answers in the ‘seeing 
people I like’ cluster emphasized a sense of camaraderie and group fun, while the 
‘recognition and respect’ answers were similar in that they related to individual pride 
for work done. One participant described the pride he felt from his work, saying 
“people you didn't even know will know who you are because you've done a good 
job. Which is pretty cool.”Like the making a difference reason, these answers related 
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to the day to day experiences that participants had, and in this case related to being 
amongst a social group who were like-minded and/or recognized one’s own work. 
 
The game and excitement of politics 
The answers in this category were all similar in that they described the excitement of 
being involved in politics, following and being a part of what one participant 
described as knowing the “the who's in, who's out, who's up, who's down” within the 
Party and in any given electoral race. Another described liking the strategy and 
figuring out how to win aspects of it. All of these answers highlighted the strategic 
and gamesmanship aspects of politics and providing satisfaction, in much the same 
way that competing or participating in a sports match was exciting.   
 
Self-respect, responsibility and duty 
The answers in this category were rich in metaphor and all related to an internal 
sense of duty and drive to participate. One activist explained how he and others he 
worked with felt by saying, “we couldn't look in the mirror in the morning if we 
didn't feel as though we were doing something at least in our own little part of the 
world, and make this a better place.” This metaphor of looking in the mirror 
structures the way the participant thought about his own participation in an important 
way, explaining the self-referential nature of this particular sense of duty. Note too 
how this scope for action is framed, bringing the scale down to a level in his own 
life: doing something “in our own little part of the world,” where the participation 
actually take place. Making “this” a better place is more ambiguous – his little part of 
the world? The state of Massachusetts? The United States? The more ambiguous 
phrase seems to connect the little corner of the world with a larger (but undefined) 
better place. Not unlike the metaphor of pebbles in a bucket, this metaphor about 
looking in the mirror and a corner of the world expresses a larger concept about 
participation, and conveys meaning. Like the other answers in the group, this 
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metaphor conveys a sense of responsibility, of pride, of having to face up to oneself 
and an internalization of norms which made all the responses in this group similar.  
Another respondent made the connection between the internalization of 
responsibility, saying, “if I don't vote, I feel like I'm the abandoning democracy, like 
what are we living in our country for? If I don't follow politics, and know what policy 
makers are doing, then I don't know who to support with my money or my votes or 
my time.” For him, the ideals of democracy were not hallowed concepts that lived 
only in books but ideas that were internalized, part of his own psyche and motivation, 
to the extent that not participating in the electoral process would lead him to feel as if 
he ‘abandoned’ democracy. Abandonment here implies that the participant perceives 
a relationship between his actions and the ideal democratic state, and that relationship 
must be maintained through active participation in the democratic process. 
While some researchers like Conway and Feigert emphasized the altruistic nature of 
these reasons, what stands out from participants’ descriptions of this sense of duty 
was this sense of internalization. Other reasons, described below, emphasized the 
sense of being a member of a community, but these answers were all similar in 
focusing on a participants’ own sense of self, more like Verba et al’s selective civic 
gratifications.  
 
Elect Democrats/Beat Republicans; Make good policy 
Reasons in these clusters expressed the desire for triumph in partisan battle. They 
linked to ideas about specific election outcomes, wanting to throw the 2006 cohort of 
Republicans out of office, and secondarily to ideas about what Democrats could 
achieve if in power. In this sense, they were much more specific than the ‘belief in a 
better world’ reasons, but less immediate than making a difference.  
A somewhat similar reason in scale of the goals was the desire to put better policy 
into place and a concern with the direction of the country. These answers varied in 
that they were less overtly partisan and tied to the outcomes of elections and more 
focused on policies. One respondent framed this importance in terms of ‘issues’: 
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Well, it really does come down to the fact that the issues make a 
difference… What I don't like is the fact that there are a lot of people that are 
still hurting, that still need help, and the government still has a role. I mean I 
respect the private sector economy, but there's a lot the government can do to 
make things better, and to make progress, from a progressive point of view. 
So for me it's really about the issues, and making an impact on the issues. 
For him, the ‘issues’ were about real people who needed help, in the present tense, 
and the avenue for creating that help was through electoral politics.  
 
Politics as an addiction 
Reasons in this cluster were like the gratification that came from the excitement of 
politics, but distinct in that they were in some way ‘indescribable’ according to 
participants. They were admittedly ‘not rational’ reasons, and the metaphor of 
addiction came up in several instances. One participant joked that he stayed involved 
in politics because “I have a problem. I need a twelve-step program.” In this sense, 
the reasons for involvement were emotional, even visceral, and sometimes described 
apologetically or jokingly, as if they were violating a sense of what they thought the 
answer should be. They were also unlike the satisfaction of working with other 
people in that they tended to be phrased in broader language. There was no specific 
event or moment of feeling like it was an addiction, but more of a general feeling 
about participation.  
 
Connecting with and convincing voters 
Back on the more concrete side of things, some participants also related the rewards 
of being involved to the one-on-one interactions they had with supporters or voters. 
As one respondent described it, this could be like a reunion with newfound friends: 
Well on a day to day basis it [the rewards] would be, finding a supporter 
who is excited about a candidate, who'd known about them before, and they 
didn't know how to connect. So for example I decided to finish off 
[canvassing] a street that someone else had started, so I went and did that 
street and knocked on the door, and this woman opened the door, and said 
I'm so glad to see you! Those were the first words she said. I was wearing 
the candidate’s campaign t-shirt. And it became clear that she was strongly 
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supporting the candidate, that she would volunteer, and no one had asked 
her. 
Other respondents related the satisfaction to the process of having completed a task: 
“When you talk to a voter, and they say yes, I'm voting for her, that's extremely 
rewarding. It's is like, that is a vote that I just got. Check. Great. Awesome.” Still for 
others, it was the satisfaction of finding out other voters shared one’s views: “Oh, 
when I hear people respond, when I hear that they like him and they like what he 
stands for, and I just feel really happy that they feel that way, and that's very 
rewarding for me.”  Finally, some respondents emphasized the connection one could 
establish with voters while at the doorstep:  
They're also willing to just open up their lives to you and share with you, 
and that you have to understand that for many people, that's a real gift of 
trust someone's giving you, and that you're now the trustee of that 
information, and how do you incorporate that information into either directly 
helping that person or taking that information and really incorporating it into 
the policy. 
In all of these cases the rewards sprang directly from the act of knocking on doors, 
phone canvassing, and talking to voters and neighbours informally about politics or 
the election. The sense of reward, too, was tied to the difficulties that came from the 
very same activity: the relative infrequency when canvassing of hearing a positive 
response, the disappointment when others held in high regard did not share the same 
emotional attachment to a candidate or view on an election. When asked about the 
least rewarding aspects of the field work, respondents who reported the good feelings 
of finding other supporters were quick to point out this negative aspect of the work. 
She respondent laughed off the low returns that came from field work, saying 
“although I'm sure making phone calls is a great thing as far as volume is concerned, 
you talk to 200 answering machines a day, and it's like, what have I been doing all 
day? 200 answering machines and 5 people that hang up on you.”  
All of these descriptions evoke the satisfaction, and disappointment, that come from 
trying to connect with others and identify a candidate’s supporters.46 They were also 
similar in that they usually expressed a sense of accomplishment (or, when negative a 
                                                            
46 I will return to this issue again in chapter seven 
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lack thereof). So while part of it was a sense of community of like-minded 
individuals, it was also the satisfaction of completing tasks and getting things done.  
 
Good for career 
Finally, on the lower end of the scale in terms of frequency of answers, a few 
participants said that being involved in a campaign was good for their career. One 
participant said “I don't think it could hurt me professionally” [WH] - not exactly an 
overwhelming expression of desire for a job. Still, while not the most common 
reason, some participants did connect their participation to potential future career 
advancement and benefits. 
 
Summary 
In clustering all the different answers together, a few themes stand out. First, many of 
the clusters could be distinguished from one another according to how ‘concrete’ or 
‘abstract’ they were – whether the participants related their reasons for participation 
to the rewards and gratifications of everyday practice, or whether they expressed 
such reasons in terms of more abstract ideas, such as hope in a better world or an 
internalized sense of duty. The most common reason was of the ‘concrete’ kind, in 
which participants talked about the gratification of making a difference through 
politics.  
Second, there were indeed reasons in which it would be difficult to separate the 
notions of duty or purpose from notions of community – for instance, in the idea of 
working with people towards a commonly shared goal. Still other reasons were more 
specific, emphasizing either outcomes, like electing Democrats, or the camaraderie 
and fun of a sociable environment. Finally, some participants were specific in their 
emotional, ‘unexplainable’ reason for participating as something they just do, in 
some cases using the metaphor of addiction. 
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How, then, to put such reasons into categories? And what might the benefits be of 
doing so? 
 
Creating categories out of reasons 
In this section, I attempt to relate the reasons participants gave into coherent analytic 
categories. In building up from the reasons, my hope is that some of the previous 
problems in terms of reducing ‘irreducible’ notions can be avoided. Categories are 
good in that they are a common language which researchers may use to relate their 
findings to one another, and build towards a common body of knowledge. In this 
sense, while I find the specific categories previously used flawed in some ways, they 
are also extremely useful. Rather than throwing out categories entirely, it is better to 
try and build better categories. 
My first step was to build on the distinction of concrete versus abstract reasons for 
participation, as this was a clear theme that came out from the reasons. This builds on 
the problem of conceptualizing efficacy and is similar to Verba et al’s approach of 
looking at the circumstances in which efficacy may be claimed. Rather than seeing 
efficacy as either entirely a matter of perception or never applicable, I follow my 
participants (and Verba et al) in seeing influence as a factor which may be related to 
immediate concrete events and outcomes, but not as relevant for a discussion of more 
abstract meanings and reasons for participation. Second, I build on the incentives 
system framework, distinguishing solidary, purposive, and material reasons for 
involvement. However, I made one critical adjustment in my assignment of reasons 
to categories: those reasons that were ‘abstract’ were not fit into any of the 
categories. Often, as described below, those more abstract notions were also the ones 
that merged solidary and purposive ideas together, so that by following an 
abstract/concrete description it was possible to keep some ideas intact, and also group 
together similar reasons into solidary or purposive categories. I have labeled this 
category ‘beliefs’, and describe it in more detail below. Table 5.2 summarizes which 
reasons were in which categories. The percentages below each category reflect the 





Table 5.2: Reasons for participation 
   All answers 
(1) Material Reasons   
(1) Good for career  4 
(1) May run for office  2 
(1) Total   6 
(1) Total as a proportion of all answers  4.2% 
     
(2) Solidary Reasons   
(2) The game/excitement  10 
(2) Seeing people I like  11 
(2) Working with good people  3 
(2) Being in a cmty that shares my views  8 
(2) Recognition/ respect  11 
(2) Total  43 
(2) Total as a proportion of all answers  30.0% 
     
(3) Purposive Reasons   
(3) Elect Dems/ Beat Republicans  7 
(3) Make my voice heard  1 
(3) Make good policy/ concern w/ direction  7 
(3) Be informed  3 
(3) Work on something I can make a diff.  23 
(3) Connecting/convincing voters  8 
(3) Total  49 
(3) Total as a proportion of all answers  34.3% 
     
(4) Belief Reasons   
(4) Self-respect/responsibility/ duty  9 
(4) Serving my community/ people like me  4 
(4) Being with people who share my beliefs  5 
(4) Good gov't/ Social justice  3 
(4) Hope/ belief in better nation/world  12 
(4) Faith in humanity  2 
(4) Pass something on   3 
(4) Politics is what I do/addiction  7 
(4) Total  45 
(4) Total as a proportion of all answers  31.5% 
     






As a category, these were the least common reasons that participants cited, and this is 
similar to the results found of participants in American civic life, and party activists 
in the US, UK, and European parties. While material reasons did play a part in 
participants getting involved, as described in the last chapter, they were rarely 
gratifications or the reason why participants stayed involved in politics.  
 
Solidary 
Overall, 30% of all answers about rewards and meaning fell into the solidary 
category. In the fact that these were all concrete they were also very similar to Verba 
et al’s concept of ‘selective solidary benefits’, because they were reasons where 
participants could describe with specific examples of why they were a benefit.  
 
Purposive 
These rewards were essentially goal-oriented rewards in that they all related to the 
achievement of outcomes. In this way, the data echoes the sentiment of efficacy that 
comes through in so many other empirical accounts, but departs from the idea of 
participation as un-influential and therefore irrational. The logic of putting several of 
the reasons in this category requires further elaboration. First, I put the ‘Elect 
Democrats/Beat Republicans’ reasons which were, as a cluster, very much related to 
the ends of getting Democrats into office. While there is a good deal of literature 
which relates partisan identity and voting to the concept of representation and social 
identity, the way in which participants phrased these reasons was very ends-oriented. 
It was not Democrats as people like themselves that served as a motivation in this 
group, but electing Democrats either as an end in itself or as a way of getting to 
better policy solutions that mattered.  
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Second, the reason ‘working on something I can make a difference on’ is, as 
discussed, very concrete and so is put in the purposive, ends-related category. As all 
of the reasons in this category related to very specific stories of getting tasks done, or 
the sense of accomplishment from actually doing things, they are all in the purposive 
category. With the exception of Finkel and Opp’s instrumental public goods notion, 
outcomes have consistently been treated in previous studies as non-procedural – that 
is, those rewards that can be found from collective outcomes are selective and 
psychic, the feeling of having contributed. At no point is it implied in the 
categorization that the outcomes are real. ‘Concrete procedural’ is incompatible with 
a traditional rational choice or incentives system conception because ends are never 
directly related to individual action, but here, on the other hand, the notion of 
‘concrete’ is very similar to the traditional ‘procedural’ or ‘selective’ in that it 
actually comes from doing participation - which includes accomplishing things. 
Third, while the title ‘connecting with/convincing voters’ may sound like a solidary, 
community building reason, on closer inspection these descriptions all related to the 
satisfaction of job completion, or the satisfaction of saying ‘check’ after identifying a 
voter. Conversely, the dissatisfaction that some participants felt was unrewarding 
was in not being able to identify more voters. So it was about getting things done. 
The way in which I’ve thus constructed this category departs from the traditional 
understanding of ‘purposive’ reasons as researched before in that it is very clear that 
participants do appear to have a sense of their own effectiveness that is based in 
reality – linked to specific stories and events, activities they have undertaken and 
goals accomplished.  
 
Beliefs 
The reasons in this category are all similar in that they express the importance of a 
deeply held belief, an emotionally important concept, or a purpose that goes beyond 
the confines of partisan concerns and electoral contests. And although the listed 
reasons here do relate to the electoral ends and specific, here-and-now purposes of 
campaigns and elections, to reduce these reasons to partisan aims would be to lose 
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their essential meaning. Whether in the form of a sense of duty and responsibility, or 
a hope for a better nation, or service to the community, in each of these reasons 
below respondents frequently made reference to a ‘higher calling’ or ‘deeper level.’ 
For this reason, I have not included them in the purposive category, in order to 
highlight the difference between motivations relating to discrete goals and purposes, 
and the deeply held beliefs which animate action. While these beliefs spur action, 
these motivations cannot be met or fulfilled in the same way as the purposive 
reasons, because these reasons are all beliefs – they cannot be ‘met,’ but rather serve 
as a motivational guide for how and why to act in life. 
These reasons are also separable from the previous purposive and beliefs categories 
in that they have inseparably social and ideational concepts. For instance, the reason 
of ‘serving my community’ that was expressed by several participants was not 
specifically goal-oriented, like those in the purposive category, but nor was it entirely 
about receiving the benefits of being among like-minded people. Rather, it was 
essentially altruistic in that it was about benefitting others, but the notion of 
community was about serving one’s own community that it was a part of. In this 
sense, the distance between self- and other that seems so far away in rational choice 
theory is not so distant here. It also is a notion that requires a conception of people as 
inherently social, as participants who are part of a specific context and community. In 
these answers, the concept of community was actually fairly concrete – it was a 
participant’s own community that he or she was a part of – that they were helping.  
In some respects ‘beliefs’ are very similar to ‘ideological’ reasons if one takes 
ideology to refer to a broad worldview. However, I avoid using the term in order to 
distinguish ‘beliefs’ from the way in which ‘ideology’ is often used in the narrow 
sense, relating only to partisan conceptions of the good. While the beliefs expressed 
here are clearly about visions of the good, they are broader than any one notion 
articulated within a political sphere and often, as in the case of ‘serving my 
community,’ have a distinctly non-partisan ring to them. Thus ‘beliefs’ both avoids 
the confusion of equating these reasons with the narrowly focused epithet of extreme 
partisanship and also emphasizes that they are grounded in and relate to a broader 




Application: the ‘civic duty’ and ‘party attachment’ problems 
Having outlined a different way of conceptualizing categories and how they relate to 
one another, how does this framework compare to those already in use when it comes 
to the ideas of civic duty and party attachment? In both cases, the notions of ‘party 
attachment’ and ‘civic duty’ are not shown in exactly the same form in the data here 
because they are broken down into different components. For instance, doing one’s 
duty, serving their community, and helping to make a difference could all be 
interpreted as answers that relate to civic duty; indeed, the utility of seeing concrete 
gratifications as nested in concepts like service to one’s community is that it helps to 
show how these ideas are intact, even when they are broken down into specific 
elements. Similarly, the gains of spending time with like-minded people (a solidary 
reason, here), of elected Democrats (a purposive reason) and the hope and belief that 
good government (Democratic government) can all create a better nation could all be 
interpreted as being ‘party attachment’ reasons. The utility of distinguishing the 
different kinds of reasons here and of their relation to one another is that it provides 
for a richer account of complex notions like ‘civic duty’ and how they are manifested 
in several different kinds of pleasures from actually doing work, and how the notion 
of civic duty provides meaning for participants in understanding their work. In sum, 
then, I see the way in which reasons are separated into categories here as a 
compatible improvement on the incentives system theory, utilizing the best aspects of 
it whilst hammering out some of the shortcomings. 
 
Role Differences 
In this section I review what differences there are between the volunteer and 
organizer roles. Because of the small number of informal advisors and the similarity 
between their answers and those in the organizer roles, I group those two together 
here.47 There appear to be group differences at both the individual reason level and 
                                                            




the category of reasons level. These differences and similarities are important 
because, as we shall see in the chapter seven, the concept of different motivations for 
professionals and amateurs is part of separates participants in each role. Having a 
sense of what the differences are in the data here will help for the argument in 
chapter seven. Table 5.4 summarizes which reasons were more common for which 
groups.  
 
Table 5.3: Most common in rewards for participation by volunteer or 
organizer roles 
Reason Canvassers Organizers and Informal Advisors 
Solidary Being in a community that 
shares my views 
The game/excitement of it 
  Working with good people 
  Respect/Recognition 
  Connecting with/convincing voters 
Purposive  Work on something I can make difference 
Belief Serving my community/people Being with people who share my beliefs 
 Self-respect/responsibility/duty Good government/Social justice 
 Hope/belief in a better  
 Faith in humanity  
 
The difference between the volunteer and organizer groups occurs at two levels. One, 
the individual reasons, displayed above, given by the two groups are different, so that 
the fun and excitement of the campaign, recognition and respect, the reward of 
connecting with individuals and voters is much more common for organizers than it 
is for canvassers. Taken on its own, the gratifications that come from connecting with 
voters would seem to be a mismatch with the organizer category, in that such door to 
door work is more within the remit of canvassers. However, the next reason for the 
organizers, the gratifications that come from working on something in which they 
can make a difference, may provide the explanation. As discussed in chapter three, 
organizers, especially those who are organizing a larger district, like a town, do often 
go door to door when there are not enough volunteers to do the work. Moreover, the 
‘organizers’ category includes not only those who are presently working as 
organizers, but those who were ever working as organizers, so that some in the 
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organizer category have also had experience just as a volunteer in present or previous 
campaigns. 
The key difference is that the organizers not only find more rewards and reasons 
coming from being able to connect and convince voters and supporters, but a greater 
sense of efficacy coming from it. If one has a greater sense of being able to make a 
difference, that would in turn relate to the sense of actually being able to do the 
convincing. In the beliefs category, good government, while not one of the most 
common reasons, came from organizers, and not volunteers. The sense of duty and 
the twin ideas of belief in a better world and a global faith in humanity came much 
more from volunteers. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of answers by group. 
 
Table 5.4: Reason distribution by group 
 Volunteer Organizers/adv
 All All 
Material 5.0 % 3.6 % 
Solidary 30.0 % 39.8 % 
Purposive 23.3 % 32.5 % 
Belief 41.6 % 24.1 % 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
  
The distributions appear to be different largely due to the extent to which volunteers 
gave reasons in the belief category to a much greater extent, proportionately, than the 
organizers did, and to the extent that organizers gave ‘making a difference’ as a 
reason to a much greater extent. My interpretation of this is that the organizers gave 
answers that were much more concrete, goal oriented and related to getting things 
done. Although the organizers did not fail entirely to give answers in the belief 
category, it was as if the organizers did not place the work they were doing within a 
broader framework of beliefs and sense of the good life to the same extent that 
volunteers did.  
I can think of two possible explanations for this. One, organizers were much more 
likely to see what they were doing in very concrete terms of getting things done, 
doing voter IDs, and getting work done – thus the broader meaning of the work 
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linked very closely to the notion of getting it done. This was a theme that came 
through in the previous chapter too, where the focus on being organized, getting 
voter IDs completed, being task specific and efficient were clearly associated to a 
greater extent with the organizers. Given the greater opportunity to have more control 
over, say, voter turnout (by getting all their work done), this became of greater 
importance to the organizers than the volunteers. Lacking such opportunities as the 
organizers, the volunteers instead relied on shared beliefs about the good life to find 
meaning in their work, beliefs that were previously held but encouraged in 
connection with the work by group leaders. Were volunteers given the same 
opportunities and tasks of the organizers, one would see the same distribution of 
answers for each group, so that volunteers would report much making a difference in 
what they were doing as frequently as the organizers. 
The alternative explanation is that the concept of beliefs as widely shared meanings 
attends only to the volunteers, who in a sense have a different organizational culture 
from the organizers. In this instance, the concept of beliefs as having important 
motivational force still holds true, but it only applies to a smaller group of people – 
the volunteers – within the Democratic Party campaigning organizations than 
originally theorized.  
My hunch is that the answer lies in between the two alternatives. The analysis in the 
last two chapters shows largely the same pattern in that there are many things shared 
between the two groups, and in addition some things that are exclusive to the 
organizers. In this sense, there is a strong case for viewing organizers as having a 
sub-culture which includes different learning, experiences, and habits of thinking that 
is different and exclusive from the volunteers. The reason why I label it a ‘sub’ 
culture and not two separate cultures is because the same cannot be said of the 
volunteers, that they have learning, experiences, and habits of thinking that are 
exclusive to only their group, and not shared with the organizers. In terms of the 
things to know and things to learn, there were many things shared by both groups – 
friendliness and outgoing, and the importance of community knowledge. But there 
were some issues and knowledge which pertained only to the organizers, in terms of 
organization skills, a methodical approach, a focus on efficiency and attention to 
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detail. In this chapter, almost all of the reasons for participation are shared, and the 
same patterns of correlating beliefs with the question on meaning indicate that both 
groups draw on beliefs in the same way as an explanation. However, the organizers 
are much more likely to cite their ability to get things done and the actual getting 
things done at the doorstep as reasons for their involvement – a reason that is almost 
exclusive to the organizers group. So again, while there is much that is shared, a few 
things are exclusive to the organizers, and nothing is exclusive to the volunteers. In 
sum, while much is shared, not everything is.  
 
Discussion 
In this chapter, I problematized the way in which motives for participation tend to be 
treated in political science literature. Drawing on rational choice theories and 
incentive system models that tend to under-theorize the role and importance of 
culture as a concept and component related to motivations, I showed how dealing 
with reasons that link ideational and community notions have shown up the 
conceptual limitations of this framework. I then presented data from the research 
interviews, using a grounded theory approach to test the concepts used in the 
incentive systems framework, the extent to which ‘motives’ as a concept is stretched 
beyond its useful limits, and what, if any differences can be found between the 
volunteer and organizer/informal advisory role groups.  
Through the process of reconstructing incentive system categories, it is clear that 
some reasons that participants give for their participation do not easily fit into the 
material, solidary, or purposive categories. When participants talked about service to 
their community, or their belief in making the world a better place, they combined 
notions of community and belonging with ideational aspirations for what the good 
life is, placing their work within the broader context of visions of a good life. In this 
sense, these concepts were different from the very concrete and immediate reasons 
which constituted the solidary and purposive categories. While previous studies have 
been inclined to try and separate these ideas into their community oriented and 
ideational benefits, I argue that, just as cultural components such as organizational 
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learning are more than the sum of their parts, so too are culturally-grounded beliefs 
which have motivational force translated into less than their sum when divided into 
parts. By keeping such concepts intact and extending the study of motivation to 
include such more-than-individually-based-ideas as cultural beliefs, incentives 
models can be used much more effectively to explain and understand what animates 
political participation.  
Further, this separation between abstract notions of the good and aspirational 
understandings of participation, on the one hand, with concrete, task-related 
gratifications and meaning on the other, also showed how participants could think of 
their work as actually making a difference in the present, which was different and 
separate from the more abstract notions of making the world better. By asking two 
different kinds of questions in the interview, one which focused on day to day 
gratifications and one which asked about what participation meant at the end of the 
day, and then comparing which reasons were more common for each answer, I 
further showed that the beliefs reasons were discussed in response to the meaning 
question much more frequently, and the solidary reasons were much more prevalent 
as a gratification in terms of the day to day work. This difference is important 
because it shows how different motives do different work – solidary gratifications are 
important in terms of feeling like work is fulfilling on a day to day basis, but these 
solidary reasons are conceptually different than the beliefs which animate work and 
help participants to understand and make meaning out of their participation. In this 
sense, they are non-interchangeable. 
Why have beliefs never been incorporated into accounts of participation before? 
First, I believe that recognizing these reasons as a category have been masked by the 
way in which influence has been framed in rational choice theory, so that reasons 
which are related to specific activities get mixed up with more abstract beliefs about 
the way the world should be. This theoretically driven tendency to  view participation 
as ineffectual has rendered each category of reason less understandable, because it 
misses both the ways in which participants think in very concrete terms about 
outcomes and influence, and the broader ways in which participation is tied to 
notions of the good life that extend beyond the immediate world of politics and 
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policymaking. The assumption in rational choice that action is ineffectual misses 
how participants learn to be rational in their practice in the sense of connecting their 
own work and input with the satisfaction of jobs done. The problem with efficacy, 
traditionally construed, is that it is both too literally oriented and not literal enough.  
Second, the tendency to separate solidary from purposive ideas from one another 
similarly mistakes the reasons in the belief category as equal to all its pieces. Just as 
organizational learning, in the last chapter, is more than its parts, so too is something 
valuable and meaningful for understanding participation lost when ideas of making 
one’s community better are separated into their ideational and social components. By 
leaving such ideas intact, we can see how notions of community and of the good life 
are intricately tied into one another. 
Finally, I believe that the importance of beliefs have been difficult to grasp because 
they are in some way essentially social, intersubjectively created, shared, and 
cultural, as Yee, Mansbridge, and other critics have acknowledged – and thus 
somewhat incompatible with a purely traditional rational choice or behavioral 
framework. The tendency in research drawing on rational choice theory on 
individuals as their own entities, taken out of context and away from their setting 
means that those aspects of meaning which are important to participation cannot be 
understood by pulling individuals apart from one another, so that what is lost is that 
which is created in between, collectively and intersubjectively.  
By acknowledging the beliefs here as being separate from the immediate concrete 
goals of trying to get things done and win elections, there is also room for 
understanding the variety of beliefs that may be expressed by participants across 
different participatory contexts and settings. In other words, the beliefs expressed by 
participants here may not be universal in the sense that partisans from other parties or 
parts of the country will express the same vision of the good and beliefs about the 
way the world must be – just as participants of different parties may ascribe to 
different ideologies in the broadest sense of the term. One of the benefits of 
separating out beliefs from purposive reasons for participation is that it creates a 
categorical/analytical space for articulating the intersubjectively created and shared 
ideas which animate participation that are specific to one context and group of 
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people, while also making the fact of those beliefs comparative across different 
groups. Republican participants, for instance, might formulate their idea of how the 
world should be in ways that are substantially different from the emphasis on 
community and commonality here – or, perhaps, perceive ‘community’ along 
different dimensions. Separating purposive reasons from beliefs thus increases the 
ability to compare reasons for participation across different groups. 
The ideas expressed in this category can be understood as cultural beliefs in ways 
that theoretically informed accounts developed that other aspects of the literature 
predict. First, the use of metaphor in the belief reasons is important because 
metaphors share stored meanings and ways of understanding the world. Cultural 
values, Lakoff and Johnson argued, are stored, communicated, and made coherent 
through metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1983: 22). Schein was explicit about the role 
of metaphor in communicating complex meanings. They are the “habits of thinking, 
mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms,” or “the shared cognitive frames that 
guide the perceptions, thought, and language used by the members of a group” 
(Shafritz and Ott 2001: 372). These are the collective ideas that guide participants 
understanding of what they are doing, and provide a source of meaning. That, as 
Kilmann reminds us, is what culture does – it “provides meaning” (Shafritz and Ott 
2001: 361), and more generally, that cultures are shared systems of meaning. 
Articulating beliefs as separate from purposive reasons also opens up understanding 
how the two relate to one another. Previously, Mansbridge and others have theorized 
that self-interest can ‘nest’ in altruism, and the same appears to be true for the 
relationship between purposive reasons and beliefs. Her (and others’) focus was on 
how self-interest could provide cover for doing altruistic behavior, and thus provide a 
way of tricking or talking oneself into doing good things, and showed how 
cooperation could only happen under specific circumstances (Mansbridge 1995: 
143). Put simply, one can see clear relationships between the concrete reasons that 
participants list as gratifications and the more abstract beliefs and meanings in 
participation. When individuals found the day to day campaigning exciting, this was 
a concrete manifestation of the idea that politics was somehow addictive or like a 
drug. The idea of excitement and a ‘buzz’ from politics on a daily level translated 
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into the broader metaphor of ‘addiction’. Similarly, one can find that the specific, 
concrete gratifications such as spending time with people that one likes is nested in 
the sense of being part of a broader, more abstract ‘community’ of people who all 
share the same ideas and beliefs and work towards them. Purposive gratifications and 
beliefs are still several logical steps away from one another, but they are still related. 
In this sense, the purposive reasons ‘nest’ in beliefs. Moreover, as we shall see in the 
chapter seven, the group norm of being productive and efficacy, especially as 
emphasized by group leaders, helps to establish this ‘nesting’ by emphasizing the 
links between concrete action and broader belief systems. 
Having separated the purposive and beliefs reasons, one important theme that came 
through in the analysis is the notion of efficacy and ability to influence and make a 
difference. While rational choice model users are theoretically inclined to dismiss 
such claims as irrational, in this chapter, again, the emphasis that organizers placed 
on working to make a difference, and the language they used to discuss such 
gratifications in very concrete terms. It may not be rational in the traditional sense of 
weighing a cost versus the benefits, but it is rational in a different way: a satisfaction 
with making a difference that comes through long hours of (learned) practice. This 
sense of efficacy merits further investigation rather than dismissal. It implies that a 
solely instrumental view of participation tells only part of the story. In addition to 
missing beliefs, it misses the ways in which people learn how to be rational and 
strategic in their own practice. 
The framework of material, solidary, purposive and beliefs gratifications outlined in 
this chapter modifies the traditional incentive framework so that those dimensions of 
motivation and making participation meaningful are not squeezed into a purely 
instrumental equation, but rather acknowledged and added to a different kind of 
‘rational calculus’ of trying to achieve certain ends. By not conflating action aimed at 
achieving ends in the short term with broader belief systems about the way the world 
should be we can recognize the important role that social life and reasons created in 
the intersubjective interactions of participants has in animating political participation. 
Finally, I highlighted some important differences in the reasons volunteers and 





gamesmanship, convincing voters, working on something they can make a 
difference, and notions of good government or social justice as reasons for their 
participation, while volunteers cited being in a community of like-minded people, 
notions of service to one’s community and belief in a better world more frequently. 
And while the distribution of the categories for day to day gratifications were overall 
very similar for the two groups, volunteers cited reasons in the belief category much 
more often when responding to the question about meaning, when compared to their 
volunteer counterparts. Considering several different explanations for why this may 
be, I suggest that organizers are more likely to think about work in much more 
concrete terms of getting tasks done and having an impact, reflecting both a greater 
sense of one’s own efficacy and a more short-term, goal orientation in thinking about 
their work. While these reasons are exclusive to the organizers, the beliefs – while 
more prevalent for volunteers – were not exclusive to that group, suggesting that 
organizers’ experiences, learning, socialization, and beliefs tends towards a kind of 
sub-culture within the Democratic Party campaigning community. Thus while there 
is much – in terms of practices, learning, experiences, and beliefs – that binds 
organizers and volunteers together, organizers also have unique experiences which 
provide a separate sub-culture of knowledge, learning, and mental models that are 
exclusive to those who have organized.  
Having described and analyzed the process of joining a grassroots political 
campaign, learning how to participate well, become a member of community and the 
motives and meanings which individuals find in participation, in the next chapter I 
turn to the question of what participation produces.  
 
 
Chapter 6: Representation and Linkage 
 
Thus far in this thesis I have focused on the community of practitioners constituting 
the grassroots campaigning organizations, the norms, learning, and relations between 
those participants, and the meanings they find in their own participation. In this 
chapter I focus on the productivity of such participation. At the end of the day, what 
does all this participation produce? 
Primarily, of course, it is intended to produce votes, and a sizeable body of research – 
as well as participants’ own experiences – serves as testimony to this outcome. But 
this chapter focuses on what else may be produced through participation. In chapter 
four, I noted that participants reported as ‘representing’ as one of the abilities needed 
to do field work well, and it is this concept that I focus on. Canvassing and 
participation at the organizational margins serves to link a campaign to voters and 
communities, and in order to do this participants provide endorsements of a candidate 
to their own social network and broader community, they serve as the physical and 
immediate representative of a candidate or campaign in civic and political realms, 
and they translate campaign messages from abstract promises into concrete entities 
with implications for real people. According to participants, doing all of this happens 
because of, and requires, an ability to connect or bond with voters and fellow 
citizens. In this sense, this boundary work of translating, representing, and endorsing 
engages voters and campaign participants (including, in some cases, the candidates 
themselves) in the co-production of a thick linkage between elites and citizens. 
Rather than the exchange-based mechanisms which are used to conceptualize party 
linkage, I argue that these grassroots campaigning interactions between canvassers 
and citizens is aimed at producing a sense of bonding, responsibility, and trust which 
cannot be reduced to a quid pro quo relationship of policy influence in exchange for 
votes. As such, grassroots campaigning participation has important implications for 
the normative concerns with the uncoupling, in which citizens feel unbound from the 
decisions of political elites made in inaccessible policy and political networks. 
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I start this chapter by discussing the concept of linkage as usually applied to party 
politics, highlighting the way it is conceptualized as an exchange in rational choice 
models and the trouble with conceptualizing party activists only as more active 
voters with respect to linkage. I then follow the concept of linkage and why it has not 
been as well developed in the literature on American parties and campaigns. 
Crucially, neither the research on parties and linkage, nor the literature on campaigns 
addresses issues of civic decline beyond voter turnout, nor does it address a role for 
participants other than something akin to voters. This appears to be a missed 
opportunity to address one of the problems of civic decline outlined by Henrik Bang 
as the ‘uncoupling’ between elites and citizens. I then outline an alternative notion of 
‘thick linkage’ which redefines campaign participants as boundary workers who 
translate between elites and non-elites. I finish the literature discussion section by 
tying this to the problem of decoupling in the contemporary era. I then discuss how 
participants go about doing field work in terms of making endorsements, 
representing, and translating between campaign elites and citizens, how this produces 
credibility, and trust, and ‘thick’ linkage. 
 
Linkage and party participation 
That political parties enable linkage between the state and society or between citizens 
and elites is one of the core tenets of the theory and research regarding parties. Some 
of the literature on parties thus focuses on how linkage has failed (Lawson 1988), 
declined (Katz 1990), or defied our expectations (Scarrow 1996). Often, attempts at 
theorizing this relationship highlight what Rosenau terms the “penetration” of the 
state by citizens, via parties (Rosenau 1969). In this view, the party function of 
linkage is often focused on how citizens may capture the levers of power in the state, 
and the way in which linkage happens ‘up’ from citizen to state or from citizen to 
elites. For instance, of Lawson’s five kinds of linkage, four are focused on the ways 
in which citizens influence elites and state organs, rather than the other way around48 
(Lawson 1988).  
                                                            
48 The fifth kind of linkage is when office holders seek to control citizens through party agencies, and 
is mainly drawn from work on Eastern bloc communist parties. 
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Katz succinctly defines linkage as “implying that the party as an organization 
provides a set of opportunities for citizens actively to influence public decisions, and 
from the other side provides elites with channels of communication to the citizenry” 
(Katz 1997: 173). In his own research on this issue, Katz (1990) uses a loose rational 
choice theory approach to ask about whether parties still need members, and 
members need parties in order to reach their rationally-decided upon goals (influence 
on policy for members, communicating with the electorate and winning elections for 
party leaders). His basic answer, using data from western European states was 
essentially, no. Members could go to other organizations for influence on policy 
(notably, burgeoning social movements and interest groups) and party elites had 
increasingly turned to mass media for their communication needs. The result of this 
rational calculus was that linkage function of parties, as fulfilled via party members 
and activists, was left only as a ‘vestigal’ function.  
Reflecting back on that article in 1997, Katz conceded that he underestimated the 
extent to which parties would value members for their legitimating function, a 
relationship that Susan Scarrow (1996) highlighted with her research on German and 
British political parties. The ability for party members to serve as “ambassadors to 
the community” (1996: 43) could not be replaced by communication through other 
means. Clark (2004) similarly points to the importance of local party organizations in 
the Western European context as increasing party legitimacy by demonstrating 
broad-based appeal in society. Importantly, even though Katz came to a different 
conclusion (initially) than Scarrow and Clark about the importance of linkage to 
party elites, they share a common conceptualization of linkage as essentially an 
exchange between voters and elites: you make the policies that are in my interests 
and I will give you my support, the party activists/voters say. Serve as my 
‘ambassador’ to voters in your community and I will reward your with preferred 
policy outcomes, social gratifications, and the sense of a job well done, the party 
leaders reply. By conceptualizing participation as a form of exchange, the 
relationship between elites and citizens hinges on outcomes, policies, and voting 
behavior. This ‘thin’ notion of linkage, as I will call it, provides a minimalist 
interpretation of the relationship between elites and citizens. 
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Importantly, in this conceptualization of linkage participants are either 
conceptualized as voters or as part of the party organization, but not as occupying a 
qualitatively separate role in the linkage relationship. According to Katz, Scarrow, 
and Clark participants act like part of the party, communicating messages and 
delivering party appeals. The metaphor of being an ambassador is demonstrative, 
conveying the sense that participants are not autonomous from a party message, just 
empty vessels which convey intact messages. Such conceptions leave little room to 
imagine any other ways in which participants act, what additional functions they may 
serve, and therefore what additional questions we may ask about participation. 
On the other hand, participants are voters by another name and another means: their 
concerns are largely about policy outcomes and elite actions. Participants are state-
oriented and outcome oriented, they think in the same way and are concerned with 
the same things as voters. They are state oriented like voters, attempting to influence 
policy choices. Of course, one could argue, many authors have pointed out how 
political and civic activists are different from non-participants in that they tend to 
have different policy preferences than non-participants, either because they are better 
off and more resourceful in general or because they are more extreme in their views, 
which causes the authors to question whether more participation by these citizens 
leads to skewed signals about what policy priorities should be (e.g., Aldrich 1995; 
Fiorina 2004; May 1973; Verba Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
In terms of relating these conceptions to the present case study both Katz’s and 
Scarrow’s research findings provide a more useful framework for conceptualizing 
linkage with respect to participation compared to the literature on American parties 
because of the separation often made between parties and campaigning in the 
American literature, so that questions regarding linkage are not connected with the 
literature on campaigning (and especially field work).  
For instance, in constructing her argument about the role of party members as 
ambassadors, Scarrow focuses on party campaigning activities. The British and 
German parties she studies are different from their American counterparts in that the 
German and British parties do have formal, card-carrying members, and that 
campaigning organizations and party organizations are not traditionally as distinct as 
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the American ones. In comparison, the research which deals with campaign field 
work in the US does, like the literature on campaigning in general, deal almost 
exclusively with the question of effects. Since the dominant notion that campaigns 
had relatively little effects on outcomes which used to be the conventional wisdom 
has faded to some degree (Shaw 2006), much more energy has been invested into 
looking at what kinds of effects campaigning can have on outcomes and under what 
circumstances. By now, a healthy and growing body of research has established that 
various field tactics can and do raise levels of voter turnout (Arceneaux 2007; Gerber 
and Green 2000, 2001; Gerber, Green and Schachar 2003; Gimpel et al 2007 
Nickerson 2005, 2006. 2007; Nickerson et al 2006). Research focuses on the effects 
of different tactics on turnout, with door-to-door contact having the largest effects 
compared to telephone, media, and direct mail appeals (Brox and Shaw 2006). 
While these studies are primarily concerned with turnout, some do connect turnout 
with problems of civic engagement and decline. As one group of authors sums it up, 
“our study reinforces the importance of campaigns as instruments of democracy. On 
the one hand, our results point to short-term gains in the socioeconomic diversity of 
battleground voters. In the long term, these efforts may result in an electorate that is 
reliably diverse across election cycles” (Gimpel et al 2007: 796). Campaigns are 
good for a healthy democracy because more people, and more socio-economic 
diverse people, go out and vote as a result of higher campaign contacts in a 
presidential election. Clark points towards local party activities as addressing the 
problems of political apathy, but only mentions increased vote share and turnout as 
positive result of local campaigning (Clark 2004: 41). Nickerson (2006: 270) also 
makes the case that his research on the effectiveness of paid versus volunteer phone 
banks has important implications for civic engagement, but largely undermines that 
argument through a research design which asks paid phone banks to act like 
volunteer ones and vice versa, thus making the primary comparison one of quality of 
phone calls rather than organization type. Overall, these concerns about anything 
other than campaigning effects, in the literature on field work49, are treated as 
secondary rather than primary concerns and are largely made on the basis of research 
                                                            
49 Research on other campaign topics, such as finance and media affects, includes more research 
regarding normative questions. See Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995), Arceneaux (2006), Banducci 
and Carp (2003), and Coleman and Manna (2000) among others.  
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designed to address turnout effects questions. They also differ from their European 
counterparts in the lack of enquiry regarding linkage and parties. 
To sum up, then, research on parties and linkage has, in the Europeans cases, focused 
on linkage as an exchange relationship between elites and party members and/or 
voters, where non-elites interact in order to achieve policy influence and elites 
attempt to communicate with voters in order to get re-elected. This exchange 
mechanism conception thus limits the concept of linkage to a minimalist or ‘thin’ 
form, focusing on only the instrumental aspects of such relationships. Participants in 
campaigns and parties matter to ‘thin’ linkage to the extent that they may increase 
voter participation, thereby helping parties to fulfill their essential aggregative and 
communicative functions (i.e., expressing by way of votes which policies citizens 
would like to see enacted).  
This instrumental conception also frames most studies of political participation to the 
extent that participants are largely conceived as voters who go the extra mile (hour, 
dollar) to achieve influence on elites. While the concerns expressed are often about 
outsized influence, the relationship is essentially the same as in the policy promises 
exchanged for votes, as above. While this is no doubt a critical component of 
participation, it is necessarily narrow and reflects a restricted set of questions which 
can be addressed regarding the normative implications of participation.  
 
Linkage and the problem of uncoupling 
Building on Henrik Bang’s work, I argue that the one of the more critical issues 
today is the problem of uncoupling, where the links between citizens and political 
authorities have become frayed. Bang describes uncoupling as deriving from the fact 
that “political authorities cannot make and implement authoritative decisions for a 
society unless laypeople accept them and recognize themselves as bounded by them” 
(Bang 2004: 4). Uncoupling is the process whereby citizens are “in growing numbers 
excluded from partaking, even indirectly, in the constitution of effective politics and 
policy” within formal political arenas, such as parliaments (Bang 2004: 6). In this 
formulation, the problem is that citizens are no longer part of political processes, and 
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therefore have no affinity or trust for the political authorities who make decisions on 
their behalf.  
Linkage should have obvious relevance for uncoupling, in that if the problem is 
basically that citizens are no longer “bounded” by or to political authorities and the 
decisions they implement because they are excluded from relevant political 
processes, then the linkage function of parties should be able to address the bond 
between citizens and elites and the issue of exclusion. Focused as it is on exchange 
mechanisms, the ‘thin’ notion of linkage leaves the issues of trust and acceptance of 
political elites un-examined. 
I argue that participating in campaigns crucially addresses these concerns. While the 
primary goal of field work is, for organizers and volunteers alike, getting votes and 
winning elections, it has the potential for knock-on effects in terms of producing a 
form of ‘thick’ linkage. By thick linkage, I mean that field work participants, in the 
act of asking voters to support their candidate, do more than just ask for votes; they 
bind themselves and commit themselves to candidates beyond a mere ‘ask’ for policy 
outcomes. Likewise, some candidates and senior-level organizers recognize the 
extent to which the practice of field work relies on and produces a bond of trust 
between participant and voter. Rather than an exchange of desires and needs, this 
interaction at the organizational margins produces a relationship between participant 
and voter that engages notions of trust, bonding, and the act of being a co-producer of 
whatever outcome candidates are pitching. It goes beyond the abstract ‘legitimacy’ 
that Clark discusses, which is based on the perception of broad-based social support 
for a party, because it is the support of specific members of society – friends, 
neighbors, trusted acquaintances – which is communicated to voters. It is in this 
sense participation can be and is productive of normative ends for democracy.  
I distinguish thick linkage from Putnam’s (1995) much more well-known notion of 
social capital, which focuses on the bonds forged between citizens and between civic 
and political realms. Here I am focused on the linkage between citizens and actual 
political elites, and on the ways in which participants are citizens who bind 
themselves to the fate and reputation of elites, bringing the goals and ideas of those 
elites (candidates) to the doors of other citizens. Rather than Putnam’s static 
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categories of ‘civic’ and ‘political,’ ‘elite’ and ‘citizen,’ I highlight the productive 
work of participants in the boundaries and margins between these categories, blurring 
the distinctions through the act of representing, translating, and endorsing. Thus thick 
linkage is distinct in both the way it addresses categories of people and in which 
relationships it addresses. 
Thick linkage is, closer to Durkheim’s organic notions of solidarity (1893), which 
Granovetter uses to build the concepts of ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties.’ Strong ties, for 
him, are typified by shared similarities and proximity between individuals, and weak 
ties are ties those between people with less in common and less direct contact 
(Granovetter 1973). However, unlike Granovetter’s notion and Durkheim’s idea of 
organic solidarity as exclusively socially focused, ‘thick linkage’ is explicitly focused 
on relations with elites. It may rely on pre-existing ties between citizens, but to the 
extent that it also produces a further layer of binding between actors on the campaign 
trail, it goes beyond any pre-existing social relations.  
Rahn, Brehm and Carson (1999) go further in relating ‘trust’ to elections, but take a 
slightly different approach to the situation. Firstly, their focus is on trust is connected 
to elections, which they refer to as ‘national institutions,’ rather than campaigns per 
so. And perhaps more importantly, in exploring both generalized trust and political 
trust they conduct the entire discussion – including addressing the role of political 
parties in contacting citizens and urging them to vote – without ever bringing in the 
concept of linkage. While the notion of trust as they use it is somewhat similar to the 
idea of linkage in that thick linkage includes a focus on trust, unlike Rahn, Brehm 
and Carson I build the concept within existing frameworks for looking at elites in 
party politics.  
In the next section I explore how participants act out and provide endorsements or 
guidance for their network of friends, family and co-workers, how they see 
themselves as representatives, and the translating work that they do. I then discuss 






On the Monday morning after the state Democratic Party convention, Joe organized a 
visibility for his gubernatorial candidate at the local public transportation hub. We all 
assembled to hold signs and wave at drivers during rush hour, or hand out flyers to 
passers-by boarding the trains and buses. The logic, according to Joe, was that the 
convention results (which were relatively favorable for his candidate) would be on 
the morning news, and so even though it was only June, the chances were people 
would be hearing something about the convention or political news whilst on their 
way into work. 
As we stood around, several passersby knew one of the group, getting a hello or even 
a quick conversation. A conversation ensued between Joe and an old friend and an 
old friend of his, who asked how the convention had gone. Joe talked up his 
candidate’s performance at the convention, and she seemed to be absorbing Joe’s 
interpretations of the events. As I sidled up to the conversation, Joe introduced 
Nancy, who responded by remarking that since she was no longer involved (since the 
days a decade ago when she and Joe both participated in local politics), Joe was “our 
moral compass.” In other words, the decisions he made guided the choices she should 
make.  
While not all participants consider themselves a “moral compass” in the same way, 
the use of dear friend cards by campaigns involves essentially the same function of 
communicating one’s vote choice to others in one’s social network. Holding signs, 
sending out dear friend cards, and talking about the election to one’s friends and 
neighbors did more than just convey the campaign message. In these cases, it 
mattered that the volunteers (more than often than organizers) already knew the 
people who they were contacting through dear friend cards, canvassing, hosting 
coffee parties and doing visibilities for a candidate. These activities conveyed 
something about the messenger as well and that they were endorsing the candidate 
they were out working for.  
Another common campaign tool was the use of lawn signs. Recall that back in 
chapter four one organizer considered these a ‘waste of time,’ compared to voter 
identification activities. However, another participant, our volunteer Dave, saw the 
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benefit of lawns signs, explaining that they were important because “people notice 
that.” I asked what it was people noticed – the number, or who put them up, or what 
– and he elaborated 
it's a real commitment, it's letting their neighbors know who they support, 
and usually you know if that sign is on that person's lawn, you know that 
probably their extended - their whole family might be supporting that 
candidate too and that - and you know people in [this city], they'll look at 
different locations, and not just [the city] but in the area, and they'll look at 
someone's house and say oh they're supporting so and so, that might mean 
something to a neighbor, you know? 
For Dave, putting a lawn sign up was significant because it was communicating to 
neighbors who their vote choice was for, and it “might mean” something to a 
neighbor. These lawn signs act as a kind of endorsement, using the endorser – 
whoever has a sign on their lawn – as a way of telling something about the candidate. 
In another lawn sign case, I drove a house mate with a broken leg to vote before the 
primaries, and before we went in the voting booth, she asked me to go through the 
down ticket races for who I was voting for so she would know who to vote for. Other 
than the gubernatorial candidates, she had either not heard of them or not made her 
mind up. When we got out of the voting booth, she commented that we hadn’t 
discussed the very last race on the ticket, for registry of deeds. In the end, she voted 
for the candidate that had lawn signs up in our neighbor’s yard, reasoning that they 
were smart and lawyers so the candidate couldn’t be all that bad. In this example, I 
was the opinion leader (not unlike Joe as the ‘moral compass’) and our neighbor’s 
lawn sign conferred approval on a candidate where no other information was known 
about them. 
While the accounts of this kind of endorsement act are between individuals with 
direct, pre-existing ties, they did not necessarily have to be close or personal ties. My 
flatmate, for instance, knew almost nothing of our neighbors other than what was 
stated – they were lawyers. But the fact that they lived across the street and so were 
in some way ‘known’ was good enough. Similarly, one participant explained the use 
of starting out phone scripts or leaving message with “hi, I’m your neighbor,” saying 
“I think it tells people that someone else in your neighborhood, who you might or 
might not know, can utter this person's [the candidate’s] name without contempt. 
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That there's some kind of approval, or there's some kind of collective sense, that 
other people near you are thinking positively about someone”. And recall Maggie, 
introduced in chapter four, who canvassed her neighbor whom she always saw when 
they were both out walking their dogs first thing in the morning. Although they had 
never spoken before, they shared  the indirect link of both walking their dogs in the 
same neighborhood at the same time, and knew each other by sight, so that when 
Maggie came to the door her presence served as that ‘kind of approval’ of someone 
in the neighborhood. It did not matter that one might not precisely know the other 
person on the side of the doorstep, only that there was a shared community 
membership.  
In each of these cases, the process of participating in a campaign provided the 
opportunity to communicate not just the candidate’s message, but the message that 
the participant themselves had chosen that candidate, offering a personal 
endorsement as another piece of what was being communicated to voters. Especially 
in the cases where there was not a direct relationship between the voter and campaign 
worker, participants meant this to convey something about the positive way the 
candidate was perceived by others in the same community. When such endorsements 
are made by participants who then go out and speak to voters who they know already 
– family members, friends, neighbors or acquaintances – they rely on pre-existing 
relationships and knowing something about the campaign volunteer. In other cases, 
the links between canvasser and voter can be even more distant, but still perceived to 
be helpful by campaign participants as they go about trying to persuade people. In 
short, campaign participants use these personal endorsements in order to try and 
drum up more support for a candidate.  
But these endorsements are not the only way in which participants link candidates or 
campaigns to voters. In the next section, I address how participants view themselves 







One theme that came out of the skills section is the concept of representing the 
candidate as part of being able to do field work well. In the act of canvassing and 
interacting with other party members and leaders, participants were charged with 
representing or ‘selling’ the candidate to selected publics. These answers applied to 
both canvassers and organizers, although there were some specific dimensions to 
representing which were only described by organizers. The practice of representing 
the candidates reverses the usual conception of the principal-agent relationship 
between elected (or aspiring) leaders and campaign workers. Rather than elected 
leaders representing citizens in the state, campaign workers represent the elected 
representatives to citizens. In a way, this reflects a reversal of the usual focus on 
citizens “penetrating” the state, so that citizen-representatives of elites are 
“penetrating” society. In this section, I explore how campaign participants describe 
doing field work well as a way of embodying representation. 
Several participants, especially in the organizer roles, emphasized the need to be able 
to be a ‘mini-politician’ in their work: “I think you have to have a little politician in 
you yourself. And be comfortable being a surrogate candidate, you know cause when 
you're going door-to-door, or you’re putting together house parties, or you’re on the 
phone recruiting for speeches or rallies or events, you know you're a salesperson, 
you're a little bit of a political figure.” In this sense some saw themselves as needing 
to be a representative of the candidate, to make a good impression with individuals. 
Another participant talked about making twenty second conversations fifty or sixty 
times a night, and in that context emphasized that they “we are going in there as 
representatives of candidate” and had to try to “sell” the their employer’s candidacy. 
The concept of representation extended beyond what organizers do to include 
volunteers and canvassers as well. One campaign distributed a “top tips” list of 
advice along with canvassing materials to their volunteers. The top tip listed was 
“Always smile and Be Polite,” with the instructions: 
People will think of you when they see [the candidate] on the news, read 
about him in the papers, and as they walk into the voting booth. 
Inevitably, a small percentage of people will be rude, but remember, you 
are the face of the campaign. 
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The metaphor of volunteers being “the face” of the campaign is a clear reference to a 
sense of physical embodiment form of representation. Here, the participant is the 
candidate and campaign.  
The concept of representing a candidate also had unique emotional and identity 
dimensions for organizers. Many reported feeling worn out, or “emotionally busted” 
in the words of one organizer, after an intense campaign (and the 2004 presidential 
election in particular). Much of this surely relates to the long hours and stressful 
workplace environment, but it also was a reflection of the emotional engagement that 
could happen when the concept of representing the candidate became too much about 
being the candidate. This could lead to a much stronger identification with a 
candidate on a personal level, and one organizer described how not being able to 
draw an emotional line between one of the candidates she worked for and her own 
self was an early mistake she learned not to repeat. In a less problematic dimension 
this close representative role for organizers meant that whatever one’s own policy 
preferences might be, as a member of a campaign’s staff it was expected that one 
would be advocating the candidate’s preferences only.  
That this kind of representation was a strong norm can be demonstrated by my 
experience in one interview that, in all other respects, was somewhat of a failure. 
After several phone calls and rescheduled appointments, I finally sat down with one 
campaign staffer who was clearly not interested in speaking with me. Given that the 
recommendation to speak with her had come from an indirect supervisor, I believe 
that she saw speaking with me as part of her job, and thus the whole interview was 
like speaking not to an individual who had their own history, but interviewing An 
Organizer for This Campaign.  Unlike the other interviews that were in neutral 
locations, such as coffee shops, or telephone conversations with participants who 
were at home or not in a political office, this one was conducted in the campaign 
office. We never really broke through the lack of trust in that interview, and this 
participant’s answers were shorter and less elaborate than all other interviews. 
Moreover, it was clear that all of the answers given were ‘the campaign line’. When I 
asked her if she had any goals for this particular election, the initial answer was no, 
just win. Then, after a pause and when I started to ask the next question, she 
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corrected herself to say the goal was better health care, immigration reform, and 
commitment to issues affecting working families – which were the key issues her 
candidate was campaigning on. Some questions which were more politically 
sensitive – such as whether or not the Democrats have a “big tent” and what she 
thought being progressive was – clearly caused some trouble for her to answer and 
still stay on the campaign script. These answers were, in fact, classic non-answers 
that glossed over any controversies which could have caused problems for the 
candidate. 
Only at the very end of the interview, when I asked what kept her involved at what it 
meant to her, did I get any answer which clearly strayed from the campaign script 
and staffer role. She described how her mom used to always watch the evening news, 
and that was the thing they did together on a regular basis. It was really about 
thinking about her parents’ experiences, and how her mother taught her to pay 
attention that kept her involved at the end of a long day. In the long run, she was 
doing all this because she wanted them to get a better deal in life. Only these 
experiences which pre-dated the campaign organizer participation did the need to 
represent the candidate not apply. Otherwise, the concept of representing the 
campaign, and the candidate, shaped the entire interview. 
 
Translating 
Translation happens in two ways. First, translation involves turning a message and a 
candidate who is distant and abstract into one which is immediate and concrete. This 
act of translation can be perceived as having pitfalls for campaigns, who try to 
control that translation through guidance of what canvassers should or should not do 
and say. Second, translation involves movement across organizational boundaries. 
Recognizing these boundaries, and the ways in which translation is a function of 
those margins, is crucial for understanding how translation is a part of thick linkage.  
Delivering the candidate’s message clearly was another key skill that participants 
emphasized in all roles, and often the need for message clarity was wrapped up in the 
broader concept of representing the candidate. One participant cited his professional 
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experience as a lawyer as an advantage in being able to stay “on message” for the 
candidate, saying “The same way [as a lawyer] if I'm working for the candidate. I 
know I'm representing that message and I don't want to impose - even if I disagree 
with that particular candidate on a given issue - I have to stay on message, because 
you're out there for, on behalf of that candidate.” A second participant emphasized 
the importance of organizers offering training for canvassers so that they could be 
confident and know what the candidate stood for, and thus deliver the candidate’s 
message clearly.  
While there was a clear emphasis on presenting the candidate’s message and not their 
own, ‘personalizing’ a candidate’s message was seen as a good way to make the 
message delivery more authentic. In contrast to staying on message even whilst 
disagreeing, other participants talked about how it was ok for participants to explain 
why they were supporting a candidate as a good way of speaking to voters. “It’s good 
enough for you to tell people why you're supporting a candidate, and how they can 
find out more information” about the candidate, one participant explained. In the 
same “top tips” packet discussed above, the second tip was to “be informed,” telling 
volunteers to “review the talking points and the literature” but also “make sure you 
are able to talk about at least one of your own personal reasons for supporting [the 
candidate].” Indeed, while canvassing on this particular campaign, my canvassing 
partner had a story from her own experience about the effects of education funding 
cuts, in order to explain her support for the candidate. 
Another packet with a list of do’s and don’ts included under the latter section, 
“DON’T argue.”Such an admonition was both practical in that arguing with someone 
was a waste of breath and time that could be spent on identifying voters who 
supported a campaign. But arguing also risked looking, well, argumentative. The 
perception that a campaign’s supporters were dogmatic and/or extreme was an image 
that no one wanted to be associated with. Hark back to the descriptions of what 
‘progressive’ meant in the previous chapter – regardless of whether one identified as 
progressive or not, whatever one wasn’t was derided as brittle, dogmatic, or 
ideological. So while no one explicitly spelled out in the campaigning packets that 
argumentativeness was bad because of this image, argumentativeness had negative 
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connotations in terms of perceptions and images of what ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Democrats 
were like. In other words, while arguing could theoretically be a form of 
perseverance and good way to drive home a candidate’s message, in practice it was 
actually perceived as sending the wrong message about the ideological brittle-ness of 
campaign volunteers and supporters, and therefore of the candidate him or herself. 
In another example of how message delivery could adversely transform the message 
being delivered, one participant relayed a crude joke which relates to this concern 
about what the canvassers themselves say about a campaign. Next door to the field 
office where he worked was a methadone clinic, whose clients would occasionally 
come by on weekend mornings for the free coffee and donuts that were on offer for 
canvassing volunteers. Amongst several of the staff, the running joke was that they 
would organize these clients to canvass for the opposition, sending them out across 
the target area with flyers and attempting to turn out the vote. That, so the joke went, 
would be the most effective way to get votes for their candidate.  
In this sense, when participants were ‘delivering’ the candidate’s message there was 
a dual mechanism of both delivering the candidate’s message (and not one’s own 
views) and a process of transforming it (through what was important according to 
one’s own views, one’s conduct, dress and demeanor). The guidance that campaigns 
offered participants on how to dress, their demeanor, and being the ‘face’ of the 
campaign attempt to guide what a message becomes through delivery. The attempt at 
control is an implicit acknowledgement that the words on a flyer, indeed the flyer 
itself, are not the only messages being communicated. 
Like Lipsky’s street level bureaucrats (1980), participants became the actual face of a 
larger organization. While organizationally marginal, these participants at the fringes 
and the boundaries of the campaign organization are also the front line of the 
candidate’s or party’s organization. Working in these spaces and roles means not just 
implementing policy at one’s discretion (as in the case of Lipsky’s bureaucrats) but 
of translating, transacting and assembling (Newman 2008). So it is with those 
participants, volunteers and organizers alike, who are the ‘front line’ of the party and 
responsible for taking their work out into the field. By their very presence, 
participants add to, transform, and otherwise adjust the message created and dictated 
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by a campaign’s central strategy unit in the process of delivering it on the doorstep, 
in meetings, and over the phone. The translation work is a part of practice, and so is 
hardly verbalized, but rather acted out in practice. The presentation of self as the 
candidate, and the addition of one’s own reasons for support are each an act of 
translation. As is the case with so many acts which are taken for granted or go 
unspoken, it is the transgression of these translation acts, as in the case of the two 
examples below, which throws them into relief. 
If the issue of being the front line of a campaign was as simple as just conveying the 
candidate’s core message, then transgressions, like being poorly dressed, 
argumentative or a drug addict, would not be such a worry (or joke) for campaign 
staff. The personal views added to the message amount to a translation of what the 
candidate’s policies mean in an essential way. With the canvasser I went out with, it 
was what those policies meant for education in an everyday way. If translation is the 
transformation of an original for a different audience (community of practice) by way 
of expressing meaning, then the acts of field work are, essentially, acts of translation. 
 
Translation and boundaries 
Understanding participation as involving translation also throws organizational 
boundaries into relief. Without boundaries, or without two different communities, 
translation would not be necessary. In her account of organizational boundaries and 
knowledge translation, Yanow points out how those people at organizational margins 
are ‘border crossers’ engaged in everyday activities of translation (Yanow 2004). For 
Freeman (2008), translation involves moving between distinct communities of 
practice who may engage the same issue in different conversations of meaning. Like 
linguistic translators, these participants at organizational boundaries are engaged in 
not just transliteration or exchanging equals – unknown object A for known object B 
– but in the art of translating meaning through their practice. Those at the 
organizational boundaries are engaged in multiple organizations and groups, and 
doing their job requires being able to translate practice as it is done among one 
community to practice, amongst a different set of actors, amongst another. 
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This is different from Wenger’s concept of borders for a community of practice. 
Early, he focused on being at the periphery and working in, later he did talk about 
translating in and out again (comparing) but always with an element of transforming 
the actual organization or one’s own role. Yanow, on the other hand, emphasizes 
how being at the organizational periphery can in fact be a relatively stable position, 
and this can also be useful for understanding how translation works. The goal is not 
to turn the organizational knowledge into something else permanently, but to 
transport, via the act of representation, the actual campaign message/candidate 
message outside the party and into a different social realm, and, hopefully, bring 
some of those people back into the campaign – at the very least as voters, and 
possibly even as supporters or fellow volunteers.  
Seeing translation as a form of boundary work implicitly involves participants 
transporting or moving across those lines. As obvious as it sounds, when campaign 
participants are also members of their community and/or talk about politics with their 
own network of friends, family, coworkers and neighbors, they cross back and forth 
between a political campaign group and a social group. When they greet other 
citizens at the doorstep, emphasize that they are a volunteer and say how a campaign 
matters to them, they show what a campaign message means in terms of everyday 
issues and implications for personal lives. Rather than leaving such campaign issues 
and messages in the realm of being only the concern of political elites and 
candidates, participants demonstrate what a campaign message or candidate is for 
“real” people. They take political issues out of the elite spheres and cross into 
everyday spheres.  
Such acts also mean that candidates and campaign leaders are no longer the sole 
producers of campaigns and campaign messages. The campaign message, 
transformed via the presence of grassroots organizers and volunteers, becomes co-
produced by elites and engaged citizens and transported into the immediate lives of 
whoever campaigners see at the doorstep, in public, or speak to on the phone. By 
transporting, translating, endorsing and representing, grassroots campaign 
participants blur the boundaries between political organizations and social networks, 
between elites and citizens. It is this crucial aspect of translation and transportation 
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which engenders trust and campaign credibility. This, in turn, is the stuff of thick 
linkage.  
 
Trust and Credibility 
Credibility comes through establishing trust in one-to-one interactions at the doorway 
and on the campaign trail, and it came from presenting an image of a candidate (and 
campaign) as connected to local people, issues, and life. From the perspective of 
campaign leaders, perhaps one of the key aspects of doing field work is that it is 
intended to increase the credibility of the candidate as this can result in more votes. 
Lest one be tempted to think that campaign field work is nothing but a force for 
good, it is important to keep in mind the ways in which these bonds of trust and 
community credibility can be faked. Although there were no cases of ‘astroturfing’ 
(where a hired campaign masquerades as a local grassroots campaign) apparent in 
this study, the concepts of faking those bonds between canvassers and voters and 
faking community connections highlights the ways in which credibility is a part of 
campaign field work. In this sense, field work cannot always or does not always 
create trust and credibility (no more than every single canvasser interacts exclusively 
with their own social network), but recognizing this potential and the ways in which 
field work can engage in credibility and the production of thick linkage helps us to 
understand the fuller normative dimensions of campaign field work.  
Recalling back to the section of campaigns skills, one of the sections mentioned 
under ‘people skills’ was the ability to find or create some kind of bond with voters 
and engender a sense of trust. One participant who talked about being a 
representative of the candidate linked this with the ability to connect, saying, “we are 
going in there as representatives of candidate not only try and sell yourself but also 
try and make that connection to you know get people to identify not only with the 
candidate but with the person you just had the conversation with” [emphasis added]. 
Of course, connecting could be a matter of good conversation skills as much as 
anything else, as he also added that this connection had to happen in “twenty second 
conversations, fifty, sixty times a night.” 
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In the interviews with participants who had either held elective office or run for 
office, this aspect of making connections and gaining trust was more explicit than in 
the descriptions of non-candidate participants. While most of them spoke of this 
positively, only woman who ran for office and found the experience overall 
distasteful, was particularly unhappy with this shallow, quick conversation aspect of 
field work. “You know the trouble is if you spend 30 seconds talking to somebody 
you can only always get to a very surface level talking about things. And you kind of 
repeat that next door, over and over again you never really get to - I mean the whole 
process encourages, or I should say discourages, any depth of thinking or 
conversation about issues.” 
Yet for others, this was a good thing. Another spoke positively about the connections 
one made on the campaign trail, saying “Well, as everybody says, there's no better 
way than to make your case than touching people. And quite literally, touching [he 
touches my shoulder]. People like touching, holding their hand, shaking their hand, 
and that really is one of the great things about politics.” Most explicitly, two 
participants who also held elected office were very clear about trust as being a 
dimension of interaction at the doorway. One elected representative found this one of 
the most rewarding aspects of campaigning, saying that when voters are “willing to 
just open up their lives to you and share with you, and that you have to understand 
that for many people, that's a real gift of trust someone's giving you, and that you're 
now the trustee of that information” (emphasis added). Finally, another participant 
put trust within the context of getting votes, saying people “vote on if they trust 
someone. So, a lot of the people I talk to say they don't vote by the party, they vote 
by the person. And I don't know if that's entirely true, but fact that I've met them at 
their house seems to convince them to vote for me” (emphasis added).  
These last two descriptions highlight different aspects of trust. In the first example, 
trust is something that is given to the candidate and becomes part of the 
responsibility for making policy. In the second example, trust is an implicit 
dimension of a voter’s decision and building it leads to votes. However, note that in 
both examples trust is not pre-existing but built through the act of speaking to voters 
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on the doorstep. Rather than innate or organic, as in Durkheim’s solidarity, trust is 
built through campaigning interactions. 
That campaigning can build trust is captured in Rahn, Brehm and Carson’s work on 
elections as national institutions. However, given that their work is on presidential 
campaigns the concept of who one trusts and why does not fit the circumstances here. 
It is a binary relationship of trust which the two elected representatives seem to speak 
of here, rather than a generalized trust for political institutions or based on 
conceptions of the imagined community. This trust, here, is much more immediate 
and specific. 
Is such trust built with volunteers and campaign organizers as well as candidates? I 
argue that although it is not as explicit as in these descriptions, from the perspective 
of participants the process of endorsing and representing candidates tacitly engages 
with and builds trust between the campaign worker and voter. Thus our campaign 
organizer tries to build “connections” through twenty second conversations, fifty 
times a night. Being a “moral compass” for friends involves an act of trusting 
another’s judgment of who to vote for. And explaining how a candidate’s platform 
for education would affect one’s own job is implicitly a testimony that yes, this plan 
is believable, I vouch for it and you can trust it too.  
Advocacy, endorsement, translation, and representation are not done simply for their 
own sake, of course, but to get votes. And it is this connection between credibility 
and vote getting that is emphasized in written campaign documents. “Even the best 
media consultants,” the DLCC campaign training manual explains, “cannot produce 
a mailing or radio spot that will move that voter as well as another human being can” 
(p. 25). In this context door-to-door canvassing has four goals. The first three should 
by now be familiar – identify votes, identify volunteers and/or donors, and increase 
name recognition for a candidate. The fourth point is to “establish the credibility of 
the campaign in the community.” No further explanation of how or why a campaign 
would need to establish credibility is explained, and how this credibility works is 
taken for granted. The only other time the word “credible” is used in the document is 
in relation to naming the campaign co-chairs, and this makes a more explicit link 
between credibility and the issue of linking a campaign to the community. In 
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determining whether or not a person would be good in this honorary role, the manual 
raises the following questions and points to consider: “Will this person’s name on 
your literature, or letterhead, be significant to the constituents in your district? Will 
having this person as a chairperson lend credibility to your candidacy? You should 
seek a person of stature in the community” (p 9). Credibility is a demonstration that 
the candidate knows who the people of stature in a community are, and implies an 
endorsement by person of stature for a campaign. In this sense, the concept of 
credibility described here is quite similar to Scarrow’s analysis of credibility as 
something that party elites value 
 
Faking it 
If one-on-one interactions could be an opportunity for imitating or attempting to fake 
real warmth and interest through shallow conversations, then the same concept 
applied to a grassroots campaign at large would be ‘astroturfing.’ Unlike ‘real’ 
grassroots campaigns that do engage people in the community and demonstrates local 
knowledge by campaign workers, astroturfing refers to a campaign of paid 
participants which intends to have the appearance of actually being a local campaign 
(in the same way that green plastic shreds are used to imitate real grass playing 
fields). In order to qualify as astroturfing it is not just that a campaign would use 
hired canvassers, but that it would make some claim to being a locally-based 
organization or among the people in some way. Astroturfing is qualitatively different 
from the process of trying to build trust on very little personal interaction in that, in 
its derogatory implications, there is deceit. On both the individual and campaign 
level, we can see how door-to-door campaigning did not necessarily build trust – yet 
these transgressions serve to point out the trust and linkage dimensions of field work. 
Although there were no cases of astroturfing that were readily visible in the 2006 
primary campaigns, more than a few supporters of one of the primary gubernatorial 
candidates had a distaste for the use of paid telephone canvassers by another 
candidate. One participant described a tense conversation with a friend who was 
possibly a supporter of another primary candidate in which she alluded to the fact 
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that the other candidate was “buying” his way into the race with advertisements and 
not using a grassroots campaign. While clearly this supporter was biased, the lack of 
a clear grassroots organization was one less reason to like the opposition. Essentially, 
astroturfing offends the local community endorsement aspects of grassroots 
campaigning, and therefore lacks the actual and real trust and bonds that can be built 
between voters and a campaign. But there could not be the concept of astroturfing if 
there was not a tacit credibility that grassroots field work builds in the first place. If 
field work was just a matter of communicating messages, then it would not matter 
who delivered the message or identified and mobilized voters. Marking astroturfing 
as fake grassroots campaigning implies that there is more produced in field work that 
‘just’ the execution of voter mobilization and delivery of a campaign message. That 
‘more’ is political solidarity. As I conceive it and drawing on Bang’s (2004) notion 
of the same name, political solidarity is distinct from the exclusively social 
connotations of Granovetter’s weak ties. However, where that is exclusively a 
construct for the social realm, I believe political solidarity applies specifically to the 
relationships between citizens as voters, campaign participants, and elected 
representatives. I got beyond Bang in placing political solidarity within the context of 
party and electoral relations and as such, political solidarity is the added dimension 
which transforms thin linkage to thick. 
 
Discussion 
In summary, in this chapter I discussed three different ways in which participants 
link campaigns and candidates to the voters with whom they interact. These linking 
processes – of endorsing, translating, and representing – are all ways of building 
relationships between voters and candidates and ideally help to persuade voters to 
support their campaigns. They produce political solidarity, which can be understood 
as another dimension of linkage. 
However, I think these instances go beyond the thin conception of linkage as it is 
conceived in terms of being an exchange of votes for potential policy influence. What 
is happening in field work engages in a much broader spectrum of concepts – 
translation, borders, endorsements, trust, and credibility. These activities, undertaken 
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by campaign participants provide a thicker version of linkage in that they 
conceptually go beyond an exchange relationship. These are activities and embodied 
acts that are undertaken in order to get more votes, but they are acts and products in 
their own right as well. Rather than linkage being a dyad relationship exclusively 
between voter and representative, or a generalized trust by voters of political 
institutions, the notion of thick linkage relates to how campaigners in partisan 
elections play a role as boundary workers. This boundary role carves out a different 
space for participants than that traditionally conceived in ‘thin’ linkage. It involves 
productively more than conveying a party’s message as is, and imagines participants 
in a more robust and meaningful way than simply as ‘ambassadors.’ Understanding 
translation as more than just transmission transforms the place of participants in the 
concept of linkage.  
This boundary work both uses and, in some cases, is productive of a trust which is 
not abstract and generalized but produced in specific interactions happening between 
specific people. While specific and not general, it may still be fragile, and something 
closer to a sense of being commonly bound together, rather than a more solid notion 
of trust. Taken altogether, what campaign volunteers and organizers appear to be 
doing – between establishing connections, emphasizing real or imagined 
neighborliness in campaign appeals, and representatives talking of the trust 
established at the door – is produce a bondedness that is distinctly political in 
character. It is not the exchange of votes for influence per se, nor can it solely be 
conceptualized as trust, as I think these connections and bonds are much too tenuous 
to be characterized as trust. The explicit attempts to establish this sense of 
togetherness, camaraderie, or we’re-all-in-it-together sum up the additional aspects of 
field work which are so tacit. The reasons for establishing political solidarity are 
strategic in that they aimed at getting votes, but the product is thick linkage. The thin 
conception of elite-citizen relations, which is exclusively instrumental, misses these 
additional dimensions of participation. 
Thick linkage has important implications for the “problem of uncoupling” (Bang 
2004). Bang uses the case of Danish citizens to make his point, but the problem has 





Crenson and Ginsberg 2002, respectively). It may not solve the changing 
configurations of power and networks which make decisions which, in Bang’s 
description, are part of the problem that citizens feel excluded in the wider world. 
But it does attempt to bring voters back into the electoral process and to engage with 
political elites – even if ‘only’ through the representative of that political elite on 
their doorstep. But by going door-to-door and engaging in grassroots field work, 
participants translate abstract people and policies into issues of everyday relevance 
and immediate accessibility, essentially providing the opportunity to re-couple. If 
grassroots participation does have the knock on effect of producing these bonds, it 
would be interesting to see how tenuous, or durable, they really are and what the 
implications are for the thin parts of linkage. Under what circumstances does the 
we’re-all-in-it-together sense of bondedness last beyond the voting booth? Do voters 
whose doors have been knocked on feel more empowered or entitled to see policy 
outcomes from their representatives than voters whose doors have not been knocked 
on? What happens afterwards between the campaign worker and the voters they 
speak to, if they do not know each other – do they speak again? If so, about what? If 
not, why? If thick linkage only operates during election years, then it may still be 
important for the problem of uncoupling, but what happens afterwards may be 
equally important for future study. 
In the next, penultimate chapter I address what Bang cites as one of the causes of 
uncoupling, that is, the ‘professionalization’ of politics. While the professionalization 
thesis is a narrative about system change, it is inextricably linked to narratives and 
profiles of the people who change with it. How do the organizers and volunteers in 
this case study compare with these profiles? As Bang’s formulation would suggest, 
the individual profile and political system combination are often followed on by 
normative assessments about the healthiness of democracy, parties, or society. By 
drawing on the data presented thus far, I make the case for the organizers and 
volunteers discussed from this case study as linked to yet another stage in party 
system change.
Chapter 7: Professional organizers and expert volunteers 
 
In Politics as a Vocation, Weber distinguishes between those who engage in politics 
in two different ways. Those who engage in politics as an avocation do so 
occasionally, while those for whom it is a vocation are the professionals. This latter 
class are distinct in that these men (and it was only men) either live ‘for’ or ‘off’ or 
politics compared to their avocational counterparts. Unlike politics as an avocation, 
as a vocation politics is ‘their life’ (Weber 1919). Weber’s distinction continues on in 
research on political participation and parties today, where those for whom politics is 
a profession and are separated from those for whom it is an amateur pursuit. It is a 
distinction with implications not only for different kinds of people who participate in 
politics, but inextricably linked to the political party organization models in which 
they participate. When party machines ruled 19th century American politics, the 
“Boss Tweeds” across the country were characterized by their loyalty to the party 
and pragmatic approach to policy ends; when New Politics activists swept through 
the Democratic Party in an era of movement politics they were ‘typed’ as idealistic 
and uninterested in party’s long term maintenance. More recently, the political 
consultant – slicked hair, no sleep, blackberry attached to the hip, too much caffeine 
– is the creature of a postmodern, media-oriented, micro-targeted and professional 
affair. These associations of participatory type capture the popular imagination, but 
they are also the subject of scholarly pursuit, which both expands the portrait of 
participatory type and enumerates the state of the party organization. More than a 
symbolic association, these participatory profiles and system profiles go hand in 
hand. 
As such, normative assessments of the system and the person apply, in some cases, to 
both the participatory type and the organization in which that participation takes 
place. For the progressive reformers and writers party bosses were the symbols of a 
corrupt system; to defenders of the American party system of compromise, 
movement activists in both the Republican and Democratic Parties were subject to 
skeptical, if not alarmed, notice. Nor have contemporary professional campaigners 
been spared the normative assessments of the modern era, blamed in the popular 
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discourse (Armstrong and Moulitsas 2006, Klein 2006) and associated in scholarly 
press (Bang 2004, Crenson and Ginsberg 2002, Fisher 2006, Stoker 2007) with the 
problem of declining and meaningful citizen participation in elections. 
What of the volunteers and organizers interviewed and observed in the Massachusetts 
grassroots political campaigns? How do they fit into these types, changes and 
systems? In this chapter, I argue that the construction of participatory types along 
professional and amateur lines is part and parcel to the understanding of the state of 
the political party system. Given the changes in internet technology, campaign 
finance, and campaigning tactics it seems plausible that the Democratic Party is 
undergoing yet another transformation and as such correlates with another, different 
set of distinctions between kinds of participation in party politics. 
I sum up the characteristics of field organizers and volunteers discussed so far 
throughout the thesis. Rather than fitting to either the profile of ‘professional’ 
political operatives or ‘amateur’ participants as developed in the literature, I argue 
that the field organizers and volunteers described here are best understood as 
participants in a new era of the party system. While there are some characteristics of 
volunteers and organizers which relate to the previous profiles drawn of participants, 
I show that there are as many similarities as differences between organizers and 
volunteers, defying the dichotomy of amateur versus professional. This 
understanding of the characteristics relevant to how organizers and volunteers 
practice participation has important implications for studying participation in the 
future and for normative assessments of the state of party politics as well. If other 
kinds of participation outside parties and campaigns – in civic organizations, public 
discourse and journalism, for instance – then the amateur/professional distinction 
would be better off as a point of comparison than a point of departure. 
In the next section, I outline profiles of ‘amateurs’ and ‘professionals’ in the US 
parties, and how these profiles are linked to specific kinds of party organizations. 
Then, I present data on the characteristics of both volunteers and organizers. Much of 
this discussion draws on material from previous chapters, either condensing or 
expanding the material to draw out the similarities and differences among 
participants in different roles. Finally, I discuss the implications for understanding 
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participants as part of new era in the party system, and for future studies of 
participation and assessing the health of civic engagement. 
 
Professional and amateur participants 
Vocation and avocation: the roots of professionals and amateurs 
The defining feature of politics as an avocation, according to Weber, was that it 
occurred only occasionally and when men were summoned to participate. “We are all 
'occasional' politicians when we cast our ballot or consummate a similar expression 
of intention, such as applauding or protesting in a 'political' meeting, or delivering a 
'political' speech, etc,” he explains (1919 [2008]).50 Anyone who came to politics 
only occasionally, including members of parliament, state councils, and even a 
prince’s “auxiliary” military forces did politics as an avocation because these more 
elite members were also only doing so on occasion rather than all the time. That is, 
“politics is, neither materially nor ideally, 'their life' in the first place” (Weber 1919). 
On the other hand Weber presents those for whom it is a vocation, and these 
individuals live off of (materially) or for (ideally) politics. Weber includes a whole 
host of types of vocational (professional) politicians, including clergy, lawyers, court 
nobility in England, journalists, and machine party politicians in the US, the last of 
whom he describes as “men interested in the management of politics” (Weber 1919).  
The distinction between vocation and avocation is a relatively small point in an essay 
mainly known for developing Weber’s definition of the modern state and what kind 
of politicians are and should be in charge of it. It is a distinction that continues to be 
used to frame and define what kind of political participation is studied, albeit in ways 
that are transformed from Weber’s original definition. All of the studies referred to 
thus far on political participation concern themselves exclusively with those who do 
politics on an occasional basis. The most important de facto change from Weber’s 
concept in the way these studies treat avocation is that these studies of political 
participation are of those who do politics ‘occasionally’ and are in some way 





(parliamentary representatives, advisory councils) are not envisioned to be part of 
avocation. One could argue that this could be because there are no avocational roles 
at the elite level in the modern state, but this possibility is not really considered in the 
work on avocational or amateur politics. So ‘avocation’ in the modern sense means 
both occasional, everyday, and non-specialist. 
Defining ‘professional’ politicians has also changed away from Weber’s initial 
definition of the term.  Noting the lack of information available on party staff 
(despite their increased importance), Webb and Fisher begin their article on 
professionalism by offering a definition, based on the sociological work developed 
on professions:  
A professional may be regarded as a member of the workforce with a 
relatively high status and strong position in the labor market flowing from a 
special degree of expertise, commitment, autonomy and capacity for self-
regulation which in turn reflects a particular education and formal training 
(2003: 11-12).  
This classic-ideal type is, they note, not always achieved equally among all staff 
members in their sample of British Labour party staff. Perhaps more importantly, this 
definition (and similar to the one created by Romzek and Utter (1991) in their work 
on Congressional staff people) is neither the same as Weber’s original sense, nor 
does it actually resemble the definition of ‘profession’ in the truest sociological sense 
of the term, where professional is defined by becoming an accredited or licensed 
member of a guild. The definition is actually based on doing something full-time and 
on the key characteristics that can be attributed to professionals. These key 
characteristics are the high status and strong position in the labor market, expertise, 
commitment, autonomy and capacity for self-regulation. 
Further, Brante (1990) identifies ‘tacit knowledge’ as a key characteristic of 
professionals. ‘Tacit knowledge’ is relatively inaccessible to the general population; 
it is usually attained through practice (especially in the form of an apprenticeship or 
‘enculturation’ into the workplace environment), and is a form of knowledge that 
cannot be standardized into a formal or university-based curriculum (Brante 1990).51 
                                                            
51 The similarities between this definition of ‘tacit knowledge’ and ‘local’ or practice knowledge will 
be addressed later in the chapter. 
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In sum, being a professional means being involved on a full-time basis and having a 
degree of efficacy, commitment, independence, and specialized knowledge. 
 
Key characteristics of amateurs and professionals 
The key characteristics of amateurs as described in the literature on American 
political parties are entirely different. Partially, I believe, this is due to the way in 
which the questions of participation have been framed through and around rational 
choice, so that motives play the most important role, front and center. To draw out 
these characteristics, it helps to review some of the specific history of studying party 
activists in the US. 
In mid-century, political scientists started to chronicle the emergence of a new kind 
of political activist. Unlike the regular activists who were motivated by solidary 
rewards, identified with the party, and valued compromise, the new amateur 
reformers were of a different “breed.” These new participants were, as Kirkpatrick 
paraphrased,  
urban and suburban, college educated, geographically and socially mobile, 
had relatively high incomes, young, heavily Jewish, largely liberal types 
who brought to politics distrust for party organization, disdain for the 
organization regulars and the paid professionals who staffed the 
organizations, distaste for a politics based on party loyalty, and a high regard 
for verbal skills and the articulation of issues and for politics based on 
ideology rather than on economic interests. (1976: 9) 
In her comprehensive study of the 1972 delegates to the Democratic and Republican 
conventions, Kirkpatrick highlighted a number of ways in which these new style 
(later referred to as New Politics) activists were different from their other party 
activist counterparts. Kirkpatrick argued that the incipient trends found in 1972 
delegate styles included a changing motivation structure in which amateurs were 
more likely to be motivated by policy outcomes and ascribed to an ideological style 
that was “holistic, internally consistent ideologies at both ends of the political 
spectrum” (351). In addition, “significant numbers of Democrats” (ibid) were less 
attached to the party and had negative attitudes towards party maintenance practices 
(e.g., compromising policy goals to build coalitions). In this sense they resembled the 
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anti-party tradition of viewing the party organization as a hindrance to achieving 
democratic ends (355). Many delegates, especially Democrats, did not even view 
winning as their primary goal.  
A lot of energy and expertise went into researching these specific claims about the 
changing motives of New Politics activists. Hofstetter (1971) argued that the analytic 
categories of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ lacked conceptual validity because you 
could not have the category and characteristics be the same thing without confusing 
the dependent and independent variables. Others showed that New Politics delegates 
are in fact interested in winning elections in later years (Abramowitz et al 1983, 
Stone and Abramowitz 1983), and party regulars were not so ready to throw all 
principles out the window in the name of winning (Costatini and King 1996). Other 
studies showed that a third or more of delegates to national conventions could be 
categorized as having a mixed professional and amateur style (Soule and Clark 1975, 
Hitlin and Jackson 1977, Nakamura 1980). Finally, a good portion of insurgent or 
New Politics delegates did socialize into party attachment and identity profiles which 
more closely resembled their ‘old’ party activist counterparts (Dodson 1990, Miller 
and Jennings 1986). 
From this work, we can draw out that the key characteristic of party activists is their 
(possibly changing) motives. By the early 1970s it seemed that partisans were 
motivated more by policy and ideological goals than their predecessors, they were 
less attached to the party organization and they cared less about winning than their 
predecessors. Later work on attitudes and engagement separated the issue of party 
attachment and/or sentiment as independent from ideological or party motives. As 
the literature review in the previous chapter would suggest, much of the research on 
motives measures party attachment as separate from ideological motives. 
Independently, both this research on party activists and that on party professionals 
are useful and internally coherent. The problem comes when one tries to compare the 
two. While for two of the key characteristics – efficacy and relation to the party 
organization – there are roughly similar questions asked of each group, two other key 
characteristics – motives and ‘tacit’ knowledge – are researched either for amateurs 
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or for professionals, but not both. This leaves one in the position of trying to compare 
apples and oranges, but apple cores with orange peels. 
As addressed in chapter five, many surveys include some measure of efficacy but 
there is a wide variation between different surveys on amateur participation as to how 
this is treated. What all these studies do have in common, however, is the largely 
prevailing presumption that individual participants have no influence on outcomes. 
On the other hand, for professionals, a sense of efficacy is part of being a 
professional, and the question of whether or not they have any influence is left 
unasked – although perhaps implicitly it is assumed that they do. Moreover, Webb 
and Fisher’s “ethos” of effectiveness is also different from the conceptualization of 
efficacy for activists in that this ethos is a collectively shared notion of doing work in 
an efficient manner has no equivalent in the research on activists. 
Secondly, the question of how professionals and activists relate to the party is treated 
differently for each group. In the research on party activists, the question is framed as 
one of changing attachments to the party. The starting assumption, working from 
Kirkpatrick, is that activists are attached to the party and the drop in party attachment 
is a deviation away from the norm. When Miller and Jennings, and later Dodson, 
show that attachment is to some extent a matter of socialization, this reinforces that 
party attachment is essentially the norm for activists. For professionals, on the other 
hand, their relatively high status in the workplace, commitment to getting the job 
done well (efficacy), and self-regulation all add up to a degree of autonomy that non-
professionals lack. In other words, the norm of relations with the party organization 
is one of being able to take it or leave it. Like the research on party activists and party 
attachment, the concept that professionals are autonomous may be stronger in theory 
than in actual fact. Nonetheless, to the extent that the attitudes about party in the two 
groups can be compared, it gives the impression of two opposite sides of the 
spectrum – activists who are highly attached and professionals who are not at all 
attached to the party. 
The other two important characteristics – motives and tacit knowledge – are 
incomparable because they are not measured, researched, or assumed to be relevant 
for both groups. While for understanding activists motives are key, they are not asked 
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about in the same way for professionals. From a narrow rational choice perspective 
this makes sense, because the ‘reward’ for professionals is their pay, making solidary 
or purposive incentives irrelevant, while for activists these latter incentives are the 
basis of participation. These assumptions also serve to reinforce the view created by 
the comparison of attitudes towards the party. If you take that the stronger party 
loyalty together with either solidary or purposive motives (or both) for party activists 
on the one hand, with autonomy from the party and no real solidary or purposive 
motives for professionals on the other, one is given the impression of a strong 
emotional relationship with the work of participation (and the party) for activists but 
not professionals. While the former are intimately wrapped up in what happens, the 
latter are cool and detached. 
The focus on ‘tacit knowledge’ for professionals but not for activists provides one 
more point of difference. Basically while professionals do develop tacit knowledge, 
there is no way of knowing, based on previous research, whether or not activists 
develop such knowledge, and whether they do so in a similar manner to 
professionals.  On knowledge, then, it is impossible to compare what is only 
researched for one group.  
Table 7.1 sums up the key characteristics of professionals and amateurs. There 
appears to be relatively little in common between the two groups. Amateurs take part 
in politics occasionally, are non-specialists, and non-elite members of the public. 
They are generally attached to the party (especially after a period of socialization), 
and the ideological purposes of their work and solidarity in participation are the most 
important reasons for their participation. Despite the apparent importance of 
outcomes to activists, however, they are not particularly effective in influencing 
outcomes – even if they think they are. In contrast, those for whom politics is a 
vocation – the professionals – work full-time are experts at what they do, and go 
about their work with a sense of efficiency and, presumably, an ability to get the job 
done. Because their incentives for participating are monetary, purposive and solidary 
incentives for professionals are not relevant or consulted. Despite the fact that they 
draw material benefits from the party, emotionally and psychologically they remain 
187 
 
relatively autonomous from the party. In short, they are, in ideal type, are totally 
different. 
 
Table 7.1: Key characteristics of amateurs and professionals 
Characteristic Amateurs Professionals 
Full-time/part-time Part-time Full-time 
Paid/Unpaid Unpaid Paid 
Motives Mixed motives (solidary and 
purposive) 
N/A 
Ideology Some more ideologically 
extreme? 
N/A 
Party loyalty Some more N/A 
Efficacy Low/none High efficacy 
Expertise N/A High 
Group autonomy N/A Autonomous, self-regulating 
 
Participatory type and party organization 
In the first issue of the first volume of Party Politics, Richard Katz and Peter Mair set 
out a series of models of party organization and their role in democracy. Written in 
part to counter the party decline thesis, they argued that the mass party was not the 
‘right’ or natural state of affairs, but only one “temporally limited and contingent 
model” of party organization (Katz and Mair 1995: 5). Western European parties, 
they argued, had gone through a series of changes since starting with the cadre 
model, then going stages of the mass party and catch-all party until the 1990s, at 
which point they theorized that a ‘cartel party’ was becoming the relevant model of 
party organization. Rather than decline per se, party organizations were simply 
undergoing periods of change. 
Katz and Mair’s work has mostly applied to the European context, and there is some 
debate over how well it fits the US parties.52 More importantly, their description of 
party changes includes descriptions of funding sources and personnel, linking the 
kind of participation in party organization with the overall model. Farrell and Webb 
                                                            
52 In the original article, Katz and Mair class American parties examples of the ‘catch-all’ model, but 
see Ware (2006) for a contrasting view. Aldrich uses a different set of party organization 




(2002) make a similar association in their description of how parties have 
transformed into campaigning organization, looking specifically at the staffing of 
campaigns at different points (see also pp. 17-22 in chapter one for a description of 
these changes in the US). In short, the profiles of participants change along with the 
models of the organizations they are in.  
The amateur and professional profile also fit within specific models of the 
Democratic Party over time. Those studying amateur participants in the mid-
twentieth century saw their arrival as hastening the end of the mass party 
organization (Wilson 1963, Kirkpatrick 1976). This was replaced by what Aldrich 
(1995) referred to as the party as a ‘service organization,’ which was run and staffed 
by the new professionals. It would be an overstatement to say that there were no 
professionals in the sense that Farrell and Webb (2002) or Romzek and Utter (1991) 
meant before the parties transformed into service organizations, or that amateurs 
stopped participating once parties became service organizations. But the association 
of one kind of participant profile over another in the different party models forms a 
key part of our conception of the party organizations. 
The following section looks at the key characteristics of volunteers and organizers. I 
look at five key characteristics for each group: time spent motives, efficacy, attitudes 
towards the party, and tacit knowledge. This draws on data presented in the previous 
chapters, plus additional data on efficacy as a group norm and attitudes towards the 
party. At several points I compare the findings here with previous ones, indicating 
where the literature on professionals is similar to what the data on organizers 
compiled here seem to match, or where amateurs and volunteers match. At the end of 
the section I will discuss how successful the volunteers-amateurs and professionals-







Key characteristics of volunteers and organizers 
Occasional and constant participation 
In chapter three, I stated that volunteers usually participated on a part-time basis and 
organizers usually participated on a full-time basis. Informal advisors were by 
definition part-time. This difference in time spent produced probably the key 
difference in experience between volunteers and organizers. While volunteers stayed 
rooted in their usual social networks, organizers lived the campaign (in the sense of 
living ‘for’ in addition to ‘off’) to a much greater extent. Joe explained the 
differences between being involved as a full-time organizer and his previous roles on 
a less hours-intense, volunteer basis: 
When you are full time staff, it is an entirely different world [from 
volunteering]. You are in a world where all the rules are changed. There's 
only a few things that are important, and they all revolve around the 
candidate and the campaign, and the people you're working with. And it 
means something different about how much you work, how intense you are, 
how you socialize, certainly, with the twenty- and even some thirty-
somethings I've seen on the campaign, their social lives revolve around it. 
They'll work until midnight and then all go out together and do something. 
It's much more of like a college environment that way. 
The main distinction was of a qualitatively different kind of experience. This all-
encompassing experience did pose a particular problem for the organizers that 
volunteers did not have, namely the ability to keep a sense of one’s own place and 
ego. One staff organizer said that an early mistake she made in a previous campaign 
was getting too emotionally involved with the outcome of the race, so that she was 
overwrought by the end. Three other organizers described the problem of keeping 
one’s own ‘ego’ in check and remembering that the campaign was not about them. 
“It's very easy to sort of lose track and get caught up in the moment or let one small 
issue dominate your thinking where that you lose track of the bigger picture,” as one 
organizer explained it. Yet none of the volunteers I spoke with identified these kinds 
of problems as part of their experience.  
While this clearly puts some space between the two groups, what is interesting is that 
it runs counter to the stereotype drawn out of the literature in the previous section. 
Amateurs, after all, are supposed to be the ones emotionally drawn into participating, 
190 
 
whilst professionals stay cool and maintain a certain distance from the course of 
events. But the intensity of the organizer experience, stemming from the very non-
occasional characteristic of their participation, is reported as lending itself to a level 
of emotional involvement among staffers that was not as true of volunteers.  
While this emotional involvement distinguished organizers from volunteers, one 
organizer also articulated a sense of being unlike other staffers as well. She described 
how field organizers tended to ‘gang together’ to deal with a sense of belonging 
neither to the world of volunteer participation of the canvassers, nor of the more 
‘professional’ world of other campaign staff: 
I meet people, either volunteers on the campaign, people from other 
constituency groups, or voters, they always say, "So what do you do for your 
job? For your real job?" Like, as if you could not be a professional person 
and do field. It's impossible to comprehend the concept that somebody 
would go out and interact with people and talk to voters as a full-time job, 
and that that's a professional and respectable thing to do. So, you have to 
contend with those sort of factors, but I think tends to lead to field staff sort 
of ganging up together and they become sort of insular, and there's a lot of 
dating, and friendships, and cliques within field staffs, and... I think it all 
stems out of this sort of feeling like they're outsiders, and being treated like 
they're less -- less qualified, less intelligent, less valuable, less professional 
than, say, the fundraisers or the communication staff, or whoever it might be.  
For this participant, her experience as a full time field organizer made her 
qualitatively different from the other volunteers or constituents who were involved 
on a part-time basis. Yet at the same time, she also described the feeling on not being 
entirely part of the ‘professional’ world of fundraisers and other campaign staff. Field 
organizers did display some of the same tendencies as other contemporary 
professionalized political staff, in terms of bringing a certain ethos of getting work 
done and commitment to the work, but the identity described as being built up by the 
group was both separate from the purely volunteer world of participation, and not yet 
quite of the ‘professional’ status of other campaign staff roles.  
 
Motives 
While in this emotional involvement organizers are distinct from volunteers, the 
same does not hold true for motives and meaning drawn from participation. As was 
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discussed in chapter five, both volunteers and organizers reported solidary and 
purposive reasons for their participation. Material reasons did not factor substantially 
as answers for participants in any role at all. Of course, there is a key difference in 
how these answers about reasons were reached in the present study with how they are 
asked about in previous studies of participation.  
Chapter five, on motives and meanings, deals with the reasons and gratifications 
participants reported in the context of continuing participation, while most surveys as 
about why participants joined in the first place. If one looks at the reasons for joining, 
discussed in chapter three, there is one important difference to point out. In that 
chapter, I stated that those currently in organizer roles were more likely to cite 
interest in school or a sense of their own aptitude for what they were doing compared 
to volunteers. On the basis of these reasons for participation alone, more organizers 
do report motives for first getting involved (e.g., material) in the way that a rational 
choice theory would predict. However, many organizers also reported first getting 
involved through movement politics or because it was just a way of life.  
Separating these reasons for first getting involved versus the rewards, gratifications 
and meaning of continued involvement thus provides a clearer picture of the 
similarities and differences between volunteers and organizers. While more 
organizers reported getting involved in the first place because of material reasons, in 
terms of thinking about their participation like as a job, not all of them did. 
Moreover, once it came to the gratifications and meaning of participation, their 
answers worked in the same framework of solidary reasons, purposive reasons, and 
beliefs as volunteers and informal advisors. The differences between the two lay in 
the distribution of which motives and reasons were reported between the two groups, 
with more organizers and informal advisors reporting gratification from a sense of 
being able to make a difference.  
This difference fits with what Webb and Fisher describe as part of being 
professional. The sense of being able to get something done was largely only true for 
organizers, and not as true for participants. However, the “ethos” of efficacy 
extended beyond just the descriptions and practices of organizers. Instead, this ethos 




The ethos of efficacy 
Practice, as embodied ways of doing things, was also a reflection and embodiment of 
particular group norms, and especially the ethos of efficacy. Despite (or perhaps 
because of) the tendency to think of participants as activists as out of touch, 
unrealistic idealists with no sense of how to do practical things, the emphasis on 
efficacy is all the more apparent. Nor would this self-conscious emphasis appear to 
be entirely new; indeed, James Q. Wilson explained at length the pride with which 
his ‘amateur’ politicians boasted of their ability to run a good, organized, effective 
campaign as well as the professionals (Wilson 1963). So perhaps in reaction to this 
out-group perception, efficacy was emphasized throughout interviews and became 
part of the group identity. 
However, the ethos of efficacy is also well described in relation to an understanding 
of the challenges of field work and what it takes to do it well. In the face of finite 
resources, time, and energy, the ability to discern what is effective and what is not 
was a prime component of being a good organizer and volunteer. The ethos of 
efficacy really linked the concept of one’s own ability and influence to outcomes. 
The focus on efficacy thus served to reinforce the notion that would could, in fact, 
make a difference. 
Despite the fact that efficiency and the ability to sort what is practical from what is 
not was a clear theme that came through the interviews, participants had a difficult 
time explaining what it was or how one avoided wasting time. More often, they 
contrasted useful tasks with not useful ones, and the emphasis was always on 
prioritizing what was really important, instead of what appeared important. One 
participant offered this contrast: “people think that organizing data bases is really 
boring, but it's probably the most important thing that needs to be done. You know, 
as opposed to, I dunno, making happy signs for the office.” Similarly, another 
participant who ran his own campaigns for elective office and worked on others 
described it as “I think also they [organizers] have to filter out what is practical or 
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pragmatic or useful, and what doesn't make any sense. For example, you know 
obsession with lawn signs is, it's almost useless, but a lot of people think its key.”  
One common phrase that demonstrates this ethos of efficacy was the oft repeated 
observation about whether something was ‘the best use of my time.’ In one interview 
with a former Congressional staff member who was still involved in electoral 
politics, I asked if he ever attended his local ward committee. This participant 
responded, no, saying that given his strengths (including contacts with other 
government officials and expertise in several policy areas), it made more sense for 
him to “focus his time and energies” in a setting where those strengths would be the 
greatest asset. In other words, he chose to participate in ways that he perceived would 
have a greater impact – in his case, working with a campaign’s policy team to shape 
proposed plans on state level policies.  
In the same vein, one volunteer compared how he was taking his time with the 
actions of others in the same city, focusing on how he thought he could be ‘good’ at 
it: 
I feel like a lot of the people who are active [here], they're active in 50 things, 
and good at nothing… I guess I'm kind of taking the time - well I'll give you 
the opposite. I'm doing one thing, and hopefully be good at it. Let everybody 
else do the 50 petitions this summer, and the protesting on the environmental 
issues, and doing this and doing that. I'll just do one thing, and hope I can do it 
halfway decent. 
The implicit comparison this participant made was with others who were not very 
effective. Being ‘good’, in his case, meant focusing all his energy and time on one 
campaign with the hope of having a maximum impact.  Similarly, another volunteer 
reported organizing the time he had slotted out for political activities so that he could 
canvass for two candidates at once, reasoning that this was the ‘best use of my time.’ 
Using individual time effectively was also emphasized in campaigning documents 
and by organizational leaders. In the party Field Manual, in the section on attracting 
and keeping volunteers, the following advice was dispensed: “People will volunteer 
when they feel that their time is being used effectively. Focus your efforts on projects 
directly related to your purpose. We're working to elect Democratic candidates and 
further Democratic causes.” (p. 17, emphasis added) In other words, the group 
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leaders have a key role to play in helping individuals link the use of their time to 
organizational outcomes. And those outcomes are quite explicitly about winning 
elections. 
Perhaps most importantly, field work was billed as the way to win elections in 
presentations from the state and national parties, and in discussions with participants 
at all levels belief in the effectiveness was generally agreed upon. In repeated power 
point presentations from the state coordinated campaign, Green and Gerber’s ‘8.6 
percent’ rise in voter turnout from canvassing was used at the beginning of the 
presentation to convince participants to take part. The impact of a blanket 8.6% rise 
in Democratic voter turnout across the state (and in some cases, across the nation) 
was used to show how many more offices Democratic candidates would have won in 
2004. Despite the somewhat dubious translation of the field experiment data into a 
claim of how many offices Democrats could have one, the message of such 
presentations is unmistakable: canvassing, which volunteers could take part in, is the 
most effective way to win offices. Nor was this an idea solely advocated by party and 
campaign leaders as a way to inspire participation, it was a concept shared by 
organizers and volunteers further down the hierarchical ladder as well. Several 
participants sited the ‘8.6%’ rise in turnout. 
One participant summed this notion of effectiveness in a ‘confession’ of what he 
thought about field work: 
I know this is recorded but I'm sorry, I hate field, I hate making phone calls, 
I hate going door-to-door, I hate breaking out walk kits, I hate it. It's like 
tedious, and I don't like it. But it's the most effective way for our 
organization to run. If we're not effective, and we don't, if we don't win as 
much as we do on legislative races, and city council races, and planning 
boards and these kinds of things that we've done pretty successfully for the 
last two years... So we have to do the field work, and we have to do it 
because that's how we're most effective, if we're effective we don't win, if 
we don't win, everybody's screwed. Because that means bad people are 
getting into office. 
Rather than a one-off comment here or there, the consistent message relayed by 
organizational leaders, field organizers, and volunteers alike was that field work itself 
was an effective way to win elections, especially statewide, down-ticket, or more 
local elections. Beyond that, effectiveness was a norm that also applied to self-
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perceptions of individual behavior, in that doing field work well meant an ability to 
recognize what was effective or efficient and what was not.  
Rather than viewing the two versions of efficacy as entirely separate, it is more likely 
that volunteers and organizers share a similar strategic sense of trying to exert 
influence and get the most out of their hours involved. All participants share in the 
sense that field work is a good use of time and can make a difference. More 
organizers report making a difference as gratifying, however, because they are in a 
better position to do so. Moreover, the ethos of efficacy and orienting activity 
towards impact that is set in organizational documents and goals is controlled by 
organizers. In this sense, their notion of efficacy helps to set the tone for the 
organization as a whole. Efficacy, while a norm for all, is more of a reality only for 
some.  
 
Attitudes towards the Party 
The third potential point of difference is in the attitudes towards the party. These are 
broadly separated into two different issues: attitudes about internal democracy, and 
attitudes about compromise. While I have no direct measure of loyalty towards the 
party, these two issues do give some indication of how participants thought about the 
party. 
One of the key points in the discussion of activists is the extent to which amateurs 
were intent on party reform and/or held anti-party sentiments, at least in the 
beginning. Internal party reform issues did come into some of the interviews, and 
was a current or issue that was going on whilst I was in the field. However, this 
conflict was the primary concern only of a relatively small group of volunteers.  
These conflicts reflected long-standing attempts at reforming the party to be more 
internally democratic. In tracing the antecedents of the amateur politician in his study 
of Democratic Party club politics, James Q. Wilson linked the Populist reform 
movement with observed distrust of political organizations. The Populists, he 
explained, “shared a conviction that the cure for democracy was more democracy… 
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Grass roots control of both parties and government would produce better policies and 
better leaders, thereby reducing the influence of moneyed interests” (Wilson 1963: 
26). While he describes the Progressive movement as more self-consciously about 
intellectual elites wresting political power from political bosses, the broad agreement 
that animated early twentieth century party reform had much in common with the 
mid-century Democratic Party reformers. That reform tradition, which was also 
noted by Kirkpatrick, can also be found today. However, unlike the earlier skirmishes 
over party reform, the relative lack of sympathy for the reform movement among 
party participants I interviewed suggests that it is much less relevant for 
contemporary participants’ identities. 
In one of the localities I conducted interviews and participant observation, some 
participants were involved in the Democratic Party local organizations or campaigns, 
and an additional group called the “Progressive Democrats.”53 The Progressive Dems 
were, as I learned quickly, not a chartered organization of the Democratic Party, and 
in fact had rumors of several run-ins with party officials over trademark infringement 
(i.e., using the name ‘Democrats’ in the title of their group without the express 
permission of the Democratic Party). Because the term ‘progressive’ was 
increasingly used to talk about politics on the national scene, I asked participants 
whether they identified themselves as such. While some of these questions elicited 
answers that referred to the policy preferences and branding within the scope of 
conflict with Republicans on the national stage, I quickly learned that it also referred 
to party reformers who identified as ‘progressive’ and came into conflict with 
individuals within the party organizational leadership at all levels. 
 In one local committee, the conflict manifested itself between two local groups, ‘the 
progressives’ and everyone else. In the case where ‘progressive’ was associated with 
this conflict, participants from both groups were very explicit in explaining this 
                                                            
53 The progressive/netroots movement for party reform has also been a feature of Democratic politics 
at the national level, including in the 2008 presidential primaries. However, the concern with this 
movement in terms of curtailing the influence of ‘Washington insiders’ is much more a feature of 
national party politics than what was observed on the state level. As such, I leave the national 




conflict as one about party reform and intra-party democracy. As one participant 
explained it  
There are conflicts between what they call establishment Democrats and 
progressive Democrats. Which in many ways revolves around how you 
define the term 'progressive.' They way I always used to define the word 
progressive, was basically it being the same as liberal… meaning, on social 
issues like against the death penalty, pro choice. On economic issues having 
a fair distribution, or fairer distribution of wealth. Progressive income tax… 
The Progressive Democrats have somewhat usurped the term progressive to 
mean something which is focused on process. Outsiders, new people is good 
[sic], people who have been involved before and insiders is bad, and if you 
want to change things, you're progressive. Even though, on 90% of the 
issues the so called I'll say liberals, have the same positions as progressives 
on issues. They still want to throw out the liberals because they're not new.  
While this participant did not define himself as a progressive reformer, he succinctly 
identified the different meanings and dimensions of ‘progressive,’ and how it was 
used locally as a term to identify those participants who were reform minded and 
wanted to bring in new participants via intra-party democracy. Another participant I 
interviewed, who identified himself as one of the leaders of the progressive group in 
that area had a similar description of what the progressive movement, locally, was 
about. He similarly identified progressive as being about process and wanting to 
bring new people in, and the conflict with the ‘establishment progressives’ despite 
issue agreements. In fact, he described an ‘Internal Divisions’ committee that was 
appointed to bring together the ‘establishment progressives’ and ‘reform 
progressives’ to find common ground. The result, he said, was that everyone found 
they agreed on everything except the Mass Scorecard. 
The Scorecard was a system of rating legislators by how closely they voted with the 
party platform on legislation – essentially, measuring legislators according to how in 
line they were with the party platform. The sponsors’ reasoning behind the Scorecard 
is that it will hold legislators accountable to their own party, and therefore make the 
party more internally democratic and accountable - which is largely the same kind of 
argument put forth by the Populists a century earlier. However, because the party 
platform is largely a symbolic document for rallying the party and left to the 
volunteer participants to create with little input from legislators, there is more 
variation among legislators policy preferences than there is in the policy statements 
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of the party platform. In the two previous issue conventions (held in off-years), the 
Mass Scorecard failed to pass and become part of the party’s charter and rules.  
Despite this report of it being the only area of disagreement, other conflicts erupted 
and were observed, mostly manifested in meetings regarding changing local city 
committee rules and regulations. These were essentially struggles for political power 
within the party city committee. However, even when the conflict manifested itself 
several times, it only included the same people every time and did not draw other 
participants in. 
Thus while conflict over reform in terms of internal democracy was not absent, there 
is little evidence that it ever gained traction as an issue by which most participants I 
interviewed defined themselves. The majority of participants I asked about what 
progressive is or was either defined it in Democratic-versus-Republican terms, or 
were averse to identifying themselves as part of or against the reform-progressive 
identity. For instance, one participant who was familiar with the localized conflict, 
when asked whether she identified with the progressive or establishment side, 
sarcastically said “God that's not a totally charged question from the City Committee. 
I'd love to know people's answers to that one. I'd say both, I mean I don't really care.” 
Similarly, another participant who spoke of the conflict deflected answering the 
question, simply stating “I don’t like labels.”  
In this sense, it would appear that participants now are engaged in a qualitatively 
different kind of relationship with party reform. Partly this may be because the issue 
was largely solved by the McGovern-Fraser reforms which opened up the parties 
nationally and on a state level to new participants (women, youth, and minorities) 
and the nomination process to voters. In any case, hostility toward the party 
organization and/or movement to reform it at the state level did not feature strongly 
in the accounts of the majority of participants. The few who were primarily 






Finally, as discussed in chapter four, organizers and volunteers both developed a 
‘tacit’ knowledge about doing field work that Brante (1990) associates with 
professionals. It seems clear that this practice-based knowledge is, at least in the case 
of field work, not exclusive to participants who are solely engaged in full-time 
organizing work, but instead shared by all participants. In this case, then, ‘expertise’ 
characterizes volunteer and organizer participants alike.  
Table 7.2 summarizes the key characteristics of volunteers and organizers. 
Volunteers were usually part time and usually not paid, whilst organizers were 
usually paid and full time. In part because they spent more time on campaigns, more 
organizers reported being emotionally involved, or dealing with close emotional 
engagement with their work. Both volunteers and organizers expressed a mix of 
reasons, gratifications and meanings from participating, though volunteers were more 
likely to express beliefs and organizers more likely to express purposive reasons 
(working on something they can make a difference on). Organizers were also more 
likely to mention first getting involved as part of a career path, and thus material 
reasons were more salient at that stage compared to volunteers. The current party 
conflict engaged neither a great number of volunteers or organizers. Finally, both 
volunteers and organizers developed a kind of expert practice knowledge through 
participation, though some organizers also discussed doing participation well in with 
reference to scientific knowledge. In this configuration, everyone is an expert at 
something – managing a database, cutting a list, or talking to their next door 
neighbor. Expertise, while taking different forms for organizers and other campaign 
staff, applies to organizers and volunteers. It is for this reason that organizers are 






Table 7.2: Key characteristics of volunteers and organizers54 
Characteristic Volunteer Organizer 
Full-time/part-time Part-time Full-time 
Paid/unpaid Unpaid Paid 
Motives and meanings Mixed, beliefs  Mixed,  material reasons for 
first involvement  
   
Efficacy Shared ethos of efficacy Shared ethos of efficacy; 
efficacy as gratification 
Party conflict Low relevance Low relevance 




How do these results compare with the profiles of amateurs and professionals? First, 
some of the characteristics would be predicted from previous studies; the fact 
participants expressing a variety of reasons for involvement is familiar, as is the 
focus on being able to make a difference and doing a job well among the organizers. 
Familiar, too, is the ‘tacit knowledge’ that Brante discusses – though this was 
previously only applied to professionals, where here there is a strong case for it 
applying to all participants. Only the greater emotional involvement organizers 
compared to volunteers is truly surprising, given the characterization of professionals 
as more independent and removed from their work. 
This may also have important implications for thinking about the long-term 
sustainability of full time, high intensity participation. What happens to organizers 
after three or four campaign cycles? Do they eventually transition into less 
demanding forms of participation, or do they drop out all together? Among the 
participants I interviewed, I did find those who were currently involved in the intense 
mode of staff organizers, as well as ones who had that experience and had moved on 
to other, more senior roles – as informal advisors, as elected officials, or as staff 
members of non-party political organizations or non-profits. In this latter role 
participants were obviously not directly employed in the narrow sense of being in 
politics, but circulated among a similar group of participants, and stayed in a network 
                                                            
54 Characteristics only relevant to one group shown in italics 
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of colleagues and fellow former organizers and staffers. Finally, I did speak with two 
participants who had been full time staff members, and were now involved on a 
volunteer basis.  
What this leaves unanswered is what happens to those participants who were 
involved intensely, but have since dropped out. In other words, it is impossible to tell 
from this study what proportion of participants stay on after an intense period, and 
what proportion stops participating altogether. In Fisher’s account of grassroots 
canvassers and employees from the 2004 election cycle, only a small proportion of 
participants who were involved in 2004 were still working in the PIRGs in 2005. It is 
a fairly damning retention rate, and as she rightly points out, raises questions about 
what the implications are for democracy if participants stop being involved in politics 
altogether. In order to really address the question of what the long-term impact is on 
individuals who previously participated as field work organizers (or any professional 
role), longitudinal studies will be necessary in the future to determine what the 
impact of such a kind of participation is on individuals. 
In the end, perhaps the most important difference between the volunteers and 
organizers studied here and the amateur and professional profiles is the most obvious. 
The volunteers and organizers interviewed are doing the same kind of work: field 
work. The crucial difference in the transition from the mass party to the service party, 
for Aldrich, was also part and parcel of the changes in what was being done by 
whom. Amateurs (and the machine politics participants before them) worked to get 
the vote out, talk to friends and neighbors, and organize party events for the 
community. Professionals made ads for radio or television and helped candidates 
through polling or other specialist services. In hindsight, one can reasonably imagine 
that the paths of professionals and amateurs would rarely cross, if at all. Organizers 
and volunteers, on the other hand, work in the same division of the campaign, 
towards the same goals of contacting, convincing, and turning out votes, contacted 
each other on the phone, and attended the same events. To be sure, participants did 
not describe these interactions as conflict free, and there were differences over 
tactics, understandings of what was happening or what was important. But organizers 
and volunteers all tried to pull in the same direction.  
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This difference speaks to what is probably a new model of party organization. In this 
new model, full time staff organizers and part time volunteers work in the same 
organizations and in the same divisions. Profiles of participants based on professional 
or amateur status can no longer neatly be linked with one model of party organization 
or another; instead a new model is needed. Katz and Mair’s original article focused 
on more than just personnel, of course, and the other areas they outline which are not 
studied here – finance, links to the state, etc – are critical for a fuller understanding of 
whether a new party organization model is emerging in the US. The research here is 
all on field work, but developments in other aspects of campaigning such as finance 
and communication – such as the developments apparent in the 2004 campaign, 
when Howard Dean used the internet to organize, communicate, and raise money 
from volunteers – suggest that the combination of professional staff combined with 
volunteer participation is the new way in which campaign divisions will work. For 
this new combination of workers, expertise may be redefined not as book knowledge 
or professionalism in the classic sense, but be based on more of the practice 
knowledge discussed here.  
The combination of professional organizers and expert volunteers also has important 
implications for the role that parties play in civic and political life. Part of the reason, 
perhaps, that professionals are associated with civic ills is not so much because they 
replace volunteers in the same jobs, but that they do different jobs in a different kind 
of organizational model. When Henrik Bang wrote that part of the problem was the 
professionalization of political participation, he was referring to the “the interlocking 
of media and NGOs with government, politicians and administrators in the new 
discursive arenas of governance networks operating within and beyond the state,” 
(2004: 6); when Crenson and Ginsberg decried and Skocpol warned about the rise of 
checkbook politics and professional managers what really the problem was the re-
organization of interest groups and civic organizations (Crenson and Ginsberg 2002; 
Skocpol 2003). In other words, people doing things on a full time or professional 
basis is not the problem per se, it is this fact in a broader re-organization which is 
troubling for civic engagement. But in the case of organizers and volunteers in field 
work illustrates that there is nothing inherent in full-time or professional practice of 





are combined with other roles and participants in the broader organization that 
matters. 
Finally, studying both full-time and part-time participation in the same activity 
and/or organization together may be a fruitful line of enquiry for future studies. First, 
if the combination of volunteers and full-time organizers in field work is increasingly 
becoming true in other kinds of political participation, such as in civic groups, 
lobbying groups, or even other divisions of campaigns (like finance and 
communications), then there will be more aspects of the relationship between the two 
groups which may be worthy of study. Do professionals and volunteers find 
themselves in conflict, and under what circumstances? Are there similar issues of 
translation between the two groups, or are the ways of knowing more fixed in other 
instances? If not, why is that the case? What are the power dynamics between the two 
groups? 
Second, what previously appeared to be a characteristic or dimension of political 
participation may in fact be true for professional or full time participation usually not 
considered because it in some way does not ‘count’ as political participation. As 
Nickerson shows in his comparison of volunteer and paid phone banks for GOTV, it 
is not the voluntary or non-voluntary basis of the phone banks that determines 
success, but how well trained each group is and how much pressure phone bankers 
are put under to produce a certain volume of calls (2007). To paraphrase Nickerson, 
it is the quality of the phone bank that is key. Similarly, the results here regarding 
how participants think about efficacy problematizes the assumption that being 
effective is exclusively possible for professionals. Rather, in the future it may be 
worth continuing to as how participants in all roles can be effective, and under what 
circumstances. What is it about doing something full time that makes participants 
think they are more effective – is it greater influence over one’s own workplace and 
the ability to set goals? Is it simply the greater number of hours worked? Studying 
more kinds of participation can lead to a greater understanding of political 
participation overall.   
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to and support a broader research agenda regarding 
political participation. Instead of working with a thin rational choice model of 
participation in collective political action, I present an alternative conception of 
political participation. By asking about participation in the ways that have been done 
here, I argue that participation is not just individual, organizationally structured, 
innate, instrumental and abstract, but collective, networked, learned, meaningful, 
productive and contextually situated. In this chapter I elaborate on each of these 
dimensions by summarizing the analysis in the preceding chapters and linking the 
findings with the contrasting conceptions of participation. I sketch out how these 
contributions relate to the themes introduced in the first chapter regarding the gap 
between research on civic and political participation, the issue of party organizational 
transformation, and the problems with rational choice, as well as potential areas of 
future research. I finish by reflecting on the research methods and the contribution 
this thesis makes to interpretative studies in political and social research.  
 
Summary of Key Findings 
Participation is not just individual and organizationally structured but 
collective and networked  
As Jane Mansbridge sums up so well, one of the major limitations of rational choice 
theory is that it assumes people are atomistic individuals (Mansbridge 1995). The 
problem is that this creates a conceptual blind spot for recognizing how human 
activity can be fundamentally and irreducibly social, related, and intersubjective. In 
this sense, political participation is often conceptualized as an endeavor that is 
rational, goal oriented, and irreducibly individual. A similar conception of 
organizations is used in the study of parties and political participation as well. 
Participation is usually studied with respect to participation in just one organization, 
where the organization is defined by either its structure or function. 
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In chapter three, I present an alternative which emphasizes how participation is a 
collective endeavor undertaken by a community of people that share norms, ideas, 
practices, and ways of doing things, and therefore also presents an alternative image 
of the organizations in which participation takes place. The chapter starts with the 
question of how participants got involved in campaign participation. Rather than 
treating this as primarily one about why people get involved in politics and the 
motivations for doing so, asking about how people get involved in politics provides 
the opportunity to ask about how participants experience organization through their 
own accounts of getting involved. Looking at the answers participants gave to the 
question ‘how did you first get involved?’ some common antecedents and similarities 
are highlighted. First, as would be expected from previous research, most participants 
described becoming socialized into their political views and growing political 
awareness, especially from experiences within families, within an extended network 
of friends and neighbors, or through school curriculum. Their first collective action 
participation was most often in a campaign, as either a volunteer or staff member. 
Campaigns organize divisions according to the tasks they do: media, research, 
fundraising, candidate support, and field work. It is the last of these divisions which 
is relevant for the thesis. Within field work, three roles are identified: that of 
organizer, volunteer, and informal advisor. Organizers tend to be staff and based in 
the campaign office, while volunteers tend to be based in the neighborhood or 
community in which they do field work, and informal advisors work with campaign 
organizers but tend to not be based in the campaign office.  
Beyond practicing grassroots politics in these campaign roles, participants also (often 
later) joined party organizations, including town and ward committees, the state 
committee, or regional Democratic Party groups. They were also, as a group, often 
involved in other political organizations and civic organizations, revealing 
participation spread across a number of organizations. There were some differences 
by role in terms of these involvements, with organizers less likely to be involved in 
more than one campaign at a time and more likely to report the importance of school-
based influences compared to volunteers. Moreover, while many organizers started 
off as volunteers, starting off as an organizer and then working as a volunteer was 




Participation is learned 
If starting participation involves not just beginning to do certain activities but joining 
a group with habits, norms, and ways of doing things, then participation also involves 
learning these habits, norms, and ways of doing things. However, this process is 
undertheorized. While the literature on socialization does hint at a process of 
becoming, most of the research has focused on the acquisition of attitudes and 
behaviors, especially in the literature on party activism. In chapter four, I present an 
account of learning to campaign and becoming a ‘good’ canvasser.  Drawing from 
work on learning in organizational studies, I discuss how participants learn, the skills 
they develop, and the ways of knowing present in field work. By and large 
participants report learning on the job and from actually doing field work. Organizers 
in particular described doing an internship that is akin to the concept of legitimate 
peripheral participation. While some participants did undertake formal training, most 
did not find it useful as it only taught skills, and not the application of skills in 
context which is what participants need to know in order to do field work. This 
learning process was tacit and taken for granted to the extent that participants did 
usually articulate a process of learning, rather they saw what they did as just the way 
of doing things. Yet they also developed specific skills for doing field work, and 
were able to articulate these. Doing field work well involved having good people 
skills, a strong work ethic, organizational skills, and knowing about the local 
community and political scene in the communities which they were canvassing. This 
latter knowledge involved not just knowing the local political customs, but having a 
sense of the patterns of everyday life in a given place as well as knowing who the 
local ‘opinion leaders’ were in a community. This knowledge can be understood as a 
sub-variation of ‘local’ knowledge in that it is specific to a geographically bounded 
community and practices, and cannot be directly used in other communities. 
This learning and doing also reflects different ways of knowing how to do field work. 
Overall, the practices of both field work volunteers and organizers are similar to the 
‘local knowledge’ and situated learning. The knowing and process is tacit, and 
learning is as often as not kinesthetic in addition to being cognitive and analytical. 
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Although ‘scientific’ knowledge would seem to be less important for the practice of 
participation which is largely based on experiential learning, in some cases the 
language and descriptions of field work by organizers in particular was similar to a 
rational-scientific approach.  
The lists that canvassers use are an organizational product in that they require the 
input of participants in multiple roles. No one participant is ever making ‘the’ list but 
together campaign field work organizations produce lists. In this sense they are also 
repositories of collective learning and knowing. Lists are also boundary objects, and 
the way in which participants in different roles interact with the list also reveals the 
different kinds of knowing that are involved. For a volunteer, an account may be rich 
with detail, shared history, and experiences with specific voters; for organizers the 
list is a compilation of names, phone numbers, addresses, and voter ID intentions. 
The former resembles local ways of knowing in that they are contextualized and are 
not relevant or applicable to voters in other contexts, while the latter is more like 
‘scientific’ knowledge in that it is decontextualized, essentialized, and aggregated, 
lacking the contextual specificity but preferencing a similar generalized kind of 
knowing. In one sense the any one given voter file contains the same information, but 
it involves a different kind of knowing for actors in different roles. The difference 
between the two kinds of knowing is not just of type but of scale.  
The implications of the findings from this chapter are relevant for two distinct fields 
of academic enquiry. First, collective learning and knowing are an important 
dimension of the practice of participation. These practices are still largely learned by 
doing, rather than learned through academic studying. To some extent, then, the 
tensions or problems which can arise through the preferencing of scientific 
knowledge over local knowledge are less applicable to field work participants, all of 
whom are involved in situated learning. However, this by no means will always be 
the case. Already there are two graduate programs in management for political 
campaigning, which include covering field work. Moreover, organizers are more 
likely than volunteers to use rational-scientific language to discuss doing field work 
well. Will field work practice continue to trend in the direction of rational-scientific 
knowledge for management practices local ways of knowing for volunteering? While 
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there are good reasons to be skeptical, there is also one additional reason to think that 
there will always be a place for local knowing, especially with respect to knowing 
particular communities, in field work. Because knowing a community is important 
for doing field work well, those campaign field work divisions which overlook this 
kind of knowing and relating to voters do so at the risk of losing the opportunity to 
do their work better. The way in which field work continues to develop is open to a 
number of possibilities. 
Second, the discussion in this chapter and especially using the voter ID list as an 
organizational artifact provides the opportunity to theorize about the relationship 
between scientific and local ways of knowing. The translation of knowing from local 
to scientific involves essentializing and decontextualizing. While the practice of 
preferencing of scientific knowledge over local kinds can lead to misunderstanding 
or not knowing, on a theoretical level the two are not as far apart. All knowledge, 
including scientific, was at one point learned and known through experience, and 
therefore a local way of knowing. Changing that experiential knowledge into 
academic, general, and rational knowledge is both a process of distillation and 
transformation. Moving back and forth between the two requires translation, both 
between members of different communities of practice and members within one 
community but working in different traditions and ways of knowing. This applies 
whether the communities in question are practitioners, practitioners in different roles, 
academics and practitioners, or academics in different research traditions. 
 
Participation is not just instrumental but also meaningful and productive 
Of the several components of rational choice theory that frame the study of 
participation, three are crucial for framing motivation for action. First, as discussed 
above, rational choice foregrounds people as individuals, which can have the effect 
of missing that which is not exclusively individual – e.g., intersubjective meanings 
and motives. Second, the distinction between what counts as civic and what counts as 
political is difficult to sustain consistently across research in different contexts. By 
separating ‘political’ reasons from ‘civic’ ones, this conception creates two 
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categories that are less than the sum of their parts in terms of their explanatory value. 
Third, conceptualizing effectiveness has always been problematic because the 
assumption of rational choice theory is that any one person’s contribution to 
achieving collective outcomes is so small as to be insignificant. Yet at the same time 
many people report making a difference as one of the reasons for their participation. 
Theoretically, then, researchers should disregard such reports as actually having any 
relation to the actual participation and course of events, and instead treated as a 
figment of a participant’s psychology. These theoretical problems further translate 
into a problem of concept validity in empirical research on participation in collective 
action. While most researchers work from the same set of original texts (namely, the 
solidary/purposive/material categories), in application they deal with the problems of 
context, civic and political differences, and efficacy in different ways. This means 
that though each particular way of categorizing participation may be internally 
coherent, when viewed across different research studies the specific reasons 
contribute to different concepts or categories of why individuals participate, 
undermining the validity of those concepts.  
In chapter five I present an alternative approach to understanding and studying 
motives and meaning. I take a bottom-up approach to dealing with specific reasons 
participants report and how these fit into categories. Using open-ended questions 
from the semi-structured interviews, I looked at the answers that participants gave as 
the rewards and reasons for their participation. These reasons were then clustered 
together into similar categories. These categories are loosely based on the incentives 
system but are conceptually different in the way that they approach the main 
problems outlined above. First, by clustering reasons which were relatively abstract 
together and reasons that were fairly concrete together, it was possible to distinguish 
between those reasons for participation relating the actually ‘make a difference’ with 
the broader beliefs about why participation mattered. These ‘concrete’ purposive 
reasons are different from the purposive categories used in other studies. Second, 
looking at the more abstract reasons as a group addressed the issues of separating 
individuals from contexts and civic from political ends. The blind spot in rational 
choice-based categories that is a result of the focus on instrumentalism misses these 
beliefs, because they are constructed intersubjectively and are collective in important 
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ways. Further, the difficult way in which rational choice theory treats effects on 
outcomes overlooks the ways in which participants do attempt to make a difference 
and think about their actions in strategic ways. By separating out concrete purposive 
goals from beliefs, the categories here throw both the meaningful and the (learned) 
ways of acting towards specific ends into clearer relief. 
Rational choice theory has also been important for traditional conceptions of how 
political participants relate to both voters and party elites. In chapter seven I discuss 
what participation in campaigns produces and how this links to the concerns about 
uncoupling between ‘lay’ citizens and elites. ‘Linkage’ is traditionally conceived as 
one of the key functions that parties fulfill in a democracy. It is often researched in a 
rational choice framework and conceptualized along the lines of an exchange 
mechanism in which citizens trade influence over the policy making decisions of 
elites for their votes. Crucially, this conception puts participants in essentially the 
same framework as voters – that is, both are concerned with influencing policies and 
elite actors. The only difference is that participants have more resources (time and 
money) with which to bargain. This leads to questions about the undue influence of 
participants with different policy preferences from voters over the candidate selection 
and policy promotion process. While articulating a concept of linkage, this rational 
choice based model is relatively thin. 
In contrast, I argue that participation is productive of a conceptually different ‘thick’ 
linkage in which participants are not just the same as voters but mediate at the 
boundaries of campaign organizations and in the spaces between the circles of elite 
political agents and less engaged citizens. This conception of producing thick linkage 
is drawn from the accounts of how to do participation well and includes participants’ 
acts of endorsing candidates to fellow citizens and voters, representing the candidate 
in social contexts, and translating an abstract person, realm, and (sometimes) set of 
policy proposals into concrete, immediate, and understandable terms for other voters. 
All of this is still oriented towards getting votes, but in the process it is productive of 
a kind of trust between voters and canvassers. This trust is distinct from the concept 
of social capital, which emphasizes the relations only between citizens and leaves the 
role of the state and the political realm abstract and different. In contrast, it is the 
211 
 
connecting of civic and political worlds, and the translation of politics from abstract 
otherness to everyday sensibilities which makes translating, representing and 
endorsing important. 
Such trust is not always built in every single canvassing interaction and situation. 
The disparaging terms that are attached to astroturfing and ‘buying’ votes through 
hired field work or non-localized campaigns is a recognition by participants that it is 
very possible to have campaign field work without it being grassroots, and a 
reminder of the relative fragility of such bonds created through canvassing.  
 
Participation is not abstract but situated 
Weber’s distinction between those who for whom politics as vocation and those for 
whom it is an avocation is often used as a starting point in studies of participation. 
While ostensibly about the characteristics of the individuals who participate in 
politics, the way these distinctions are built into profiles of participants of ‘amateurs’ 
or ‘professionals’ is inextricably linked from the model of organization in which 
people participate. In this sense, while amateurs and professionals may at first appear 
to be abstracted ideal types, I argue that they can only be understood along with a 
sense of the organization in which participants work. In chapter seven, I review some 
of the literature on amateur and professional typologies of political activists and the 
relationship between these profiles and models of party organizations. I then go on to 
present a comparison of the characteristics of the organizers and volunteers discussed 
throughout the previous chapters. 
Organizers do participate on a more full time basis compared to volunteers, and this 
in turn produces a qualitatively different experience with a campaign than for the 
volunteers. For campaign organizers, the intensity and long working hours of the 
campaign created what some described as potential problems in maintaining an 
emotional separation from their work and the outcome. Rather than independence 
characterizing their work, then, their experiences were characterized by a stronger 
emotional intensity compared to volunteers.   
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Apart from the emotional intensity, organizers reported the same reasons and 
meanings relating to their participation as volunteers. The differences are in how 
often different reasons were given by participants in different roles; organizers were 
much more likely to cite the concrete satisfactions, especially making a difference, 
compared to volunteers. In this sense the differences in terms of efficacy are along 
the lines of what would be predicted from previous research, in that efficacy was 
more of a defining characteristic for organizers than volunteers. However, efficacy 
also operates as a group norm amongst all participants, as evidenced by descriptions 
of how volunteers as well as organizers are oriented towards making the ‘best use’ of 
their time. Thus while organizers are more likely to report gratification, and probably 
have more opportunity to make a difference, there was an ethos of efficacy for all 
participants as well. 
In terms of party attitudes, it appears that party reform is much less of a salient issue 
than it appears in previous research on participation – partially, it would seem, 
because major party reforms have already taken place. Although increasing internal 
democracy (especially among those who self-identified as progressive) was 
important to some volunteers, the majority of participants interviewed were not 
concerned with internal democratic reforms. This highlights the possibility that 
attitudes towards party reform are not a static characteristic of a participant’s own 
psyche, but are linked to the present political context and stage of party development.  
Taken altogether, these findings relate back to the themes introduced in the first 
chapter, providing good reason to think that the links between ‘political’ and ‘civic’ 
engagement are much closer, and close in multiple ways, than previous studies would 
suggest. They also indicate that the Democratic Party underwent a period of 
transition again during the 2004 and 2006 elections. Finally, the findings contribute 
to non-rational choice ways of envisioning, describing, and conceptualizing 






The civic-political gap 
In chapter one, I linked the separate development of research on political parties and 
civic organizations to, in the US case, a rise of anti-party sentiment and the 
development of the progressive movement in the early twentieth century. While 
Putnam and others have envisions civic participation and organizations as an 
apolitical phenomenon, Clemens, Skocpol and others have noted how the progressive 
organizations were not only engaged in the political sphere, but did so as an explicit 
challenge to the power of machine party politics. Meanwhile, most studies of 
political participation developed with little attention paid to connections with civic 
engagement and, by extension, questions of civic decline. 
The data and analysis presented in this thesis offers an alternative view to both of 
those outlined above. First, as discussed in chapter three, party political participation 
develops from activity in non-party spheres: home, school, and an immediate social 
network. Moreover, participants were on average members of multiple party, 
political, and civic organizations. From an experiential point of view, then, 
participants moved between civic and political participation freely.  
Civic organizations were not loci of political activity per se, but as explored in 
chapter seven civic connections (or the attempt to create them) were a crucial 
component of building trust between voters, campaign workers, and candidates. 
Done well, practicing grassroots participation necessitated a kind of connection 
between campaign workers, voters and party elites that is under-theorized in the party 
literature and brings to the fore the importance of parties for building goods (such as 
trust) associated with a host of democratic and civic ills. The concept of thick linkage 
necessitates further research, and could contribute to research on civic participation 
and health as much as the literature on party politics.  
Finally, this research indicates that research on participation in parties and 
participation in civic engagement could be a fruitful area of cross-pollination. For 
instance, what is often considered the normative implications of professionalized 
participation has less to do with the key characteristics of professional participation 
and more to do with broader trends in how political participation and systems are 
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organized. The problem with participation that Stoker (2006) criticizes is the 
replacement of door-to-door contact by volunteers with advertising run by 
professionals. But this is not about comparing the way that professionals and 
volunteers do work, but rather two different ways of doing campaigns. A better 
comparison would be of participation in the same kind of political work that may be 
of various kinds, i.e. both full time ‘professional’ and volunteer. In short, rather than 
separating the study of parties from the study of civic participation, and then 
subdividing the study of parties into studies of vocation or as an avocation, it could 
be more productive to study different ways of participating (e.g. full-time/part-time) 
when that participation involves the same participatory activities (e.g. field work), 
and then connecting that with broader concerns about civic health. What happens in 
parties may have important implications for questions about civic decline.  
Further, research on parties could equally benefit by addressing some of the same 
issues developed in civic engagement, as well as some of the insights developed on 
‘non-traditional’ participation. As participation in parties continues to transform, 
finding the connections between that participation and participation in other new 
ways could demonstrate common trends or themes. In sum, the gap first noted in 
Democracy at Risk left in the study of civic engagement by the absence of parties 
appears to be a significant one. In this thesis I have attempted to fill one part of that 
gap and in so doing point towards the need for more research in the area. 
 
Participation and the Democratic Party in transition circa 2006 
This thesis started out by contextualizing the concerns about current party and civic 
woes within a broader debate about decline and transformation. At the time that this 
research project started and as evidenced by Democracy at Risk, the decline thesis 
had the weight of a large body of evidence and vocal supporters behind it. Now such 
arguments seem intuitively dated, and there is healthy interest among academics, 
think tanks, and government policymakers in a broader civic revival. How could 
things turn so quickly? 
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First, as discussed throughout the thesis, there were already many scholars, including 
Pippa Norris, Russell Dalton, Theda Skocpol, David Marsh and others who have 
been emphasizing the narrative of change and transformation over decline. So what 
appears ‘new’ in the latter part of the decade may in fact be a broader recognition of 
generational and slow, long-term change. Although it is not a longitudinal study, the 
evidence in this thesis and gathered through research indicates that there are many 
good reasons to think that 2006 marked a period of transition towards more, and 
different, civic and political engagement. Rather than coming from individual 
patterns of participation, however – patterns relayed either by those who have been 
involved over a longer period of time or those who have just started – what appears 
most striking is the investment of organizational infrastructures, norms, practices and 
leadership into the concept that political participation can make a difference and is an 
important component to winning political campaigns. That is, participatory 
organizations are changing as well. Party representatives put together slides 
emphasizing how participants can make a difference. Literature communicates that 
grassroots volunteers are part of the winning strategy. Campaign leaders, field 
organizers, and volunteers alike describe an ethos of efficacy which permeates and 
validates the notion that grassroots participation is an integral part of the campaign. 
This may results in a greater quantity of participation – more people contributing 
more hours – and there are also early signs that this participatory impulse is being 
pushed not just into party organizational structures, but civic initiatives as well. 
Deval Patrick, upon becoming Governor of Massachusetts in 2006, established the 
Office of Civic Engagement in the executive branch; Barack Obama has also (along 
with his wife, Michelle) emphasized civic and community engagement in early 
public appearances during the presidential transition of 2008-2009.  
However, more immediately, the findings discussed here indicate a transition in how 
the Democratic Party is organized. Participant ideal type profiles of being a 
‘professional’ or an ‘amateur’ no longer fit quite so easily; instead volunteers and 
full-time staff work in the same divisions and in some cases do the same work; 
though their experiences in the campaign may be different they are closer than 
previous research would indicate. Where Broder, Kayden and others emphasized the 
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relative marginality of grassroots participation in campaigns previously, the evidence 
here is one of participation which is central to campaign strategies. If Massachusetts 
in 2006 was indeed the tip of the spear, then it would seem that very few campaign 
organizations would exclude substantial grassroots participation in the future. As 
social researchers, this invites further research and reflection on how we might 
conceptualize a political party not solely as a service organization with ‘auxiliary’ 
party activists, but one in which networks of grassroots volunteers are a core 
component. 
There is further reason to be interested in the changes in party organization and how 
participation is practiced, as hinted in chapters six and seven, and that is the question 
of what happens to all participants after their encounters on the campaign. What 
happens to voters – do they engage more, trust more, or maintain their same views, 
ideas, beliefs and activities as before? What of the volunteers who have been in the 
game for a while, and those who have just started? Finally, what about the field 
organizers who are, at least initially, emotionally engaged and wrapped up in their 
campaigns, who learn on the job how to organize, motivate, plan and think about 
their work? The last question is especially important because early news reports 
indicate that a number of candidates for state and local offices in Massachusetts and 
across the country cut their teeth as campaign staff, organizers, and Congressional 
aides (Cooper 2009). If work and personal identities, concepts about trust and 
representation, and norms about campaign organizations are formed through 
practicing everyday participation, it would be fascinating to know how, if at all, these 
translate into ideas and practices of governance. 
 
Rational Choice Reconsidered 
Regarding the concept of rational choice and the findings presented here, there are 
several important conclusions to draw. First, looking at organization from the 
perspective of participants provides an alternative image of organization from the 
instrumental, structural, and functional images provided through the classic texts on 
party organization and rational choice explanations of participation.  Second, viewing 
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organization from the viewpoint of participants foregrounds a lived context which 
takes place in a number of organizations but also is constructed by personal 
networks, contacts, and relationships built up over a period of time. In this sense the 
participatory context is made up of organizations as structural entities but goes 
beyond it as well. Looking at participation from the viewpoint of participants 
foregrounds an image which is best understood as if it were a culture. This image of 
organization foregrounds the intersubjective, collective and shared. It highlights what 
participants construct and what can only be recognized in such spaces: meaning, 
mental models, ways of doing things, tacit assumptions, and norms about the 
activities. Participation is not just an individual activity which takes place in clearly 
defined organizations, but has collective dimensions which are created and shared by 
participants through networks and across numerous campaigns or party entities.  
Third, the reconceptualization of the categories of reasons participants give for their 
activity should have application for other future studies of participation. By using a 
division of reasons which better reflects the different ways in which participants 
think about the meaning of their participation, the concepts are more robust, 
particularly when trying to explain notions of efficacy and the role of beliefs about 
the good life, in which civic and political ideas are difficult to separate. This should 
lead to a greater ability to compare and contrast the reasons that participants give in a 
variety of participatory modes and contexts. 
More broadly, in this thesis I present the idea of participation as collective, 
networked, learned, meaningful, productive and contextually situated. Taken together 
this is a way of thinking about participation which does not fit in the rational choice 
framework, but may have more in common with work developed in other social 
science fields. The wealth of research on practice in organizational studies, and Carol 
Pateman’s work on gender and participation have been touched on only briefly in the 
previous chapters, but points towards the need for a broader and more coherent 
development of a concept of political participation which does not just highlight the 
flaws in rational choice theory, but presents a viable alternative. I have attempted to 
add to the discussion about what such an alternative could be, drawing on the insights 
gained in interpretive research and in other social science fields. Clearly, more work 
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needs to be done in this vein so that we may understand participation not just through 
a rational lens, but through cultural, contextual, and practice lenses as well.  
 
Reflections on research design 
In reading over the conclusions and insights drawn in all the chapters, the importance 
of the research design is paramount. In particular, the specifics of the case and the 
adoption of an interpretative approach are important for reflecting on the research 
findings. 
The case for the generalizability of the results from this case was made in chapter 
two. The case of participation in grassroots campaigning in Massachusetts is an 
extreme one in that the extent to which the context of participation is independent of 
and greater than just one campaign or party organization may be stronger here than in 
other places where there are fewer campaigns to get involved in at the grassroots 
level. This plethora of organizations made it easier to identify, articulate, and flesh 
out the concept of a culture and network of participation which extends beyond any 
one organization, but this may not necessarily be the case in other areas. On the other 
hand, the increasing ability of campaigns to reach supporters over a broader 
geographic area through internet-based organizing may mean that this participation 
across multiple campaign organizations is an increasingly common aspect of 
participatory experiences in the future, in which case the ‘unusual’ case here is more 
like the beginning of a broader trend. At the very least, the extent to which the case is 
unusual is well suited to the research aims of generating theory about the context and 
concept of participation.  
There are, of course, limits in the extent to which the specific findings here can be 
translated or generalized to participation in different parts of the US, to different 
parties in the US, and to cross-national comparisons. Where possible, I have used the 
case study to develop theories about participation which may be useful across 
different contexts, so that the important generalization is not to a parent population 
but to the level of theory. The reconceptualization of the categories of reasons which 
participants describe is done specifically with the purpose of comparison of 
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participation in different parties or collective organizations, and the concept of thick 
linkage should similarly highlight the possibility or ways in which political activity 
feeds into problems identified in civic engagement in different actual contexts.  
The use of interpretative methods and approach is important in terms of the way the 
context of participation was accessed and analyzed, and for recognizing and 
understanding the beliefs, learning, and norms which were are all in some way 
collectively constructed and known. In particular, adopting a commitment to 
understanding participants’ experiences from their point of view was important in 
terms of how I conducted my data collection, and, eventually, my conception of what 
it is that participants do when they are participating. As described in chapter two, 
snowballing interviews made a commitment to extending the case beyond a few 
campaign organizations. This changed the way I understood the case. While my 
original assumption was that participation was organizationally bounded, the ways in 
which participants shared contacts revealed more about the structure of personal 
networks and relationships which existed beyond any one organization. The overall 
result was that the extent to which the context of grassroots participation took place 
in a network which extended beyond any one campaign or party organization, and 
therefore was not entirely bounded by them, became much more clear. Had I stuck to 
the commitment of studying participation within only a few organizations, I would 
have probably gained other insights but lost the opportunity to understand and 
explore this extra-organizational context.  
Moreover, recognizing what tied participants together more than just shared 
participation in any one organization or just personal relationships involved 
uncovering and enquiring about how participation is organized as a culture. This 
foregrounded the role and importance of shared beliefs, organizational learning, and 
norms – particularly about efficacy – for participation. For instance, the interpretative 
approach used in the chapter looking at motivations provided theoretical and 
analytical tools which did not suffer from the same shortcomings as the research 
done in traditions which emphasized people as individuals and in no relation to their 
context. Where incentives systems and rational choice downplays or misses 





to address them. Additionally, attention to organizational learning and knowing is 
non-existent in studies of participation. Yet doing participation does not come out of 
nowhere. Taking an interpretative approach to learning provides the intellectual 
resources and grounding for studying learning, and in this respect uncovers a 
previously overlooked dimension of political participation. In this sense, an 
interpretative approach is part and parcel of the research questions, methods, process 
and answers. 
Participation involves doing things – talking with neighbors and friends, meeting 
other participants, convincing voters. By focusing on participation as practice, this 
thesis also contributes to the growing number of interpretative studies which look at 
politics and policy as an everyday phenomenon. This shift in emphasis foregrounds 
the meanings and multiple social worlds that actors bring with them and develop in 
the practice of politics, problematizes neat relationships between ‘political’ on the 
one hand and ‘social’ on the other. It breaks down the distinction between elite and 
lay, or between ordinary citizens and leaders, showing how citizens and lay people 
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Appendix 1: Massachusetts Data 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS  
Population, 2006 6.4 million 
Population change, 2000 – 2006  1.4% 
Non-hispanic white residents 80.0% 
Hispanic residents 7.9% 
Black residents 6.9% 
Asian residents 4.9% 
Native American/other residents 1.8% 
Foreign-born residents 12.2% 
High school graduates 84.8% 
College (B.A.) or higher graduates 33.2% 
 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS  
Median Household Income $54,417 (19% above national average) 
Job growth, 2001-2006 45th out of 50 states 
Jobs in Education and Health Sector 18.4% 
Jobs in Trade, Transport, and Utilities 
Sector 
17.6% 






















1. How did you first get involved in politics?  
 
CAMPAIGNS 
2. How did you first get involved in this campaign? 
3. Tell me a little bit about your candidate 
4. Why did you pick field/delegate work? 
5. Describe your duties with this campaign (repeat for each campaign involved in): 
o Hours per week/ or month 
o Training(s) – any institutes, degrees, retreat weekend, just experience? 
o Paid or unpaid 
o Are there other organizations you work with regularly?  







6. What do you think is the dominant issue on this race? 
7. Is there any issue in particular that’s really important to you, personally, in this race? 
 
8. In general, what is the single most important component of the whole apparatchik for 
winning this campaign? 
9. What does it take to be good in field work?  
10. What’s the function of fieldwork – why does it matter? 
11. What do you do differently now that you have experience in field work? 
 








13. When you first started on this race, did you have any particular goals in mind? 
Something that you wanted to get out of this experience? 
 




15. Most rewarding part of your time here? Least rewarding? 
 
16. One of the things people often talk about with Democrats is the fact that we have a 
big tent. Is that a conception that works for you, when you think about the DP? 
a. Advantages to that? 
b. Disadvantages? 
 





1. Are there any political groups you’re involved with outside the campaign? 
o What purpose 
o Why that group 
o How they first got involved 
 
2. Have you ever attended a meeting of the Democratic Party or one of its committees? 
Yes/no – follow up 
o Which committees? 
o How often? 
 
3. Political groups donated money to? 
 
4. Would you describe yourself as someone who works for the Democratic nominee 
every year no matter who the candidate is, or you’ve worked some but not others? 
(and why) 
 
5. Why get involved in both, or just one? 
6. Is there any crossover between the multiple groups, in terms of membership? 
7. Crossover of purpose? 
 
NON-POLITICAL CIVIC ACTIVITY 
8. Are there any non-political civic groups you’re involved in? 
o School committee, parents group, church, Amnesty International, Elks, etc. 











10. Are there other charities you’ve donated money to in the past year? 
o Which 
11. Rank the organizations in order of personal importance to you. Both today and long 
term. 
 
12. Would you ever want to see the non-political purposes or causes addressed in the 
political arena? 
 
13. At the end of the day, why stay involved? What’s it [participation] mean to you? 
 
 
Finally, if you’re interested in receiving the results and copies of any published material from 
this research, please provide your mailing address and email address below. Your information 
(including all answers) will be kept confidential and all information will not be shared with 
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Clark and Wilson 
1961 original 
Clark and Wilson 
1961 Wilson 1962 
Olson 1965; May 
1973 Olson 1965 
Olson 1965, Muller and 
Opp 1986 
I want the chance 
to further my job or 
career Personal Career Material 
Other personal 
reasons Selective material Selective Outcomes - selective material 
Campaigns are 
exciting Social   Social Social Process 
non-
allocatable selective psychological 
Chance to be with 
people I enjoy/ 
friendships Social Social Social Social Process - selective social 
Chance to influence 
policy Policy-oriented Purposive  Ideological 
Collective 
outcomes Collective Benefits ideological instrumental PG 
Duty as a citizen/ 
civic responsibility Partisanship [-] Other Impersonal  
Civic 
gratifications Altrustic cultural instrumental PG 
Politics is part of 
my way of life Partisanship   
Other personal 
reasons [-] 59 [-] [-] [-] 
Attached to party  Partisanship [-] Other Impersonal  [-] Expressive 
non-
allocatable party attachment 
                                                            
58 See also Dodson 1990, Costatini and Valenti 1996, Costatini and King 1983 utilizing same framework 
59 But note: VSB include the category of “I do my share,” which may the closest equivalent and it considered a selective civic gratification 
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